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RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse vise à explorer le rôle et l’impact de la collaboration au niveau des activités liées à 
la protection de la propriété intellectuelle par le biais de brevets sur la « qualité » de ces derniers 
dans les domaines de la biotechnologie et de la nanotechnologie au Québec. Nous examinons ici 
plusieurs mesures ou proxy normalement associés à la « qualité » des brevets. La thèse vise à 
répondre à la question suivante : Existe-t-il des associations possibles entre les attributs de la 
collaboration université/industrie et la qualité d’un brevet? Le réseau de collaboration regroupe 
des scientifiques œuvrant au sein des universités et des industries (Motohashi & Muramatsu, 
2012). De plus, la propriété de brevets d’origine “universitaire” par les entreprises est souvent 
considérée comme l’un des canaux essentiels des liens université-industrie (Bray & Lee, 2000; 
Bulut & Moschini, 2009; Y. Wang, Hu, Li, Li, & Li, 2015; Y. Wang, Huang, Chen, Pan, & 
Chen, 2013; Y. Wang, Pan, Chen, & Gu, 2013). Selon des études exploratoires antécédentes en 
matière de brevets et de propriété intellectuelle, on recense relativement peu d’articles portant sur 
l’impact des réseaux de collaboration sur les activités de brevetage et sur la « qualité » des 
brevets au Canada. Dans cette thèse, nous examinons l’impact de ces réseaux, représentés par les 
liens entre des inventeurs et détenteurs de brevets avec les universités et les entreprises. Des 
facteurs tels le financement, le nombre d’années d’expérience de l’inventeur, les caractéristiques 
des réseaux de co-invention et de co-publication sont considérés afin d’estimer la « qualité » des 
brevets issus de la collaboration université/industrie au Canada. Sterzi (2013) a constaté que les 
brevets universitaires appartenant à des entreprises sont d’une qualité supérieure lorsqu’ils sont 
initialement assignés aux universités. Cette thèse vise donc aussi à mesurer l’impact des divers 
types de cessionnaires de brevets sur la « qualité » de ceux-ci, tout en considérant les liens 
université-entreprise.  
Nos travaux ont étudié la « qualité » des brevets générés par les inventeurs universitaires au 
Canada et qui ont été assignés à une université ou au gouvernement et les ont comparés à la 
qualité des brevets détenus uniquement par l’industrie. La première question que cette thèse 
aborde est la suivante: les brevets qui sont générés par au moins un inventeur issu du milieu 
universitaire (résidant au Canada) et assignés à une université sont-ils d’une « qualité » moindre 
que ceux appartenant seulement à une entreprise? Également, en considérant le rôle du 
gouvernement en tant qu’entité du secteur public, nous posons la seconde question suivante : les 
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brevets qui sont générés par au moins un inventeur issu du milieu universitaire (résidant au 
Canada) et assignés au gouvernement sont-ils d’une « qualité » moindre que ceux appartenant 
seulement à une entreprise? Nous posons également des questions similaires afin de mesurer 
l’impact des cessionnaires gouvernementaux et universitaires sur la « qualité » des brevets, afin 
de comparer les impacts des cessionnaires publics par rapport aux cessionnaires industriels sur la 
« qualité » de l’invention. 
En outre, cette thèse cherche à expliquer comment les caractéristiques spécifiques des 
inventeurs influencent la qualité des brevets issus de la collaboration université/industrie. Par 
conséquent, cette thèse vise également à répondre à la question suivante : comment les 
caractéristiques des chercheurs affectent leur capacité à générer des brevets de meilleure 
« qualité »? Des variables telles que le nombre d’années d’expérience et la collaboration avec de 
prestigieux inventeurs détendeurs de brevets sont considérées. De plus, nous avons observé 
l’impact des caractéristiques du réseau de co-invention et de co-publication sur la « qualité » des 
brevets. Nous avons donc mesuré si les brevets générés par les inventeurs situés dans des réseaux 
de co-inventeurs ou de co-auteurs très centraux sont d’une « qualité » supérieure à celle des 
brevets générés par les inventeurs moins centraux. En outre, cette recherche vise à déterminer si 
les brevets issus d’une combinaison brevet-article ou d’une combinaison brevet-subvention sont 
d’une « qualité » supérieure à ceux qui n’ont pas de telles combinaisons, soit des articles et 
brevets publiés par les mêmes équipes sur les mêmes thèmes de recherche et objets d’application. 
Pour évaluer l’impact des attributs de la relation université-industrie sur la « qualité » des 
brevets, notre méthodologie consiste en l’estimation de régressions binomiales négatives 
classiques et à zéro-augmenté, Tobit, et à variables instrumentales pour les moindre carrés 
ordinaires (2SLS) afin de prendre en considération l’endogénéité potentielle de nos modèles. Nos 
mesures ou proxy de la « qualité » des brevets comprennent le nombre de citations, le nombre de 
revendications, un indice de type Herfindahl des citations en amont, et un indice de type 
Herfindahl des citations en aval. Ce type d’indice mesure la diversité des documents cités par un 
brevet en particulier et la diversité des brevets qui citent ce brevet.  
Nos résultats montrent que les brevets générés par au moins un inventeur universitaire et 
appartenant au secteur public (gouvernement et université) citent une moins grande diversité de 
documents et sont moins cités que ceux issus du secteur privé (industriels). Nos résultats 
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montrent aussi que les brevets détenus par les institutions publiques sont moins diversifiés que 
les brevets détenus par le secteur privé. Par conséquent, les brevets attribués aux firmes sont 
susceptibles d’avoir obtenu plus de citations que les brevets de sources publiques (Popp, 2006; 
Popp, Santen, Fisher-Vanden, & Webster, 2013). Nos résultats sont cohérents avec les études 
antérieures de Popp (2006) and Popp et al. (2013). 
Nous avons utilisé la méthode « fréquence de termes et fréquence de documents inverse » (TF-
IDF) qui est une technique d’exploration de données classique permettant de mesurer la 
similitude entre les différentes combinaisons de paires de brevets et d’articles, afin d’identifier 
les paires brevet-article que nous allons utiliser. Nos résultats démontrent que l’impact des paires 
brevet-article sur la « qualité » des brevets est négatif pour les variables nombre de citations et 
nombre de revendications. 
De même, nous avons utilisé la méthode TF-IDF pour mesurer la similitude des brevets et des 
subventions pour trouver les paires brevet-subvention. Nos résultats suggèrent qu’il n’y a un effet 
négatif des paires brevet-subvention sur le nombre de citations. Cependant, les paires brevet-
subvention affectent positivement l’indice Herfindahl des citations obtenues.  
 
Mots clés : collaboration université–industrie, qualité des brevets, propriété des brevets, 
cessionnaires universitaires, cessionnaires gouvernementaux, cessionnaires industriels, paires 
brevet-article, paires brevet–subvention, biotechnologie, nanotechnologie 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to explore the role and impact of collaborative patenting on the “quality” of 
Biotechnology and Nanotechnology patents in Quebec. We examine a number of measures or 
proxy measures that are normally associated with the “quality” of patents. This study seeks to 
answer the following question: Is there any association between university–industry 
collaboration attributes and a patent’s quality? The collaboration network includes university 
and industrial researchers and scientists (Motohashi & Muramatsu, 2012). Furthermore, the 
ownership of academic patents by corporations is often addressed as one of the essential channels 
of university–industry ties (Bray & Lee, 2000; Bulut & Moschini, 2009; Y. Wang et al., 2015; Y. 
Wang, Huang, et al., 2013; Y. Wang, Pan, et al., 2013). According to prior exploratory studies in 
patenting and intellectual property, there is a lack of attention given to the impact of the co- 
patenting network on the patent “quality” in Canada. In this research we explore the impact of 
these networks, represented by inventors’ and assignees’ ties to universities and corporations. 
Furthermore, particular factors including funding, inventors’ career age, characteristics of the 
inventors’ co-network, and publications are used to estimate the “quality” of joint patents granted 
to Canadian inventors and/or organisations. Sterzi (2013) found that academic patents owned by 
firms are of a higher quality when initially assigned to the universities. This study aims to 
measure the impact of the patent ownership structure on patent “quality”, when the university–
industry linkage is considered. 
We investigated the “quality” of patents generated by academic inventors in Canada and 
assigned to the university or the government and compared it with the “quality” of patents 
privately held by industry. The first question that this research addresses is: Are patents 
generated by at least one academic inventor (residing in Canada) and assigned to the university 
of a lesser “quality” than those owned by a firm? Likewise, in regard to the role of government, 
as an entity of the public sector, we pose the following question: Are patents generated by at 
least one academic inventor (residing in Canada) and assigned to the government of a lesser 
“quality” than those owned by an industry firm? To answer the above questions we estimated 
the impact of government assignees and academic assignees on patent “quality”, in order to 
compare the impacts of the public assignees and industrial assignees on invention “quality”. 
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Furthermore, this study seeks to explain how the inventors’ specific characteristics influence 
the “quality” of patents that stem from university–industry collaboration. Therefore, this thesis 
also aims to answer the following question: How do the researchers’ characteristics affect their 
opportunities to generate patents of a higher “quality”? Variables such as career age and 
collaboration with prestigious patent inventors are considered. Moreover, we observed the 
impact of the co-invention and co-authorship network characteristics on patent “quality”. We 
therefore measured whether patents generated by inventors that are highly centralized in the co-
inventor or co-authorship networks are of a higher “quality” than patents created by inventors 
that occupy less centralized positions. Furthermore, this research aims to assess whether patents 
issued from a patent–paper pair or patent–grant pair are of a higher “quality” than those without 
such a link, i.e. articles and patents published by the same teams and on the same research topics 
and application objects. 
To assess the impact of university–industry linkage attributes on patent “quality”, our 
methodology uses classic and zero-inflated negative binomial regressions, Tobit, and two-stage 
least-squares regressions (2SLS) to account for potential endogeneity problems. Our measures or 
proxies of patent “quality” include the number of forward citations, the number of claims, a 
Herfindahl index of backward citations, and a Herfindahl index of forward citations. This type of 
index measures the diversity of documents cited by the patent, and the diversity of patents that 
cite this particular patent. 
Our findings show that patents generated by at least one academic inventor and owned by the 
public sector (government and university) are of a lesser “quality” measured by both number of 
forward citations and a Herfindahl index of backward citations, than those of private (industrial) 
assignees. Our findings also reveal that patents owned by public institutions are less diversified 
than privately held patents. Therefore, the patents assigned to the corporations are likely to have 
obtained more citations than public patents (Popp, 2006; Popp et al., 2013). Our results are 
consistent with the former studies of Popp (2006) and Popp et al. (2013). 
We used the Term Frequency and Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) method as a classic 
data mining technique to measure the similarity between patents and papers, in order to identify 
the patent–paper pairs. Our results show that the impact of patent–paper pairs on patent “quality” 
is negative for the number of forward citations and number of claims variables.  
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Likewise, we used the TF-IDF method to measure the similarity of patents and grants to find 
the patent–grant pairs. Our results suggest there is a negative effect of patent–grant pairs on the 
number of forward citations. In contrast, patent–grant pairs positively affect the Herfindahl index 
of forward citations.  
 
Keywords: University–Industry Collaboration, Patent Quality, Patent Ownership, Academic 
Assignees, Government Assignees, Industrial Assignees, Patent–Paper Pairs, Patent–Grant 
Pairs, Biotechnology, Nanotechnology 
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 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1
Both biotechnology and nanotechnology are strongly science-based and useful in various other 
technologies (Motoyama, 2014). In this research, both the biotechnology and nanotechnology 
industry in Canada are examined.  
The biotechnology sector has been rapidly growing, with a market of $200 billion in 2009, 
showing an annual growth rate of 10.2% during the period 2005 to 2009 (Soh & Subramanian, 
2014). The health care and medical domains are the largest biotechnology application sectors, 
covering 66.2% of total biotechnology market value (Silber, 2010; Soh & Subramanian, 2014). 
The majority of the biotechnology firms located in Canada have been established from spin-offs 
of the regional universities and research facilities, such as the University of British Columbia 
(UBC). The annual research funding assigned to UBC reached CAD$350 million, an increase of 
over 250% over the previous 5 years (Groote & Gee, 2005). The provincial government in BC 
allocated over CAD$450 million for life-science researches in BC, showing the high priority of 
the governmental sector in developing biotechnology in that province (Groote & Gee, 2005). 
Canadian biotechnology firms are however predominantly located in Quebec and Ontario (L. A. 
Hall & Bagchi-Sen, 2002). 
Regarding nanotechnology, Genet, Errabi, and Gauthier (2012) found that 90% of all 
nanotechnology SME firms are located in Europe, the US and Canada. Large and very large 
nanotechnology firms are mostly situated in Europe (48%), US/Canada (24%), and Asia (21%) 
(Genet et al., 2012). The US, as a leader of nanotechnology among the world, considers 
nanotechnology as one of the “22 National Key Technologies and Strategic Technologies in 
2005” (Liu & Guan, 2016, p. 222). More than ten government agencies in the US supported the 
World Technology Evaluation Center at Loyola College to work on nanotechnology projects 
during 1996–1998 (Liu & Guan, 2016). Liu and Guan (2016) analyzed inter-organizational 
partnership in the field of nanoenergy in the US, and found collaboration between 
nanotechnology partners was fragmented across various integrated inter-institutional 
collaboration network components. The authors investigated the collaboration between different 
players engaging in small components as a salient factor. They found that particular universities 
and corporations are located in the center of the network, serving as a bridge between different 
entities. The components are highly integrated and all of the partners can reach each other 
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directly and indirectly. Thus, information exchange can span the network widely and very fast 
(Liu & Guan, 2016). According to the network observations, the University of California and 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) were located in the center and served as a bridge to 
diffuse the knowledge across the network (Liu & Guan, 2016).  
Like nanotechnology, biotechnology as a science-based industry is an interesting, 
multidisciplinary field of study in the university–industry linkages (UILs) literature (Soh & 
Subramanian, 2014). UILs significantly affect economic growth in science and technology-based 
sectors (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2002; Mansfield, 1992; Soh & Subramanian, 2014). 
Transferring universities’ discoveries to industry is essential in the life sciences, in order for 
inventions to be commercialized (George, Zahra, & Wood Jr, 2002; Murray, 2002; Soh & 
Subramanian, 2014). Scholars have found that university–industry collaboration leads to new 
product development as well as generating patents (Deeds & Hill, 1996; Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 
1994; Soh & Subramanian, 2014). Particularly in the biotechnology sector, firms and universities 
can gain important benefits from their alliances, especially as biotechnology firms have a 
considerable experience in engaging in UILs (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Soh & Subramanian, 
2014). Various studies show that collaboration with industry and among academic scientists is 
crucial to develop and maintain a strong biotechnology domain (Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, & 
Brewer, 1996; Oliver, 2004; Zucker, Darby, & Armstrong, 2002). Different kinds of 
collaboration are required, including the participation between academic scholars at the same 
university, collaboration of academic scientists between different universities, and the alliance 
between academic scientists and their industrial partners (Oliver, 2004). 
Zavale and Macamo (2016) assessed the kind of knowledge university and industry transfers 
through the UILs in low-income and developing countries, and how it is transferred. They 
categorized the interaction channels in three groups: embodied knowledge, disembodied 
knowledge and resources (Zavale & Macamo, 2016). Embodied knowledge is structured 
according to informal and personal interaction of scientists at universities with their partners 
within firms (Zavale & Macamo, 2016). This knowledge is mostly shaped through informal 
meetings, academic consultation and student internships in companies (Zavale & Macamo, 
2016). Disembodied knowledge is science-based and produces codified knowledge such as 
patents (Zavale & Macamo, 2016). This knowledge enables the licensing of academic patents by 
corporations, as well as co-authorship of articles by academic and industrial scientists (Zavale & 
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Macamo, 2016). As a third channel, resources include funding and contracting to universities for 
research projects, or assigning grants for equipment and infrastructure to universities and 
academic research facilities (Zavale & Macamo, 2016).  
Researchers have found that in low-income and developing countries, UILs are essentially 
structured by embodied knowledge transfer involving informal and personal interaction rather 
than disembodied knowledge (Kruss, Adeoti, & Nabudere, 2012; Zavale & Macamo, 2016). The 
low-income countries lack sufficient infrastructure, policies to protect university and industry 
interactions, and resources to build UILs. Therefore, the developing and less developed countries 
hardly engage in UILs as a knowledge-intensive process, and university and industry 
participation instead is based on informal interactions (Kruss et al., 2012; Zavale & Macamo, 
2016). According to (Zavale & Macamo, 2016), government intervention is crucial to build 
effective UILs. Government can take action by defining specific rules and policies by which to 
engage and to connect all partners and networks to shape the embodied, disembodied and 
resource knowledge-based UILs (Zavale & Macamo, 2016).  
Likewise, various scholars have explored different university and industry partnership channels 
and their scope in most developed countries (Hershberg, Nabeshima, & Yusuf, 2007; Veugelers 
& Del Rey, 2015; Zavale & Macamo, 2016). The licensing of academic scientists’ patents by 
industry is considered as one of university and industry interaction channels (Bray & Lee, 2000; 
Bulut & Moschini, 2009; Y. Wang et al., 2015; Y. Wang, Huang, et al., 2013; Y. Wang, Pan, et 
al., 2013). 
The aforementioned studies show there is no sole university–industry collaboration channel. 
Some scholars divided the UILs as market-based or non-market-based. Cases where corporations 
contracted universities, or where industry licensed patents, were associated with the market-
based view (Mowery & Ziedonis, 2015). Various scholars analyzed the impact of UILs on the 
academic performance of the universities in terms of number of publications and number of 
article citations (Salimi, Bekkers, & Frenken, 2015). Some former scientists measured the impact 
of university–industry collaboration on the performance of the corporations (Chai & Shih, 2016; 
George et al., 2002; Motohashi, 2005). The university–industry interaction can be studied as a 
dual interaction, with effects on both sides (Chai & Shih, 2016). A university is not an entity that 
is exogenous to industry, i.e. it can be considered as an endogenous variable which can be 
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influenced by industry (Chai & Shih, 2016). In the literature on UILs, some researchers have 
observed the impact of university and industry linkage on innovation outcomes (Motohashi & 
Muramatsu, 2012).  
There is extensive literature that measures innovation performance, patent quality, patent value, 
and innovation importance using various proxy measures; there are overlaps among mentioned 
domains and the boundaries are blurred (Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003). Significant numbers of 
researchers use patent citation as a measure of innovation performance (Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 
2003). Patent citation is also commonly used as a proxy to measure patent quality (Hagedoorn & 
Cloodt, 2003). Likewise, Petruzzelli, Rotolo, and Albino (2015) measured innovation importance 
according to the number of forward patent citations. Scholars found that there is a positive 
association between patent importance and the number of patent citations (Briggs, 2015; 
Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003; Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, & Vopel, 1999). Therefore, a patent 
citation seems to be the preferred and most commonly used indicator to measure patent quality 
and importance (Briggs, 2015; Mariani & Romanelli, 2007; Schettino, Sterlacchini, & Venturini, 
2013). 
Petruzzelli et al. (2015) assessed patent importance using various drivers, including the number 
of claims and technology scope, leading a patent to have a strong influence in subsequent 
innovation development (Petruzzelli et al., 2015). Scholars have investigated the influence of 
firms engaged in several technology domains on patent quality, and patent importance in 
subsequent technologies, bearing in mind the overlaps in the existent literature regarding patent 
quality and importance (Petruzzelli et al., 2015; Singh, 2008). Scientists have used the breadth of 
technology measured by 1 minus the Herfindahl index of backward citations to calculate the 
technological variety of patents as another patent quality indicator (Petruzzelli et al., 2015; 
Singh, 2008).  
Researchers reveal the ability to extensively search the information from different domains to 
provide knowledge accumulation for firms and scientists (Fleming, 2001), leading to the 
generation of patents of outstanding importance (Petruzzelli et al., 2015). Singh (2008) also 
measured the impact of the Herfindahl index of the regional distribution of patents across 
different geographical locations on patent quality. Singh’s (2008) investigations showed that 
cross-regional R&D collaboration has a moderating effect on R&D distribution, which is 
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negatively related to innovation quality. The lack of cross-regional knowledge integration is a 
potential explanation for lower innovation value for distributed patenting activities across various 
geographical locations (Singh, 2008). Petruzzelli et al. (2015) showed that a greater technology 
scope is associated with a greater number of forward citations from subsequent non-
biotechnology patents. 
Bonaccorsi and Thoma (2007) used the number of claims to measure patent quality. Inventors 
have to demonstrate the novel aspect of their invention in the claims in order to be highly legally 
protected. A higher number of claims increases the probability that scientists can rely on the 
patent, leading the patent to be cited more by subsequent patents (Petruzzelli et al., 2015). 
Considerable efforts have also been undertaken to examine U–I collaboration, with the result 
that there is no single channel observed and used to transfer knowledge: University–industry 
knowledge interactions, licensing of academic patents by corporations, and patent–publication 
links, are all highlighted as science-based UILs. The Bayh–Dole Act passed during the 1980s 
gives permission to federal contractors including universities to claim the patents funded by the 
government, providing more authority for universities to keep their intellectual property rights 
(Kenney & Patton, 2009). Moreover, it standardizes procedures for the researches funded by 
government, to better control and clarify the process of the projects (Kenney & Patton, 2009; 
Sampat, Mowery, & Nelson, 2004). Through granting licensing authority to the universities, the 
number of patents emanating from universities and research facilities increased, although the 
quality of patents held by universities is less known (Motohashi & Muramatsu, 2012). The 
measurement of innovation quality varies across different regions and technology domains 
(Petruzzelli et al., 2015; Popp, 2006; Popp et al., 2013). For instance, Petruzzelli et al. (2015) 
examined how determinant factors of patent quality differently influence patent citations across 
different domains. Petruzzelli et al. (2015) used six factors to analyze patent importance, 
including: technology breadth, novelty, number of claims, scope, use of the scientific knowledge 
in generating the patents, and the existence of collaboration for the invention. Their study 
revealed that the number of claims positively affects an invention’s influence as measured by the 
patent’s number of forward citations in non-biotechnology fields, while this factor has an 
inverted U-shaped effect in the biotechnology field. 
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We found no adequate literature that measures the impact of university and industry linkages 
on patent quality in biotechnology and nanotechnology in Canada, while controlling for the 
patent ownership structure and patent–publication links. Magerman, Looy, and Debackere (2011) 
reported no significant difference between the forward citations of patents belonging to patent–
publication pairs and those of patents that are not associated with these pairs. In this research we 
measure, or proxy for, the “quality” of patents using different factors including forward patent 
citations, number of backward citations, and number of claims (Dang & Motohashi, 2015; 
Hirschey & Richardson, 2004; Narin, Noma, & Perry, 1987; Schettino et al., 2013; Wu, Chang, 
Tsao, & Fan, 2016). We also contribute to the measurement of patent “quality” by using the 
patents’ technological breadth identified by 1 minus the Herfindahl index of technological 
concentration.  
In addition, we sought to answer whether academic patents that are privately held by 
corporations are of a higher quality than that owned by public assignees. The ownership of 
academic patents by corporations is one of the UILs channels examined in this study. We 
compared the impact of patents assigned to universities and government with that of industrial 
assignees for patents generated by academic inventors residing in Canada. The novel method in 
the technology-science literature coined “patent–paper pairs” was used to investigate the link 
between patents and scientific publication. “Patent–paper pairs” were associated with the 
inventor(s) of a patent listed as the author(s) of the article(s) in a similar subject within a short 
time frame after a patent was granted (Lissoni & Montobbio, 2006; Magerman et al., 2011; 
Magerman, Looy, & Debackere, 2015; Murray, 2002). 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the conceptual 
framework of this study, including a literature review on the patent ownership structure, patent–
paper pairs, UILs, and patent quality which justifies the proposed hypotheses of this 
investigation; Section 3 explains the research questions and proposed hypotheses; Section 4 
describes the data and methodology; in Section 5, the data’s descriptive statistics are presented; 
Section 6 summarizes the results; Section 7 shows the general discussion; and finally in Section 
8, the conclusions are highlighted. 
  
 7 
 LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 2
 
2.1 Biotechnology and nanotechnology in Canada 
This section is focused on Canadian biotechnology and nanotechnology. Biotechnology started 
in laboratories in 1970 in universities with the support of public research institutions, and then 
this industry started to expand to include small science-based corporations (Gilding, 2008). This 
technology was especially the target of research institutes and universities, venture capital firms 
and multinational pharmaceutical corporations, benefiting from collaborations across regions and 
countries in drug discovery and the creation of commercial products (Gilding, 2008). 
Biotechnology is an enabling technology involved in several domains. A large number of 
scientists are working in biotechnology firms’ R&D divisions to initiate new products aimed at 
generating more revenues (Traore & Rose, 2003). The number of biotechnology firms located in 
Canada increased from 282 in 1997 to 385 in 1999, rising 27% for this period, and their revenues 
more than doubled (Traore & Rose, 2003). Their revenues increased from CAD$813 million to 
CAD$1.9 billion (Traore & Rose, 2003). The latest data for the biotechnology domain in Canada 
was gathered in 2005. Statistics Canada revealed Canada gained CAD$4.2 billion in revenue and 
employed 13,000 people, of which 8,391 of employees hired in the private and public sector 
worked in R&D in the biotechnology domain in 2005 (BiotecCanada, 2015).  
Biotechnology is a process that works on living organisms to produce products; therefore, it 
represents the integration of life science and technology (Dorockis & Boguś, 2014). The 
technology has applications ranging from food starter cultures and genetic modification to 
pharmaceuticals and detergents, as well as products for agriculture and forestry (Dorockis & 
Boguś, 2014). Biotechnology requires high-quality research infrastructure with qualified 
scientists, taking a high investment risk to accomplish biotechnology projects (Dorockis & 
Boguś, 2014). While the US, Canada and specific Western European countries, as developed 
countries, hold an outstanding position in the biotechnology domain, many developing countries 
have also recently started to invest in the biotechnology domain; for instance, China, Malaysia, 
India, Singapore and the Philippines (Dorockis & Boguś, 2014). In terms of biotechnology, the 
US holds the largest and most diversified position in the world. Canada is 5 years behind the US 
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in terms of development in the biotechnology sector (L. A. Hall & Bagchi-Sen, 2002). The 
biotechnology industry in Canada has doubled in size between 1994 and 1997 and the number of 
firms has increased from 121 to approximately 300; while revenues for biotechnology increased 
from CAD$353 million to CAD$1.1 billion (L. A. Hall & Bagchi-Sen, 2002). Today, the 
biotechnology sector in Canada contributes CAD$40 billion to the economy (BiotecCanada, 
2015). 
The strategic collaboration of universities, industries and government in Quebec (especially 
Montreal and Quebec City) position the province as a leader in the bio-pharmaceutical sector in 
Canada, with a strong technological infrastructure is also in place in Ontario (especially 
Toronto), while British Columbia (mainly Vancouver) contributes valuable university–industry 
research (L. A. Hall & Bagchi-Sen, 2002). Biotechnology is a science-based, multidisciplinary 
industry. There are various studies that show the collaboration between academic and industry 
scientists is crucial in biotechnology to develop and maintain the technology. Therefore, different 
kinds of collaboration are required, including the participation between academic scholars at the 
same university, collaboration of academic scientists between different universities, and the 
alliance between the academic scientists and their industrial partners (Oliver, 2004).  
Nanotechnology is an emerging technology that enables the manufacture of new products and 
tools. Considering the impact of this technology on economic improvement, over CAD$3 billion 
of government funding was assigned to nanotechnology up to 2007 (Niosi & Reid, 2007). 
Nanotechnology is a technology entailing work at the 0.1–100 nm scale (Niosi & Reid, 2007). 
“Nanotechnology involves the intentional manufacture of large-scale objects whose discrete 
components are less than a few hundred nanometers wide” (Niosi & Reid, 2007, p. 432). As 
such, the technology depends upon research and tools from diverse fields including molecular 
biology, electronics, materials science, and physics (Niosi & Reid, 2007), using engineered nano-
materials in engineering, space, medicine and technology applications (Bera & Belhaj, 2016).  
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2.2 Biotechnology and nanotechnology patents 
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) is a Special Operating Agency (SOA) of 
Industry Canada and it has two goals: (a) administrating the Intellectual Property (IP) rights 
including patents, industrial designs, and trademarks; and (b) facilitating the use of the 
intellectual property system and its utilization (McMaster, 2007). About 7% of all firms located 
in Canada use intellectual property to keep the novelty rights of their innovations (McMaster, 
2007). Among the 39,600 patent applications filed in Canada (including foreign inventors), only 
2% were filed only in Canada, while 95% were also filed in the US (McMaster, 2007). 
Canadians filed 8,200 patent applications in the US in 2004, 50% more than the patents filed in 
Canada (McMaster, 2007), and corresponding to the sixth rank in the world after the US 
(190,600), Japan (65,000), Germany (20,000), China (17,000) and South Korea (17,000) 
(McMaster, 2007). During the period 1963 to 2015, Canada filed a total of 124,000 patents in the 
US, ranking eighth after the US (6 million including U.S. and foreign origin inventors and 3 
million generated by U.S. based inventors), Japan (1 million), Germany (408,000), the United 
Kingdom (165,000), France (153,000), South Korea (152,000), and Taiwan (139,000) (US Patent 
and Trademark Office, 2015). 
 
2.2.1 Patent Quality 
In large-scale patent-econometric studies, scholars use different indicators to measure or to 
proxy for patent quality. For instance, Narin et al. (1987) used the number of backward citations 
to measure patent quality, i.e., the number of previous patents that are quoted as references in a 
focal patent document (Narin et al., 1987). Other scholars use number of backward citations in 
the non-patent literature to examine patent quality (Carpenter, Cooper, & Narin, 1980; Hirschey 
& Richardson, 2004). Because the non-patent literature is scientific in nature, this measure 
indicates the scientific grounding of a patent. Taking a different approach, Manuel Trajtenberg 
(1990) applied incremental forward citations as an attribute to estimate patent quality. The 
number of patent forward citations tallies the number of times that a focal patent is cited in 
subsequent patents within a period of 5–10 years after the patent application year (Manuel 
Trajtenberg, 1990). 
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Hirschey and Richardson (2001) used the Current Impact Index (CII), Science Linkage (SL), 
and Technology Cycle Time (TCT) indicators to examine patent quality. The CII identifies the 
number of citations that a corporation has received in the most recent 5 years divided by the 
expected average number of citations that similar high technology companies received (Hirschey 
& Richardson, 2001). SL is a measure to analyze the link between a patent (as technology) to 
science through scientific publications that are listed on the front page of a patent document as 
“other references cited” (Hirschey & Richardson, 2001). The TCT measures the time that has 
passed between the current patent and the previous generation of the patent, thus calculating the 
length of the cycle between the current technology and the prior stage of the technology 
(Hirschey & Richardson, 2001, 2004). New emerging technologies have a short cycle time (4 or 
5 years), while mature technologies have a long cycle time (average 15 years or more) (Hirschey 
& Richardson, 2004).  
In a later work by the same authors, Non-Patent References (NPRs), Citation Index (CI), and 
TCT are used by Hirschey and Richardson (2004) to assess patent quality. The NPR variable 
links to scientific publications cited on the front page of the patent application and includes 
books, articles, and brochures (Hirschey & Richardson, 2004).  The NPR variable determines 
how close the patent is to scientific publications in a given year (Hirschey & Richardson, 2004). 
The CI measures the number of forward citations obtained in patent applications in a current 
year, for patents granted to the corporation in the most recent 5 years (Hirschey & Richardson, 
2004). 
Goetze (2010) used three indicators to assess patent quality. First, the author used the number 
of International Patent Classifications (IPC) in which a patent is filed to build and assess an 
indicator of patent quality. Second, he also used patent net citation measured as the cumulative 
number of citations that inventor i obtains from subsequent patents (issued by inventor j) minus 
self-citations associated to patents generated by the same inventor i. Finally, the authors used an 
indicator that identifies the portion of foreign inventors (indicated by dissimilar country location) 
among all co-inventors for jointly generated patents to assess patent quality.  
Motohashi and Muramatsu (2012) measured patent quality by the number of inventors, patent 
forward citations (number of forward self-citations and number of forward non-self citations), 
number of claims, and a generality index. Generality index determines the breadth of the 
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domains in which patent is cited, measured by the number of forward citations (Motohashi & 
Muramatsu, 2012). 
Schettino et al. (2013) also constructed a composite patent quality indicator as suggested by 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004). Schettino et al. (2013) used family size, patent forward 
citation, patent backward citation, and number of claims to construct a composite metric to 
measure patent quality. Family size calculates the number of jurisdictions that are required to 
protect the same innovation activity; it also measures the patent survival span. For instance, the 
time between a patent’s expiration and application is highly associated with the family size  
(Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel, 2003). 
Patent quality is also often measured by patent renewal information, number of citations, and 
number of claims (Dang & Motohashi, 2015). However, patent renewal information has a 
shortcoming in terms of timeliness and does not reflect recent changes in patent quality (Dang & 
Motohashi, 2015). Dang and Motohashi (2015) therefore used number of claims to measure 
patent quality.  
Thompson (2016) analyzed patent quality metrics and found the inventiveness of the patent 
application’s claims to be associated to patent quality. He therefore used patent number of claims 
as a metric to measure patent quality (Thompson, 2016). The author also states that typical 
research investigates the prior art of each patent. Thus, the use of the number of backward 
citations exclusively is not a sufficient metric for patent quality, because it does not show the fact 
that patents with a high number of claims obtain more backward citations (Thompson, 2016).  
Patent application is based on a “first to invent” philosophy and as such the legal status of 
previous patents is fundamental to analyze the novelty of patents (Wu et al., 2016). Patent quality 
indicators are related to legal status (LS) of patents evaluated by number of claims (Wu et al., 
2016). Essentially, patent quality measures the potential future value of patents and offers 
valuable direction for policy makers to better monitor the market (Wu et al., 2016). Lawyers, by 
contrast, consider legal consistency and certainty to assess patent quality. For lawyers, legal 
certainty is a main priority whereas patentability requirements and novelty are secondary 
concerns (Burke & Reitzig, 2007). There is extensive literature regarding patent quality; a 
summary is presented below in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 : Patent quality indicators 
Variable Detailed description of measure 
Number of backward citations to the non-patent 
literature (Non-Patent References, NPR) 
(Carpenter et al., 1980) 
• Shows the number of non-patent references 
that are actively quoted by patent, and refers to 
scientific citations in patent document. 
Number of backward citations to patent 
literature 
(Narin et al., 1987) 
• Identifies the number of patent references 
that are actively quoted by a patent. 
Incremental forward citations 
(Manuel Trajtenberg, 1990) 
 
• Demonstrates the number of times that a 
focal patent is quoted as a relevant state during 
an examination of subsequent patent 
applications filed within a period of 5–10 years 
after the focal patent application. 
 
Current Impact Index (CII) 
 
Science Linkage (SL) 
 
Technology Cycle Time (TCT) 
 
(Hirschey & Richardson, 2001) 
 
• CII shows the number of patent citations that 
a company has obtained during the most recent 
5 years divided by anticipated number of 
patent citations that similar high-tech 
companies gained. 
 
• SL links patents to scientific publications 
through the “other references cited” on the 
front page of the patent document. 
 
• Technology Cycle Time (TCT) demonstrates 
the time that has passed between current patent 
and previous generation of the patent. 
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Table 2.1 : Patent quality indicators (Cont’d) 
Variable Detailed(description(of(measure 
Citation Index (CI) 
Technology Cycle Time (TCT) 
Non-Patent References (NPR) 
 
(Hirschey & Richardson, 2004) 
 
 
•  CI measures the number of citations received 
in subsequent patents in the current year, for 
patents granted to a company in the most 
recent 5-year period. 
•  TCT determines the time that has passed 
between current patent and previous generation 
of the patent. 
• NPR is associated to the scientific citations in 
patent document. 
 
Number of International Patent Classification 
(IPC) subclasses 
Net citations 
Inventor co-location  
(Goetze, 2010)  
• Number of IPC subclasses is the number of 
international classification subclasses in which 
a patent is filed.  
• Net citations indicates the cumulative number 
of citations that inventor i received from 
subsequent patents (generated by other 
inventors j) minus patent self-citations (issued 
by inventor i). 
• Inventor co-location identifies the share of 
foreign inventors, identified by dissimilar 
country location, among all co-inventors. 
Number of inventors 
Patent forward citations (number of forward self-
citations and number of forward non-self 
citations) 
Number of claims 
Generality index 
(Motohashi & Muramatsu, 2012) 
• Patent forward citations was measured by the 
number of forward self-citations and number of 
forward non-self citations 
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Table 2.1 : Patent quality indicators (Cont’d and end) 
 
Patent quality has attracted the attention of numerous scholars, who have used the terms patent 
quality, value, importance, and influence interchangeably (Petruzzelli et al., 2015; Singh, 2008).  
Among the antecedent factors of patent quality, patent citation is the most common measure 
quality (Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003; Jung & Lee, 2014). As patent citation is a noisy proxy to 
measure patent quality, there are some considerations regarding using citation to measure quality. 
Factors affecting patent citations include proximity of the inventors (Gittelman, 2007), and the 
rigor of decision making by subsequent patent examiners to cite prior art of the patent (Gress, 
2010). Whether or not we know about the patent examiner’s decision and qualification, the 
existence of citations shows the prior art of patents (Jung & Lee, 2014).  
 
Variable Detailed(description(of(measure 
Number of claims 
Backward citations 
Forward citations 
Family size 
(Schettino et al., 2013; Seol, Lee, & Kim, 2011) 
• Number of claims contained in the patent. 
• Number of backward citations shows the 
number of prior patents cited in a focal patent.  
Number of forward citations identifies the 
number of times a focal patent is cited in 
subsequent patents.  
• Family size calculates the number of 
jurisdictions that are required to protect the 
same innovation activity, and the time between 
patent application and expiration (Harhoff et 
al., 2003). 
Patent number of claims 
(Dang & Motohashi, 2015; B. Wang & Hsieh, 
2015; Wu et al., 2016)  
• Number of claims contained in a patent. 
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2.2.2 Patent Value 
Many methodologies have been proposed to evaluate the monetary value of each patent 
(Harhoff et al., 1999; Harhoff et al., 2003). Patent value identifies the present value assessed by 
patent examiners on a patent value scale (Reitzig, 2003). Some scholars count patent forward 
citations to measure patent value (Lerner, 1994), as they did for patent quality (see the previous 
section). Other researchers examine the probability of patents being granted to investigate patent 
value (Ernst, Legler, & Lichtenthaler, 2010). Harhoff et al. (2003) posit that patent value can be 
considered as a firm’s asset value. Therefore, to assess patent value, the observable effects of 
patents on pricing, costs, and also number of products being patented are observed. 
Simultaneously, unobservable effects of patents on owners’ competitors are examined (Ernst et 
al., 2010; Reitzig, 2004).  
Several approaches to assessing patent value have been developed. These methodologies, 
which can be categorized as the contemporary approaches, include cost-based, market-based, 
design-around-based, and income-based approaches (Reitzig, 2004). Among the contemporary 
approaches, cost-based methodology concentrates on the costs required to develop the products 
being patented (Ernst et al., 2010; Sherry & Teece, 2004). The market-based approach compares 
a patent with similar patents previously sold in the market (Takalo, 2002). The design-around-
based method computes the costs to develop equivalent products according to the patent claims. 
It identifies the costs required to design a product having the same results as a patented product 
(Gallini, 1992). The income-based approach estimates the patent contribution as the economic 
benefits of a patent for a company including its cash flow. The future cash flow of a company is 
therefore counted in this methodology (Ernst et al., 2010). 
Hsieh (2013) stressed that it is difficult to measure patent value before the patent’s 
commercialization. Hsieh (2013) suggested four independent variables from the factor analysis to 
assess patent value in the early stage of the commercialization process: General Management 
Benefit, General Management Risks, Offensive Benefits, and Cost-Related Risks. Essentially, 
the author observed both benefit and risk indicators to assess patent value. The variable General 
Management Benefits contains indicators that bring benefits for corporations, for instance 
increased revenues, increased business diversification, facilitating welfare progress, and offering 
new business opportunities (Hsieh, 2013). The component General Management Risks includes 
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increased market risks, boosted production and development risks, and increased charges for 
litigation. Offensive Benefits are associated to increased market share, increased citation, and 
increased litigation. As a fourth component, Cost-Related Risks relates to patent maintenance 
costs and patent application expenses (Hsieh, 2013). Finally, according to the patent value 
assessment, Hsieh (2013) proposed short-term and long-term further commercialization 
strategies for each group of patents, considering a combined benefits and risks approach. 
B. Wang and Hsieh (2015) used a fuzzy method to measure patent value according to 
10 criteria categorized into three groups: patent strategic value, patent protection value, and 
patent commercialization value. The first group, patent strategic value, includes competiveness 
and innovativeness of a patent, business potential, and organization growth (B. Wang & Hsieh, 
2015). The second group, patent protection value, includes patent quality indicators and patent 
residual life cycle time (B. Wang & Hsieh, 2015). According to B. Wang and Hsieh (2015), 
patent quality indicators are associated to patent number of claims and licensing status of patents.  
The third group, patent commercialization value, relates to obtaining revenue from a patent 
application in a relevant-industry domain (B. Wang & Hsieh, 2015). It is essential for firms to 
have an intellectual property valuation when they engage in an acquisition process or strategic 
appliances (Phillips, McGlaughlin, Ruth, Jager, & Soldan, 2015). Patent valuation therefore has a 
significant impact on certain business activities due to firms’ alliances or acquisitions (Breitzman 
& Thomas, 2002; B. Wang & Hsieh, 2015).  
2.3 University–Industry Linkage 
A review of the literature on university and industry collaboration reveals a number of different 
paradigms that can appropriately be used to investigate UILs. For instance, joint R&D activities, 
co-patenting, and co-authorship of scholars at universities and at firms are all defined as factors 
in university and industry participation (Abramo, D’Angelo, Di Costa, & Solazzi, 2009; Baba, 
Shichijo, & Sedita, 2009; Motohashi, 2005).  
George et al. (2002) examined the impact of university-industry (U–I) alliances on the firm’s 
number of patents as well as financial performance and R&D expenses of the corporation. They 
considered all alliances (formal agreements) that the firm had entered into by the end of 1995, 
horizontal linkages including joint R&D, patent swaps, technology transfers, and joint ventures, 
as well as vertical links including outsourcing and distribution links. The results of that study 
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demonstrated that corporations with UILs generate more patents than firms without university 
assistance. Furthermore, firms engaging in UILs have lower R&D expenses than companies 
without such a link (George et al., 2002). However, according to George et al.’s (2002) research, 
U–I participation does not enhance the companies’ financial performance. 
Motohashi (2005) analyzed the impact of UILs on the performance of both small and large 
corporations. He found that small firms tend to exhibit better performance than larger companies 
when collaborating with universities. Small firms and young companies cannot compete with 
large corporations in terms of tangible assets (Motohashi, 2005). Therefore, small companies can 
employ UILs as a practical means to develop new products. In Motohashi (2005) survey, UILs 
included both formal (for instance, joint R&D activities, training, and patent licensing) and 
informal activities (consultation services). Motohashi (2005) found the objectives of U–I 
collaboration to include the development of new products, licensing technology, paper 
publication, enhancement of human resource management, discovering the potential for joint 
R&D participation, and improving the skills required for project management. 
Balconi and Laboranti (2006) used Social Network Analysis (SNA) to structure the 
collaboration between the various players in a mutual network. They considered each professor 
as a vertex to collaborate with other partners. They built a UILs network using cases where 
professors were listed as inventors of patents, but patents were assigned to firms. The impact of 
UILs on professors’ scientific performance was measured by the number of article citations. 
Balconi and Laboranti (2006) found that UILs offered the opportunity for professors to increase 
their publication citations. Further, Balconi and Laboranti (2006) constructed a U–I co-inventor 
network, where there was at least one academic scientist listed among industrial inventors’ 
names. Their research revealed two common patterns for situations where patents generated by 
academics are assigned to companies (Balconi & Laboranti, 2006). In the first pattern, patents 
are issued as a result of collaboration between academic inventors and industrial assignees 
(Balconi & Laboranti, 2006). In the second, the corporation defines a project that is then 
accomplished by the university (Balconi & Laboranti, 2006).  
Various scholars measured the co-authorship of publications to reconstruct university and 
industry participation (Abramo et al., 2009; Balconi & Laboranti, 2006). Abramo et al. (2009) 
examined the impact of co-authorship of university researchers with their industry colleagues on 
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research performance. They found that academic researchers who jointly published articles with 
their industrial partners attained a higher research performance than scholars without such a link. 
Research performance was rated by number of articles published, together with publication 
contribution calculated by number of co-authors (Abramo et al., 2009). However, Abramo et al. 
(2009) found that the impact factor of journals containing articles by U–I researchers was 
generally lower than for those containing articles co-authored by other players. Moreover, 
university–private publications did not demonstrate a higher multidisciplinary value than other 
publications (Abramo et al., 2009). 
Baba et al. (2009) tested the impact of mutual patenting on firm’s innovation performance, 
measured by number of patents generated. To that end, they studied the impact of co-invention 
networks of both “Pasteur scientists” and “Star scientists” on the number of registered patents. 
“Pasteur scientists” are academic scientists who have published a large number of articles as well 
as generating patents. According to the examination conducted by Baba et al. (2009), the 
inclusion of “Pasteur scientists” in collaborative networks has a significantly positive impact on 
the number of patents. The impact of  “Star scientists” on firm’s performance is more modest, 
compared to “Pasteur scientists” (Baba et al., 2009). 
Several scholars have examined how UILs affect patent value (Belderbos, Cassiman, Faems, 
Leten, & Van Looy, 2014; Motohashi & Muramatsu, 2012). They proposed different hypotheses 
to measure the impact of UILs on innovation performance, and found that patents with UILs 
obtain greater value than those not linked to corporations.   
  Motohashi and Muramatsu (2012) categorized UIL patents as jointly invented or joint-
application UIL patents. In joint application, university and industry jointly file the patent 
application, while joint invention is related to the inventors from university and industry who 
jointly generate patents; it is essentially concentrated on the inventors (Motohashi & Muramatsu, 
2012). Motohashi & Muramastsu’s (2012) results highlight that jointly invented patents have 
higher value, measured by patent forward self-citation and non-self citation, than jointly applied 
patents. Motohashi and Muramatsu (2012) constantly swapped patent quality and value terms 
containing the same concept and measures. 
Motohashi and Muramatsu (2012) learned that UIL patents obtain a higher number of forward 
non-self citations than patents solely generated by either companies or universities. Furthermore, 
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jointly invented patents achieve more generality than patents issued without corporation 
assistance, on a generality index referring to the range of the citing patent, measured by the 
number of forward citations (Motohashi & Muramatsu, 2012).  Comparing small and large firms, 
Motohashi and Muramatsu (2012) found that patents generated by small firms through UILs 
have higher quality than those issued by large corporations. As we described in Section 2.2.1, 
Motohashi and Muramatsu (2012) measured patent quality by the number of inventors, patent 
forward citations (number of forward self-citations and number of forward non-self citations), 
number of claims, and a generality index. This difference could be attributed to the many high 
technology start-up companies that receive more UILs patent non-self citations (Motohashi & 
Muramatsu, 2012). 
A number of scholars have investigated the impact of co-patenting and co-ownership on 
innovation performance (Belderbos et al., 2014; Belderbos, Faems, Leten, & Looy, 2010; 
Hagedoorn, 2003). A survey of the innovation management literature highlights an open 
innovation system. Such a system offers opportunities for partners to receive information via a 
variety of internal and external channels (Belderbos et al., 2014; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; 
Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, West, Eds., & 2006). Partners can then integrate knowledge from 
these sources and allocate information to innovation processes to develop new products 
(Belderbos et al., 2014; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006). The debate on co-patenting addresses the 
complexities of collaboration with external partners (Belderbos et al., 2010; Hagedoorn, 2003). 
Belderbos et al. (2010) found a negative link between co-patenting share and corporate financial 
performance. Similarly, Hagedoorn (2003) earlier cited co-patenting as a policy that corporations 
tend to avoid. However, the investigations carried out by Belderbos et al. (2014) focused on the 
ownership aspect of co-patenting and the complexities of how to share intellectual property 
among partners, ultimately revealing the effects of co-ownership on the value creation process of 
firms. 
Chai and Shih (2016) assessed the impact of U–I co-funding on corporations’ innovative 
outcomes performance. They analyzed projects supported by the Danish National Advanced 
Technology Foundation (DNATF) that were co-funded by universities and companies. Their 
sample was sorted according to small and medium sized corporations (SMEs), young 
corporations, and project size. Chai and Shih’s (2016) study reveal two perspectives for U–I 
participation. According to the first view, the university is considered as an exogenous entity that 
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has a linear effect on corporations’ performance (Chai & Shih, 2016; Mansfield, 1995). As a 
second perspective, U–I participation entails more complexities, in a bidirectional relation (Chai 
& Shih, 2016; Murray, 2002). Thus, science can be affected by technology, and the university is 
an entity endogenous to the technology (Chai & Shih, 2016). Chai and Shih (2016) measured 
three dimensions of firm’s performance: number of patents, number of publications, and number 
of cross-institutional publications. They found that for SMEs and large projects, funded 
corporations issued more publications than unfunded firms. For young corporations as well as 
firms involved in large projects, companies issued significantly more patents up to 4 years after 
corporation funding (Chai & Shih, 2016). For all three samples, the number of cross-institutional 
publications was significantly enhanced for corporations that obtained funding as compared to 
unfunded companies, observed 3 years after funding (Chai & Shih, 2016). Bearing in mind the 
massive amount of literature on UILs, a summary of the research is highlighted in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 : University–Industry Linkage  
Title University–Industry 
Collaboration 
Results  
The effects of business–
university alliances on 
innovation output and 
financial performance 
 
Domain: Publicly traded 
biotechnology companies  
(George et al., 2002) 
 
Includes all alliances (formal 
agreements) that the firm has 
entered into by the end of 1995; 
horizontal linkages include joint 
R&D, patent swaps, technology 
transfers, and joint ventures, 
whereas vertical links include 
outsourcing and distribution 
links 
 Indicator of innovative output: 
Number of patents issued to the 
firm under USPTO, number of 
products on the market, and 
number of products under 
development 
- Companies with UILs generate 
more patents than firms without 
university assistance 
- Firms with U–I collaboration 
have lower R&D expenses than 
companies without such a link 
- U–I participation does not 
enhance the firm’s financial 
performance  
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Table 2.2 : University–Industry Linkage (Cont’d) 
Title University–Industry 
Collaboration 
Results  
Assess the impact of U–I 
collaboration on new 
technology-based firms’ 
performance 
 
Domain: 
Small startup firms in Japan 
(Motohashi, 2005) 
 
Joint R&D activities, training, 
technology licensing, 
consultation 
Objective of U–I collaboration is 
development of new products, 
licensing the technology, paper 
publication, enhancement of 
human resource management, 
discovering potential for joint 
R&D participation, and 
improving the skills required for 
project management 
- Small firms tend to exhibit better 
performance than large 
corporations through UILs 
University–Industry 
interactions in applied 
research: 
Domain: The case of 
microelectronics (academic 
centers for electronics in 
Italy) (Balconi & Laboranti, 
2006) 
- Patents generated by professors 
at universities and assigned to 
corporations 
- Co-invention of academic and 
industrial inventors (at least one 
academic scientist is listed 
among industrial inventors’ 
names for a patent) 
- Academic inventors can perform 
better in terms of scientific 
publications by building relations 
with industry  
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Table 2.2 : University–Industry Linkage (Cont’d) 
Title University–Industry 
Collaboration 
Results  
Assess the role of “Pasteur 
scientists” and “Star 
scientists” co-invention 
network on firms’ R&D 
outcome, measured by 
number of registered patents 
Domain:Advanced materials 
field(Baba et al., 2009) 
Co-invention of “Pasteur 
scientists” and “Star scientists”  
- Mutual patenting network of 
“Pasteur scientists” increases the 
number of registered patents, 
while the impact of  “Star 
scientists” co-patenting on number 
of patents is more modest in 
comparison 
Assess the impact of 
university and private sector 
collaboration to jointly 
publish articles (co-
authorship) on research 
performance, journal impact 
factor, and multidisciplinary 
of publication (Abramo et 
al., 2009) 
Domains: Polymer materials 
science and technology, 
industrial chemistry, 
electronics, applied physical 
chemistry, chemical 
fundaments of technology, 
principles of chemical 
engineering, molecular 
biology, applied 
pharmaceutical technology 
Co-authorship of articles in 
international journals 
-Researchers who jointly publish 
articles with their industrial 
partners have better research 
performance than scholars without 
such a link 
-Research performance examined 
by number of articles published by 
scientists and sum of publication 
contributions calculated by 
number of co-authors 
- The impact factor of journals 
containing collaborative articles 
(published by U–I researchers) is 
generally lower than those co-
authored by other players 
- University–private publications 
do not demonstrate a higher 
multidisciplinary value than other 
publications 
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Table 2.2 : University–Industry Linkage (Cont’d) 
Title University–Industry 
Collaboration 
Results  
Assess the impact of UILs 
on patent value and compare 
the value of jointly invented 
and joint-application UIL 
patents. 
(Motohashi & Muramatsu, 
2012) 
UILs joint-invention and UILs 
joint-application of patent 
 
Indicators to evaluate patent 
value: 
Number of patents, patent 
forward citations (number of 
forward self-citations and 
number of forward non-self 
citations), number of claims, and 
a generality index 
- Jointly invented patents have 
greater technological value in 
terms of UILs patent forward self-
citation and non-self citation than 
jointly applied patents 
- UIL patents gain a higher 
number of forward non-self 
citations than those patents solely 
generated by companies or 
universities 
- Jointly invented patents achieve 
more generality than other patents 
issued without corporate assistance 
-Small firms tend to obtain greater 
value for UIL patents than patents 
generated by the large 
corporations 
-Small firms’ UIL patents tend to 
reveal more generality than those 
of large corporations 
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Table 2.2 : University–Industry Linkage (Cont’d and end) 
Title University–Industry 
Collaboration 
Results  
Measuring impact of U–I 
mutual funding on the 
corporation’s performance 
by number of patents, 
number of publications, and 
number of cross-institutional 
publications 
(Chai & Shih, 2016) 
Jointly funding corporations by 
university and industry (shared 
budget) 
-For SMEs and large projects, 
funded corporations issued more 
publications than unfunded firms  
- Young corporations and firms 
involved in large projects issue 
significantly more patents up to 4 
years after corporation funding 
-The number of cross-institutional 
publications is significantly 
enhanced for corporations that 
obtained funding compared to 
unfunded companies (for three 
years after funding) 
 
 
2.3.1 Co-invention and co-authorship network 
Innovative activities occurring in different regions and economic growth are the main concerns 
of economic geography (Lee, 2015). Localized knowledge spillovers (LKSs) target the 
geographical proximity of different partners engaging in innovative activities in cluster(s), for 
instance: firms, inventors, and research facilities (Lee, 2015).  Spatial concentration of different 
actors located in clusters can improve the knowledge exchange and diminish general costs 
through increasing the number of researchers, mobility and personal collaboration opportunities 
(Lee, 2015). The social network in the high technologies such as biotechnology can span 
different geographical areas across the world, and it is not bound to the local region (Coe & 
Bunnell, 2003; Gertler & Levitte, 2005; Lee, 2015). Among the collaboration networks, co-
invention is associated with patents generated by more than one inventor (Cantner & Graf, 2006; 
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Ejermo & Karlsson, 2006; Lee, 2015). There are different kinds of participation including co-
invention, co-authorship, strategic alliances and also informal and personal relationship of 
different actors (Sun, 2016). 
To analyze social network collaboration, the multidisciplinary technique of social network 
analysis (SNA) has been developed by sociologists and then accomplished with the use of 
mathematics and statistics (Cantner & Graf, 2006). It is applied in the fields of sociology, 
marketing, computing and industrial engineering (Cantner & Graf, 2006). There is a wide range 
of studies that use SNA for their network analysis. For instance, Cowan and Jonard (2004) used 
SNA to measure the impact of network characteristics on performance through simulation. Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) compared the impact of social proximity and geographical 
proximity on knowledge spillovers. They found that social proximity significantly affects 
knowledge spillovers, to a greater degree than geographical proximity (Cantner & Graf, 2006). 
Sun (2016) used SNA to map the correlation of different partners in the patents co-assignship 
network. We explained in Section 4.3 the network measures used to analyze the co-invention and 
co-authorship network centrality in our study. 
Walsh et al. (2016) identified different forms of co-invention activities including co-invention 
(with customers, suppliers, competitors), co-assignees (which concentrates on the share of 
intellectual property among different patentees), and any formal and informal collaboration 
(excluding co-invention and co-assignees) in the US. The authors demonstrated that 
approximately 23% of triadic patents (patents registered in Japan and the EPO and granted by the 
USPTO, year 2000–2003) reflect non-co-invention collaboration; 10% of such patents include 
collaboration with customers, 4% with universities, and 12% with suppliers. For the co-inventor 
network, collaboration is divided among suppliers (5%), customers (4%), competitors (1%), 
firms (2%), universities (2%) and government organizations (0.5%). Walsh et al.’s (2016) results 
show that in the US, it is rare to jointly generate patents with competitors’ participation. 
Furthermore, their findings indicate that for the large firms, the extent of collaboration is 13% 
with suppliers (including co-invention, co-assignees, and formal and informal collaboration 
excluding co-invention and co-assignees); and 35% of those suppliers were partners for joint 
invention. Likewise, 11% of collaborations exist with customers (30% of those customers were 
partners for co-invention) and 4% with universities (in 40% of those partnerships, customers 
were engaged as co-inventors) (Walsh et al., 2016).  
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2.4 Research gap 
In science-based industries, the product development process is based on a collaborative 
network of academic scientists and other public research institutes with industrial scholars 
(George et al., 2002; Oliver, 2004). Biotechnology and nanotechnology are science-based 
domains that drive other industries forward (Baba et al., 2009; Niosi & Reid, 2007; Oliver, 
2004). Therefore, the university–industry linkage is crucial in the biotechnology and 
nanotechnology fields (Baba et al., 2009; Niosi & Reid, 2007; Oliver, 2004). In the 
biotechnology sector, collaborations between universities and other players, including firms and 
research facilities, are deemed essential for actors to compete and survive in this competitive area 
(Bowie, 1994; Oliver, 2004; Peters, Groenewegen, & Fiebelkorn, 1998). Various researchers 
highlight the strategic role of U–I alliances (Bowie, 1994; Liebeskind et al., 1996; Oliver & Julia 
Porter, 1997) and demonstrate that such linkage significantly increases the number of patents as 
an essential source of market value (Shaker, 1996). Patents are indeed an important requirement 
of the product commercialization process (Almeida, 1996; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995). 
Biotechnology is considered to be one of the few domains where the ideas and knowledge 
generated in universities and research labs can be transferred to firms quickly (Baba et al., 2009; 
Cohen et al., 2002). Many start-up biotechnology firms use intellectual property as one of their 
key assets to protect the rights over their idea generation (Arora & Merges, 2004; Gans, Hsu, & 
Stern, 2002; Giuri et al., 2007). This helps explain why only one third of patents generated by 
individual inventors have no collaborative ties with other partners (Wagner-Dobler, 2001). 
Conversely, the proportion of inventors in mutual networks issuing patents serves to highlight the 
prevalence of collaboration in the biotechnology and nanotechnology domains (Wagner-Dobler, 
2001).  
The impacts of U–I collaboration on scientific and technological production have been 
measured by several factors. Various researchers have examined the role of U–I collaboration on 
patent licensing, article publication, production performance, and R&D productivity (Branstetter 
& Nakamura, 2003; Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984; Motohashi, 2005). Motohashi (2005) 
reveals that small start-up firms achieve a greater productivity from the collaborative network. 
Other studies assumed that networks of scientists and those of inventors have distinctive social 
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structures, although in some aspects, their activities overlap (Murray, 2002; Partha & David, 
1994).  
Traditional bibliometric methods are often used to assess UILs (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; 
Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998) and also to measure how such ties 
affect overall performance, specifically where science-based technology is concerned 
(Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Zucker et al., 1998). Murray (2002) identified three traditional 
university–industry collaborative networks: the citation of papers in patents; the publication of 
papers by firms and industrial scientists; and the co-publication of papers by academic scientists 
and industrial inventors. Murray (2002) proposed a novel concept dubbed “patent–paper pairs” to 
understand which aspects of science and technology are linked together, and simultaneously to 
identify which firms or scientists have a significant impact on science and technology. The 
patent–paper pairs concept is based on the premise that both scientists and inventors contribute to 
idea generation through publications and patenting. This methodology tries to identify which 
patents and papers are paired, linking science and technology (Ducor, 2000; Leopold, May, & 
Paaß, 2005; Murray, 2002). A number of authors have used an accurate content analysis to 
measure the similarity between patents and papers in order to identify such pairs (Lubango & 
Pouris, 2010; Murray, 2002; Podolny & Stuart, 1995). Patent–paper pairs are the patents and 
papers that are issued from the same project (Murray, 2002). Lubango and Pouris (2010) studied 
70 patents from the USPTO, EPO, and WIPO and found 58 patents (82%) initiated by scientists 
from South African universities linked to articles. They surmised that authors have a propensity 
to generate patents and to publish articles at the same time. Magerman et al. (2011) studied the 
impact of patent–paper pairs on citation flows and demonstrated that there is no significant 
difference between the forward citations of patents belonging to patent–paper pairs and those of 
patents that are not associated to these pairs. However, their findings did reveal that publications 
linked to a patent received significantly more citations compared with publications without a 
patent counterpart.  
With respect to prior literature studying UILs, there is still a lack of attention given to 
measuring the impact of patent–paper pairs on patent quality by considering different quality 
factors such as number of claims, patent forward citations and patent backward citations.  
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Furthermore, as discussed in Section 2.3, the licensing of academic patents by corporations is 
addressed as a channel to connect the universities and research facilities to the private sector. 
There is a large amount of research on patent ownership structure (Crespi, Geuna, Nomaler, & 
Verspagen, 2010; Henderson, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 1998a; Lissoni, Montobbio, & Seri, 2010; 
Motohashi & Muramatsu, 2012; Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002; Sampat, Mowery, & Ziedonis, 2003; 
Sterzi, 2013).  
Kenney and Patton (2009) raised criticisms of the Bayh–Dole Act, stating that claiming 
university ownership of patents is a dysfunctional procedure, with information asymmetries and 
potentially inconsistent intentions between the inventors and universities. It is not economically 
efficient, as it causes a delay in licensing and prevents inventors from commercializing their 
inventions in a timely manner (Kenney & Patton, 2009). Thus, they proposed two substitute 
solutions for patent ownership. First, inventors would be free to decide whether the ownership of 
their patents would lie with either universities and corporations (Kenney & Patton, 2009). This 
approach encourages inventors’ entrepreneurship, as they can choose between public and private 
patentees, considering the advantages and disadvantages of each option (Kenney & Patton, 
2009). Second, the inventors would make all their inventions publically available through a 
strategic public domain, and the university administration would not be involved in licensing 
(Kenney & Patton, 2009). Kenney and Patton (2011) argue that university ownership is not 
crucial in Europe and Japan. The inventors build extra intermediaries between themselves and 
the competitive market by licensing their patents in the Technology Licensing Offices (TLOs) 
(located at universities) instead of with corporations (Kenney & Patton, 2009, 2011). Audretsch, 
Lehmann, and Warning (2005) and Thursby, Fuller, and Thursby (2009) reveal that U.S. 
professors assign a significant number of patents to corporations instead of universities, even as 
university employees.  
There is an important debate in many countries regarding which institution can own the 
intellectual property rights. In Canada, different universities have different approaches to owning 
patents; for instance, the University of British Columbia owns the patents generated by its 
scientists, while at Simon Faster University patents are owned by the inventors (Rasmussen, 
2008). The link between Intellectual Property and R&D grants and its impact on innovation 
performance is still disputed (Hanel, 2006). Several scholars have assessed the impact of public 
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assignees (including government and university) on patent quality and then compared patents 
privately held by corporations (Bessen, 2008; Crespi et al., 2010; Lissoni et al., 2010; Mowery & 
Ziedonis, 2002; Popp, 2006; Popp et al., 2013; Sterzi, 2013). Most researchers assumed that 
patents assigned to the governments were related to more essential needs and would tend to be 
cited more (Popp, 2006; Popp et al., 2013).  
Former research has not given adequate attention to measuring the impact of patent assignees 
across different institutions (including university, industry and government) on patent quality in 
the biotechnology domain in Canada. Therefore, we set out to measure patent quality associated 
with public assignees versus private assignees in this study, for patents generated by academic 
inventors residing in Canada. Moreover, we are going to examine the impact of various network 
structure on innovation performance. 
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 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES CHAPTER 3
 
3.1 Patent ownership and patent quality 
Prior to the Bayh–Dole Act, universities, profit or non-profit organizations, and public 
institutions were obligated to give the permission for their inventions to the government that 
funded their research (Grimaldi, Kenney, Siegel, & Wright, 2011). A significant change took 
place after 1980, giving the authority for the innovation ownership to universities and other non-
profit organizations. Bayh–Dole deals with the ownership of patents granted through the federal 
government. Research facilities, universities, and other public institutions under the Bayh–Dole 
Act can decide about the ownership of patents. Hence, universities can hold the ownership right 
to their patents, instead of the government (Grimaldi et al., 2011; Henderson et al., 1998a; 
Sampat et al., 2003). This law supports patent commercialization in universities (Grimaldi et al., 
2011; Henderson, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 1995, 1998).  
The Bayh–Dole Act which changed patent ownership policy in the US does not exist in 
Canada; instead, each university has its own policy for making a decision regarding patent 
ownership (Atkinson-Grosjean, House, & Fischer, 2001; Hoye, 2006; Kenney & Patton, 2011). 
For instance, at Waterloo, inventors can own their patents (Kenney & Patton, 2011). In 1989 the 
Intellectual Property policy was reformed in Canada from the first-to-invent to first-to-file policy 
(Hanel, 2006). Furthermore, the duration of the patent grant was changed from 17 to 20 years 
(Hanel, 2006). In first-to-invent, when two persons claim the same patent, the USPTO evaluates 
the contribution of each inventor to determine who has the right to the patent. In first-to-file, the 
patent is granted to the first inventor who files the patent application.  Hoye (2006) surveyed 37 
Canadian universities and found there are four different intellectual property policies existing at 
universities in Canada: (1) the university reserves the right of first offer on IP conducted from its 
academic research, in any circumstance—this is called the “First Offer” policy; (2) inventors 
share the revenues resulting from their patents with the university, when inventors commercialize 
the patents; (3) inventors share the patents’ revenues with the university when the university 
commercializes the patent; and (4) the university makes an agreement with inventors to consider 
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different thresholds for various revenue levels, to decide the revenue distribution between 
university and inventor (Hoye, 2006).  
With the “First Offer” policy, the university has the right to assess all the academic inventions 
that would be interesting for the inventors to commercialize, then the university owns and 
commercializes the innovation (Hoye, 2006). This policy occurs in the universities containing the 
TLOs. Among the 37 Canadian universities surveyed by Hoye (2006), 30 have TLOs, of which 
13 reserve the First Offer right of university ownership, while the other 17 do not (Hoye, 2006). 
In this policy individual inventors can only own their patents if the university is not interested to 
commercialize the inventor’s patents; still, however, there are some universities that control the 
patent licensing by individual inventors. For instance, at McGill University, inventors need the 
approval of the TLOs located at the university to commercialize their inventions (Hoye, 2006). 
Many European countries along with Canada have used government tools to encourage 
innovation commercialization from universities (Rasmussen, 2008). Canada has a long history of 
state and provincial involvement to commercialize innovation (Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 2001; 
Rasmussen, 2008; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). A survey of innovation commercialization 
procedures in Canada would be interesting in several aspects: (1) Canada has a decentralized 
education system which makes government intervention difficult (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997); (2) 
in Canada there are extensive federal programs that support innovation commercialization; (3) 
Canada has a large public research sector and a small domestic market, as European countries do 
(Rasmussen, 2008). Canadian universities spent CAD$36.4 million on Intellectual Property 
management in 2003, allotted to: external resources (25%), licensing revenues (36%), 
institutional grants (29%), and institutional allocations (10%) (Rasmussen, 2008). 
The reform that occurred in 1989 in Canada, associated with the change in the Intellectual 
Property Rights policy to first-to-file, dramatically increased the number of patent applications 
issued by foreign and domestic inventors residing in Canada (Hanel, 2006). This reform 
significantly increased R&D grants specifically in the pharmaceutical industry. Canada is ranked 
third, after the US and Japan, for the number of patents arising from grants per dollar allotted 
(Hanel, 2006), as R&D grants have significantly increased the number of patents (Hanel, 2006; 
M. Trajtenberg, 2000). However, the increasing number of patents doesn’t necessarily improve 
the innovation quality (Hanel, 2006). Rafiquzzaman and Mahmud’s (2002) studies reveal the 
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quality of Canadian patents has improved compared to other G-7 countries (United States, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom) except the US, when quality is 
measured by the number of patent citations. 
Likewise, to assess the impact of patent ownership structure on innovation outcome in the US, 
Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) examined the impact of the Bayh–Dole Act on patent content at the 
Columbia U., U. of California, and Stanford University, both before and after 1980. Mowery and 
Ziedonis (2002) used forward citations following six-year windows as an index to measure the 
“importance” of patents. The forward citations show the influence of citing patents on 
subsequent patents. “Generality” is an index to show different technology classes associated with 
citing patents (Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002). Accordingly, a higher “generality” value shows the 
higher number of technology fields involved in citing patents (Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002).  
The explorations of Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) demonstrate that there is no evidence of 
decline in the “importance” or “generality” of patents after 1980. However, the patents tend to be 
less significant and less general than those issued by highly experienced universities both before 
and after 1980, while being initially assigned to companies after the Bayh–Dole Act (Mowery & 
Ziedonis, 2002). The studies of these universities, which are among the top patent holders in the 
United States, illustrate that the number of biomedical patents increased both before and after 
1980. Hence, the passage of Bayh–Dole did not bring significant contributions to this increasing 
number of biomedical patents. Accordingly, Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) reveal that patenting is 
more relevant to factors other rather than Bayh–Dole. They argue that patent quality is more 
likely linked to the history of inventors and patentees. They indicate that Bayh–Dole facilitates 
the entrance of inexperienced inventors to generate patents. However, their explorations illustrate 
that the impact of Bayh–Dole on patent content was modest. Moreover, they found that the 
“importance” and “generality” of the University of California (UC) and Stanford University 
patents did not decrease after the Bayh–Dole Act came into force. In contrast, Henderson et al. 
(1998a) determined that the importance and generality of university patents declined after the 
passage of Bayh–Dole. According to the Bayh–Dole Act literature, more attention has been paid 
to measuring inventors’ experience in patenting predating Bayh–Dole (Henderson et al., 1998a; 
Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002). Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) compared patents issued by qualified 
universities after 1980 with patents assigned to companies less experienced in patenting, pre-
1980. They proposed that the decline in post-1980 patents is more related to new, inexperienced 
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academics or public institutions as patentees, rather than being related to Bayh–Dole. Their 
results thus show that the decline in post-1980 patent quality is more affected by the 
qualifications of new inventors than by changes made by the new ownership rights legislation. 
By contrast, Henderson et al. (1998a) conclude that the decline of academic patents is associated 
with the large number of patents issued by small firms after the passage of Bayh–Dole.  
However, the number of patents developed by university scientists increased after the Bayh–
Dole Act came into effect. The main purpose of Bayh–Dole is that the majority of valuable 
university patent technologies are unexploited (Motohashi & Muramatsu, 2012). Therefore, 
university ownership of intellectual property rights results in significant contributions to industry 
(Motohashi & Muramatsu, 2012). The process of patent commercialization at universities is 
facilitated through shifting patent ownership to the universities themselves and restructuring 
academic scientists’ intellectual property rights. As a consequence, these scientists tend to 
develop more patents (Henderson et al., 1998, 1998a; Motohashi & Muramatsu, 2012; Sampat et 
al., 2003). Through granting licensing authority to the universities, the number of patents at 
universities and research facilities is increased, although the quality of patents held by 
universities is less known (Motohashi & Muramatsu, 2012). 
Bessen (2008) stated that individual inventors in a low-technology paradigm might not obtain 
high patent value, however this does not mean that they issue low quality patents. Instead, it 
shows that small inventors might receive less value through issuing patents (Bessen, 2008). 
However, other inventors involved in small firms may generate very valuable patents, as well as 
those in large corporations (Bessen, 2008). In a high-technology market (Silicon Valley, for 
instance), small firms can offer their patents to the market and there is an opportunity for large 
firms with great financial assets to purchase their innovations (Bessen, 2008).  
There is a huge difference in patent value between different categories of patentees (Bessen, 
2008). Small and individual patentees, firms with less than 500 employees, and non-profit 
organizations obtain on average less than half the value compared with patents granted to large 
corporations (Bessen, 2008). However, this does not hold true for small and individual inventors 
in a high-technology market (Bessen, 2008). Small firms can be fit perfectly into the technology 
market, with high demand for acquisition of small firms’ innovation outcomes by large 
technology-driven corporations (Bessen, 2008).  
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3.1.1 Government assignees versus private-sector assignees 
Numerous scholars have investigated the links between patent ownership and patent quality 
(Crespi et al., 2010; Henderson et al., 1998a; Lissoni et al., 2010; Motohashi & Muramatsu, 
2012; Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002; Sampat et al., 2003; Sterzi, 2013). Popp et al. (2013) assessed 
the impact of assignees’ type on the patent citations at six energy technologies fields including: 
Hybrid, Nuclear, Solar, Wind, Efficiency, and Fuel Cell. Popp et al. (2013) defined different 
dummy variables to identify various assignees’ institutions including U.S. government, industry, 
university, other research facilities and U.S. government child patents. Popp et al. (2013) defined 
two dummy variables according to the government assignees. First, a dummy variable for 
government assignees was set at 1, where patents were assigned to the U.S. government 
laboratories (Popp et al., 2013). Second, U.S. government child patents were also set at 1, where 
patents were privately held by a corporation but cited at least one patent that was assigned to the 
U.S. government (Popp et al., 2013). Popp et al.’s (2013) outcomes demonstrated that the results 
vary across different technology domains (fuel cell, solar energy and wind); government patents 
obtained higher quality. However, only 1.4% of patents in the wind sector were assigned to the 
government. For the remaining domains, the government assignees received fewer citations 
(Popp et al., 2013).  
Likewise, Popp (2006) discovered that government patents are not cited more frequently in 
subsequent patents than other types of assignees. This result can be explained by the nature of the 
government projects. They have greater risk than other research projects but government has 
enough resources to take the risk; private companies cannot take such tremendous risks. The U.S. 
government patents obtained 22% less citations than private patentees (Popp et al., 2013). 
According to Popp’s (2006) findings, the government patents tended to receive more citations 
after 1981 compared to patents issued before 1981. There can be two possible explanations: first, 
patents concentrated more on applied science before 1981, while later patents were linked to 
more basic knowledge and so tended to be cited more than before (Popp, 2006).  
The second explanation involves the nature of government patents accomplished at 
laboratories, which seems to have changed over time (Popp, 2006). Particular policy actions took 
place in 1980 to shift patent ownership from the public to the private sector; these include the 
Stevenson–Wylder Technology Innovation Act of 1980, the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, and the 
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Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (Popp, 2006). The Technology Innovation Act 
launched a technology transfer office to engage all federal laboratories (Popp, 2006). The Federal 
Technology Transfer Act of 1986 deals with the collaborative R&D projects run with the 
cooperation of government laboratories and private corporations (Popp, 2006). Accordingly, the 
shift in the nature of government patents encouraged private corporations to cooperate with the 
government in patenting, causing the government patents to be cited more after 1981 (Popp, 
2006). However, the government patents were still not cited as frequently as patents held by 
corporations (Popp, 2006; Popp et al., 2013). The above results show that as the nature of 
government patents changed over time, privately owned patents became more appropriate for the 
commercialization and marketing of innovations, and thus were cited more (Popp, 2006; Popp et 
al., 2013).  
As we discussed above, the results may vary according to the domains and regions (Popp, 
2006; Popp et al., 2013). With respect to the former studies, U.S. government child patents that 
were assigned to firms obtained greater quality in terms of patent citations than government 
patents (Popp, 2006; Popp et al., 2013). There is still a lack of attention given to measure the 
impact of government assignees on the quality of biotechnology patents issued by inventors 
residing in Canada. Therefore, in this section, we seek an answer to the question, “Do public 
patents obtain more quality than patents that were privately assigned by the corporations?” 
Therefore, this thesis proposes a hypothesis regarding the impact of government assignees on 
quality of patents generated by academic inventors. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Patents generated by at least one academic inventor and exclusively owned by 
the government are of a lesser “quality” than those owned by industrial assignees. 
 
In most of the literature reviewed in the previous and current chapters, scholars have used 
various indicators that they claim measure, or is a proxy for, “quality”. A few scholars have 
warned that these proxies are just that, proxies, and do not measure quality per se. These 
indicators may measure impact, usage, generality or diversity of prior art or of future 
applications, etc. In this thesis, although we use the term “quality” as a general term, it is meant 
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as implying impact, usage, diversity, etc. The next chapter will define the exact indicators that 
will be used for this purpose.  
 
3.1.2 Academic assignees versus industrial assignees 
Patent ownership depends on a variety of legislation and institutional factors. Certain countries 
have their own intellectual property strategy. Essentially, universities in those countries tend to 
own their inventions instead of companies. For instance, in the UK and the Netherlands, 
universities are able to manage their inventions in accordance with internal policies (Lissoni, 
2012). Similarly, professors can keep the privilege of their inventions in Scandinavian countries 
and Germany (Lissoni, 2012). The status of these countries in regard to academic patenting is 
outstanding. Furthermore, certain universities may own the inventions of their scientists through 
internal intellectual property policies (Lissoni, 2012). Thus, professors have high control over 
their inventions and they tend to keep their own patent rights (Lissoni, 2012). Conversely, there 
is a lower proportion of academic ownership in certain other countries, where universities have 
less control over their assets (Lissoni, 2012). 
Sterzi (2013) identified that there is still a lack of attention given to measuring the impact of 
patent ownership including university and firms on patent quality. Comparing the quality of 
patents owned by universities with the quality of company-owned patents during the period 
1990–2001, Sterzi (2013) found that academic patents owned by firms show greater quality in 
the first year of patent application compared to those assigned to universities and other research 
facilities. However, this difference diminishes and then disappears over time, with an increase in 
citations of academic patents. This is due to the fact that patents acquired by companies mostly 
target direct commercial benefits in the short term, while those owned by universities and other 
public institutions tend to answer scientific questions that have an impact over longer periods 
(Czarnitzki, Hussinger, & Schneider, 2012; Sterzi, 2013). Firms’ patents obtained 44% higher 
forward citations than academic patents in first three years after patent application date, however 
this rate diminished to 23% after six years (Sterzi, 2013). 
Lissoni et al. (2010) and Crespi et al. (2010) also investigated whether there is a link between 
patent ownership and patent quality. Lissoni et al. (2010) assessed patent quality for five 
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European countries (Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, France, and Denmark). They found that 
patents owned by industry are of a greater quality compared to patents owned by universities. 
Likewise, Crespi et al. (2010) measured the value of academic patents in six European countries 
(the Netherlands, Spain, France, Italy, the UK, and Germany). Crespi et al. (2010) were unable to 
find any evidence to identify a relationship between ownership and patent quality. 
However, analyzing the patents owned by universities is not a fundamental indicator for 
university science and technology linkage (Meyer, 2003). Instead, patents owned by at least one 
academic inventor may be more essential to measure science–technology transfer (Meyer, 2003).  
In previous studies, there is inadequate research to measure the quality of patents generated by 
academic inventors residing in Canada and owned across different institutions including 
universities and corporations. Therefore, we suggested the following hypothesis in this study to 
measure the impact of academic patents on patent quality: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Patents generated by at least one academic inventor and assigned to universities 
and other academic research facilities are of a lesser “quality” than those owned by industrial 
assignees. 
As discussed in Section 3.1, the Bayh–Dole Act deals with patents that receive public grants 
from the government but are accomplished by and assigned to the universities. We highlighted 
the impact of the Bayh–Dole Act on “importance” or “generality” of the patents in Section 3.1. 
In this study we set out to examine the so-called “quality” of patents assigned to the universities 
and other research facilities in cases where the inventor(s) received public funding from the 
government. We wanted to assess the impact of government grants on patent “quality” in those 
cases. We discuss in detail the impact of the Bayh–Dole Act on patent quality in Sections: 2.4, 
3.1, 3.1.1, and 3.1.2. 
Thus, we propose a hypothesis including government funding, academic assignees and patent 
quality, presented below: 
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Hypothesis 2A: Patents generated by at least one academic inventor and assigned to the 
university tend to rank higher in terms of “quality” when grants were received from the 
government. 
 
3.1.3 Network collaboration characteristics and patent quality 
There are various examinations assessing the influence of scholars’ research collaboration 
network on patents generated by corporations (Gilding, 2008; Guan & Chen, 2012; Mariani, 
2004; Tether, 2002). Furthermore, there are studies that measure the impact of different players’ 
network position on their partners’ performance, where the actors’ knowledge flows in 
interactive networks (Bettencourt, Kaiser, & Kaur, 2009; Chen & Guan, 2010; Cowan & Jonard, 
2004; Guan & Chen, 2012; Schilling & Phelps, 2007).  
Previous studies investigated the impact of various actors’ network structure, where their 
connectivity centers on the partners’ innovation outcomes (Bettencourt et al., 2009; Chen & 
Guan, 2010; Cowan & Jonard, 2004; Guan & Chen, 2012; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Guan and 
Chen (2012) assessed the influence of network position on patenting at the national level, 
including the countries playing crucial roles as knowledge creators. Schilling and Phelps (2007) 
examined the firms’ network characteristics on industrial innovations.  
Xiang, Cai, Lam, and Pei (2013) structured the new model to integrate the patent citation and 
co-invention network. They considered the patent citation as explicit, codified knowledge which 
is easily identified through the patent document. Co-inventors first engage in a long process of 
sharing non-codified knowledge; however, various face-to-face relationships between different 
partners is required to effectively shape the co-invention networks (Bresman, Birkinshaw, & 
Nobel, 2010; Szulanski, 1996; Uzzi, 1996; Xiang et al., 2013). The co-inventors network is 
associated with tacit knowledge, which is non-codified and more difficult to track. Various 
personal relationships are required to transfer such knowledge. Xiang et al. (2013) believed the 
patent citation doesn’t show the whole picture of knowledge exchange; therefore they considered 
the network properties of co-inventors as a complementary entity to complete the whole picture 
of knowledge transfer. Incorporating both the patent citations and the co-invention networks 
comprehensively reflects the true extent of knowledge transfer between different partners, 
 39 
including explicit as well as tacit knowledge (Xiang et al., 2013). Various scholars have explored 
the network properties of knowledge transfer (He & Fallah, 2009; Marquetoux, Stevenson, 
Wilson, Ridler, & Heuer, 2016; Xiang et al., 2013). They reveal a clustering co-efficient as a 
measure of network cohesion; where information in the short path with high density can broadly 
diffuse faster (He & Fallah, 2009; Marquetoux et al., 2016; Xiang et al., 2013). 
Betweenness centrality is measured according to the geodesic path in the network; it 
demonstrates how frequently the actors between all actor pairs are located in the network’s 
shortest path (Gilsing, Cloodt, & Bertrand–Cloodt, 2016). Gilsing et al. (2016) investigate the 
impact of betweenness centrality on innovation performance. Actors that occupied a highly 
centralized network tend to obtain high reputation, power and innovation performance (Gilsing, 
Nooteboom, Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & van den Oord, 2008). Essentially, betweenness 
centrality provides players faster access to strategic information, among other benefits, and 
facilitates the broad spread of information through the whole network (Gilsing et al., 2016). The 
central position allows actors to control the information flow as well as the information visibility 
in the network (Burt, 1995). Therefore the actors dealing with high betweenness centrality are 
situated in the crossroads of strategic information and tend to obtain better innovation 
performance (Gilsing et al., 2016). Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) used four indicators including 
R&D input, patent citations, number of patents, and generating new products to build a 
composite structure to measure innovation performance as the latent variable. Patent citation and 
prior art of patents were found as the most common proxy to measure patent quality (Hagedoorn 
& Cloodt, 2003). Therefore, in this section, we want to find out whether government patents or 
university patents obtain more or less citations when the inventors are highly centralized in the 
co-invention or co-authorship network. Previously, we discussed the impact of both government 
and academic assignees on patent quality. We suggested both government and university patents 
are likely to receive less citation than patents privately held by corporations. This study seeks to 
answer the following question: Do co-invention and co-publication network characteristics have 
a significant influence on patent quality? This research observes the influence of the scholars’ 
clustering method and its correlated network positions of the university patents.  
Accordingly, we proposed the following hypotheses including interactive variables of 
assignees (government and university) and co-invention and co-authorship network centrality: 
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Hypothesis 3A: Patents generated by at least one academic inventor and owned by the 
government are of a lesser quality than industrial assignees, even when the academic inventor(s) 
is highly centralized in the co-invention network. 
Hypothesis 3B: Patents generated by at least one academic inventor and owned by the 
government are of a lesser quality than industrial assignees, although the academic inventor(s) is 
highly centralized in the co-publication network. 
Hypothesis 4A: Patents generated by at least one academic inventor and assigned to universities 
and other academic research facilities are of a lesser quality than industrial assignees, although 
the academic inventor(s) is highly centralized in the co-invention network. 
Hypothesis 4B: Patents generated by at least one academic inventor and assigned to universities 
and other academic research facilities are of a lesser quality than industrial assignees, even when 
the academic inventor(s) is highly centralized in the co-publication network. 
 
3.2 Patent–paper pairs and patent quality 
A number of scholars have explored various metrics to find a good proxy measures of 
innovation quality, as inspired by the scientometric literature and also as initiated by Manuel 
Trajtenberg (1990) (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1992; Narin, Hamilton, & Olivastro, 1997). 
There is ample evidence in the science–technology linkages literature expressing patent citations 
as a very good proxy for innovation performance, while various patent quality indicators are 
examined (B. H. Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005; Harhoff et al., 1999). Bonaccorsi and Thoma 
(2007) selected multiple indicators used by B. H. Hall and Trajtenberg (2004), Henderson et al. 
(1998a), and Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) to measure innovation productivity. The authors 
categorized the patent inventors in three groups. The first group is composed of patent inventors, 
where all inventors are also named as author(s) of scientific publication(s) in nano science and 
technology (NST). The second group consists of inventors who have no scientific publication in 
NST. The third group comprises patent inventors, where at least one of the inventors has 
published article(s) in the nanotechnology domain. Analyzing the impact of each inventor 
category on patent quality, Bonaccorsi and Thoma (2007) discovered the quality of patents solely 
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generated by the inventors community to be lower than patent quality linked to the author–
inventor network. 
Haeussler and Sauermann (2013) presented evidence on the social impacts of authorship and 
inventorship on innovation performance. Scientists share their ideas through publications and can 
receive recognition from other researchers through citations of their scientific articles, and also 
through benefits such as increased salaries and consulting opportunities, as positive outcomes of 
their inclination to authorship (Haeussler & Sauermann, 2013; Merton & 1973). Inventorship is 
also rewarding, however; academic inventors can receive peer recognition in their professional 
network from patenting, in addition to the revenues they can generate by licensing their 
innovations and ideas (Dasgupta & David, 1987).  
Murray and Stern (2007)  studied the impact of intellectual property on knowledge diffusion, 
putting patent–paper pairs at the heart of their research strategy. They indicated that inventors 
tend to both publish articles and issue patents, and particularly that half of the publications in the 
field of nature biotechnology are linked to patents within five years of publication. Murray and 
Stern (2007) categorized the patent–paper pairs in two groups: pre-grant period with no formal 
Intellectual Property Right (IPR), and post-grant period including IPR associated to the time 
period during which articles are published. Their findings demonstrate that the citation rate of 
publications associated to patent–paper pairs declines after the patents are granted (see also 
Heisey and Adelman (2009) and Kang, Ryu, and Lee (2009).  
Various scholars have suggested that IPR offers financial and social benefits for innovative 
activities (see for instance Hellmann (2007) and Kitch (1977), while others abide by the “anti-
common” perspective, arguing that IPR has a negative impact on innovations. The debate 
between these two approaches points to the question of how IPR affects a researcher’s inclination 
to generate more knowledge in future scientific activities. Some scholars take the approach that 
IPR is more akin to “privatizing” knowledge and thus prevents knowledge flows between 
researchers’ ideas and their exploration (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1998; Heller & Eisenberg, 
1998). Murray and Stern (2007) explored whether there is a difference in the citation rate of 
publications that are patented. According to their findings, as well as those of Heisey and 
Adelman (2009), intellectual property acquisition has a negative impact on knowledge 
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application by subsequent scientists. Thus, the number of publication citations decreases after 
patents are granted.  
Likewise, Magerman et al. (2015) used text mining to find patent–paper pairs. They explored 
the forward citation of publications belonging to such pairs and compared the citation rate with 
that of un-paired articles. They concluded that publications with a patent counterpart received 
more citations than scientific publications that were unconnected to patents. Furthermore, they 
found that patenting activities do not hinder research activities. Instead, involvement in patenting 
activities has a significantly positive impact on the research footprint of authors (Feldman, 
Kenney, & Lissoni, 2015; Magerman et al., 2015). 
A survey of the literature on patent–paper pairs and the impact on innovation performance 
reveals that less attention has been directed to assessing the impact of such pairs on patent 
quality; different patent quality indicators have been chosen for measuring this impact. This 
paper therefore aims to answer the following question: Do patent–paper pairs have a higher 
quality than other patents that are not linked to such publications? With this debate in mind, the 
following hypothesis is therefore proposed: 
Hypothesis 5: Patents invented by at least one inventor who has also authored a scientific article 
in a similar field within a short time frame are of a higher quality compared with patents that 
have been developed without close links to publications. 
3.3 Patent–grant pair and patent quality 
Kang and Park (2012) investigated the impact of government R&D support on biotechnology 
patents in Korea. They found that government funds positively affect firms’ innovation, while 
financing holds a positive influence on domestic and international collaborations (Kang & Park, 
2012). Kang and Park (2012) further concluded that inter-firm collaborations positively affect 
corporations’ innovation. Moreover, Kang and Park (2012) reveal that government grants related 
to R&D projects have a positive influence on firms’ patents. Government improves the 
innovation rate by supporting R&D projects.  
Block and Keller (2009) investigated the top 100 published patents in R&D magazines for the 
period of the 1970s through 2006. Block and Keller (2009) discovered approximately 90 percent 
of the best-awarded innovations in the US received government grants. Accordingly they 
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proposed that government funding is positively related to firms’ innovation through the positive 
link of government granting and internal R&D resources (Block & Keller, 2009). Likewise, there 
is a positive association of government funds and external collaborations (Block & Keller, 2009). 
The external collaborations also positively influence patenting (Block & Keller, 2009). 
Consequently, government grants affect innovation directly as well as indirectly, through both 
internal and external R&D collaboration resources (Block & Keller, 2009).  
De Jong and Freel’s (2010) findings reveal that granting in R&D projects diminishes the 
geographical distance obstacles to finding a valuable partner located in a distant region. Several 
scholars have found that R&D resources positively affect corporations’ innovation performance 
(Belussi, Sammarra, & Sedita, 2010; Freel, 2003; Kang & Park, 2012; Parthasarthy & 
Hammond, 2002; Romijn & Albaladejo, 2002).  L. A. Hall and Bagchi-Sen’s (2007) 
investigations imply that government funding definitely affects the R&D intensity in U.S. 
biotechnology corporations. Furthermore, firms’ R&D intensity is positively correlated with 
innovation performance (L. A. Hall & Bagchi-Sen, 2002, 2007; Kang & Park, 2012). Scholars’ 
investigations identify several funding sources that might affect the scientists’ activities leading 
to patenting (Geuna, 2001; Geuna & Nesta, 2006; Goldfarb & Henrekson, 2003; Guerzoni, 
Taylor Aldridge, Audretsch, & Desai, 2014; Gulbrandsen & Smeby, 2005). Guerzoni et al. 
(2014) discovered that academic scientists are encouraged toward patent invention, when they 
obtain funding from their own academy.  On the other hand, academic scholars have lower 
propensity to be issued patents (Guerzoni et al., 2014), when gaining financial support from non-
academic institutions or corporations.  
Gulbrandsen and Smeby’s (2005) findings are not consistent with those of Guerzoni et al. 
(2014). Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2005) found that those scientists who obtain external funding 
collaborate more than those with no financial support from corporations. Moreover, Gulbrandsen 
and Smeby (2005) suggested that scholars with industrial funding can generate more patents and 
accomplish more commercial activities than those with no firms’ funding.  
There are no prior explorations that solely examine the correlation of financial support and 
commercial activities (Gulbrandsen & Smeby, 2005).  Few scholars reveal that increasing the 
number of patents and boosting university entrepreneurship programs can increase the number of 
contracts (Geuna & Nesta, 2006). Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2005) findings emphasize that 
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academic scientists who gain industrial funding gradually collaborate with other partners at 
universities, foreign research facilities, firms, and their colleagues at the same department. 
Furthermore, Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2005) results illustrate that collaboration and industrial 
funding are positively associated with patent invention and commercial output.  
Guan and Yam (2015) examined the impact of public funding on innovation performance, 
measured by the number of patents as one of the indicators of innovation performance, in Beijing 
in the 1990s. Guan and Yam (2015) categorized the government funding in three categories:  
Direct Earmarks, Special Loans, and Tax Credits. Money that comes from the Direct Earmarks is 
assigned to equipment, renewal, procurement, and new product development for the projects 
engaging in high risk (Guan & Yam, 2015). This financial resource is assigned to high-priority 
projects in national technology development in China (Guan & Yam, 2015). China’s government 
offers Special Loans to firms, which must be paid back, when the firms cannot obtain loans from 
the bank easily (Guan & Yam, 2015). Under the Tax Credits, companies can obtain tax 
exemptions or reductions over the three years after the corporation released its product(s) into the 
market (Guan & Yam, 2015).  Their outcomes show all the government financial support is not 
related to the patents generated at either high-tech or general firms (Guan & Yam, 2015). Direct 
Earmarks is negatively related to the patents generated by the firms (Guan & Yam, 2015). These 
results show that the government funding system in China does not perform efficiently, and that 
the funding system in that country should be restructured to provide more market information on 
the funding process (Guan & Yam, 2015).  
Therefore, this study seeks an answer to the following question: “Do federally funded patents 
tend to obtain more citations?” We thus postulate that: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Patents generated by at least one academic inventor in Canada who received 
grants from a government in a similar field of patenting within a short time frame obtained 
significantly higher patent quality. 
 
As we discussed in Section 3.1.3, we considered whether co-publication or co-invention 
network centralization has a significant effect on patent citations, as a patent quality indicator 
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(Xiang et al., 2013). Therefore, in this thesis, we measured whether the patents in patent–grant 
pairs obtain higher quality than patents without such a link, when the academic inventors occupy 
a highly centralized co-publication network.    
 
Hypothesis 6A: Patents generated by at least one academic inventor who received grants from 
a government in a similar field of patenting within a short time frame are of a higher quality, 
even when the inventors are highly centralized in the co-publication network. 
 
3.4 Star scientists and patent quality 
A number of studies explore the impact of faculty prestige on scholars’ involvement with 
industrial patents (Geuna & Nesta, 2006; Perkmann, King, & Pavelin, 2011; Siegel, Wright, & 
Lockett, 2007). Bercovitz and Feldman’s (2011) findings indicate that “star scientists” bring 
significant value to joint team members. Zucker and Darby (1996) defined star scientists as the 
best partners of the biotechnology firms who had published at least forty genetic studies in 
GenBank1 (Zucker & Darby, 1996, 2001; Zucker et al., 2002; Zucker et al., 1998). Furukawa and 
Goto (2006a, 2006b) likewise considered “core scientists” as industrial scholars who had 
published large numbers of scientific articles and obtained remarkably numerous paper citations. 
Baba et al.’s (2009) findings imply, in contrast with prior studies, that the most effective 
university–industry collaborations are associated with “Pasteur scientists” instead of star 
scientists. Pasteur scientists are those essential players in the university–industry knowledge 
transfer network who have published qualified articles as well as generating patents (Baba et al., 
2009).  
                                                
1 GenBank is a NIH genetic sequence database that covers the DNA DataBank of Japan, the European Molecular 
Biology Laboratory (EMBL), and GenBank at NCBI. !
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Hong and Su (2013) determined that social proximity and university prestige characterize the 
bridges among non-local scholars at universities and corporations who jointly develop new 
products. Collaboration with prestigious universities offers credibility for corporations in 
presenting product quality (Hong & Su, 2013). Various scholars indicate that firms tend to 
collaborate with top-tier rather than second-tier universities, regardless of the distance between 
them (J. D. Adams, 2005; Hong & Su, 2013; Laursen, Reichstein, & Salter, 2011).  
Bercovitz and Feldman (2011) found that partners maintained interest in collaborating with star 
scientists regardless of the geographical distance, when the scientists’ reputation is considered. 
These researchers also determined that the value of the scientists’ reputation can compensate for 
the negative impact of coordination costs over a distance. However, Bercovitz and Feldman 
(2011) outcomes indicate there is no evidence to demonstrate that scientists’ reputations 
encourage distant participation. They offer two possible explanations. First, because 
opportunities to work with star scientists are in high demand, there are ample numbers of local 
partners available to collaborate with them (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2011). It is not beneficial for 
the star scientists to suffer traveling expense and long-distance collaboration cost, when they can 
easily collaborate with local partners (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2011). Second, many star scientists 
cooperate with scholars at start-up companies that are located close to the universities (Bercovitz 
& Feldman, 2011).  
Thus, this study aims to identify the relationship between academic star scientists and 
university involvement with firms. It seeks to the answer the following question: Do more 
prestigious academic faculties raise the likelihood of academics to generate high-quality 
patents?  
Perkmann et al. (2011) suggested that the association of scientists’ qualifications and 
university–industry linkage depends on the field, and that this relationship differs in various 
disciplines. They demonstrated that the faculty chair has a positive influence on corporation 
engagement in technology-oriented fields. Various scholars have discovered that the quality of 
both university and industrial firm increases the likelihood of university–industry linkage 
(Breschi, Lissoni, & Montobbio, 2007; Geuna & Nesta, 2006; Stephan, Gurmu, Sumell, & Black, 
2007). Thus, in this study, we seek an answer to the following question: Do star scientists 
positively affect the quality of an innovation outcome? Hence, the next hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 7: Patents generated by star scientists receive more numerous citations than patents 
issued without engaging prestigious scholars. 
In this section we proposed hypotheses regarding the impact of patent–paper pairs, patent 
ownership, and patent–grant pairs on patent quality. The Bayh–Dole Act passed during the 1980s 
gives the authority for the universities to retain their intellectual property rights. There are 
debates over supporting public patent ownership versus favoring industrial assignees. Supporters 
of academic ownership say it encourages scholars’ incentives at universities to generate new 
products and ideas, leading to economic growth (Sampat, 2006). Licensing is one of the channels 
by which universities can contribute to innovation commercialization (Sampat, 2006). However, 
the impact of public ownership is not so clear on other channels of knowledge transfer (Sampat, 
2006). Licensing of academic patents by the corporations is considered as one of the significant 
channels of UILs. There is extensive literature that measures the impact of UILs on innovation 
performance.  
In this research we are aware of the concerns regarding the use of patent citations or claims as 
proxies for patent “quality” (Alcacer & Gittelman, 2004; Jung & Lee, 2014). However, while the 
inventors filing the patent might not be aware of the examiners’ backgrounds and qualifications, 
or the number of examiners, the presence of the prior art of the patents demonstrates the 
existence of the associated former knowledge in the patent (Jung & Lee, 2014). Some scholars 
have found that the aggregate citations are a meaningful proxy for the knowledge flows (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, & Fogarty, 2000; Jung & Lee, 2014); and Jung and Lee (2014) used patent citation 
as a reasonable proxy for the knowledge flows. We used forward citations, number of claims and 
Herfindahl index of both forward and backward citations to measure patent quality. 
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 DATA AND METHODOLOGY CHAPTER 4
4.1 Data and variables 
Three data sources were applied in this exploration to find potential patent–paper pairs: the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for patents2 and Elsevier’s Scopus for 
papers.3 The Scopus database includes authors’ names, their affiliations, publication date, title 
and abstract for each scientific article. The USPTO provides information on the inventors’ names 
and their addresses, the assignees’ names and their addresses, patent application and granting 
dates, the number of claims, etc. First, all the papers and patents in Canada in which at least one 
author or one inventor had an address or an affiliation in Canada were extracted. This exercise 
yielded a database of 563,684 scientists having published 180,719 articles, giving 1,013,450 lines 
representing article-scientist pairs, and a database of 14,082 inventors having generated 16,392 
patents, giving 51,315 patent-inventor pairs. These two databases were merged using a roughly 
unique ID for each individual (i.e., identifying the individuals who had common names in both 
patents and papers4). From this merged database, we selected only the patents and articles 
belonging to scientists-inventors residing in the province of Quebec. The data sample for the 
patent–paper pairs research in this study was restricted to the patents generated by academic 
inventors residing in Quebec, because the very detailed funding data required for this study only 
exists in this province. This study hence covers the data belonging to 2,517 scientists and 
inventors residing in Quebec who were involved in patenting and in publishing activities during 
the period 1985 through 2005 in the biotechnology and nanotechnology domains. These 
individuals were involved in filing 1,110 patents over this period. 
                                                
2 Canadian biotechnology and nanotechnology inventors generally patent in the US in addition, or in lieu of, 
patenting in Canada (Beaudry & Kananian, 2013). Furthermore, the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) 
does not provide consistent addresses for inventors, which adds to the difficulty of disambiguating inventor’s names. 
3 Scopus generally links authors with their affiliations, which greatly facilitates matching with the USPTO database 
and with disambiguation of names. Because of the large number of individuals to match for this research, this 
database was therefore favoured.  
4 Better precision is not necessary prior to the data mining similarity analysis. 
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As funding is crucial in patenting, the third database applied in this research is related to public 
grants and contracts. Thus, the Quebec University Research Information System (Système 
d’Information sur la Recherche Universitaire—SIRU), provided by the Quebec Ministry of 
Education, was used. This database contains information for the yearly amounts of contracts and 
grants obtained by Quebec academics. Out of the 372,967 records of SIRU, we selected the 
grants and contracts of the 2,203 Quebec scientists-inventors identified by the patent-paper 
selection exercise. Yearly public and private funding was calculated for each academic scientist 
residing in Quebec, as both grants and contracts were measured in this observation. In addition, 
for all 2,679 Canadian university scientists-inventors that collaborated with Quebec Academic-
inventors, we extracted funding information from the Tri-Council Agencies (the Natural Science 
and Engineering Research Council – NSERC; the Canadian Institutes of Health Research – 
CIHR; and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council – SSHRC). 
In this analysis, the information from the USPTO, SIRU and Scopus databases was grouped in 
two datasets. The first dataset contains 53,577 observations linked to biotechnology and 
nanotechnology inventors in Canada for the period 1996 to 2005. There were 10 rows, 
representing as many years, for each inventor, some of which are the academic-inventors 
described above, covering different information regarding the grants, contracts, article citation 
numbers, career age and tens of other variables through 1996 until 2005. This very detailed 
yearly information for each inventor, is then aggregated at the patent level (only for the relevant 
years – i.e. that of the patent application) according to the unique patent identification number, 
and comprises of 1,110 patents. Since there might be more than one inventor linking to each 
patent, the average of grants, contracts, and other indicators associated with inventors has been 
calculated for each unique patent. In other words, all the variables that were initially measured at 
the academic-inventor-year level and then grouped (averaged) at the patent level for all the 
academic inventors. On caveat of this method is that as we do not have the amount of funds 
provided to industrial scientists, only the public and private funds that transit via university 
accounts are considered in this study.  
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4.2 Dependent variables 
Many scholars have used various patent indicators that they claim are good proxies for the 
“quality” of patents, including the number of patent backward citations, the number of forward 
citations, the number of claims, the number of IPC-subclasses, patent renewal times, and the 
number of patent applicants as dependent variables (Carpenter et al., 1980; Goetze, 2010; 
Hirschey & Richardson, 2004; Narin et al., 1987; Manuel Trajtenberg, 1990). For instance, the 
number of forward citations counts the number of times that patents have been cited in 
subsequent patents during the 5-year period after the patents were granted (Burke & Reitzig, 
2007; Manuel Trajtenberg, 1990). The number of backward citations counts the number of 
patents referenced as citations in the patent document (Burke & Reitzig, 2007; Narin et al., 
1987). Henderson et al. (1998a) used the Herfindahl index as a measure of patent concentration. 
Bonaccorsi and Thoma (2007) constructed a quality index built from different quality factors 
such as the number of forward citations, the number of backward citations, family size and the 
number of claims. Bonaccorsi and Thoma (2007) integrated 1 minus the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations as a component of their originality index. A higher value of originality index 
demonstrates patents are less concentrated, and hence more diversified (Henderson et al., 1998a). 
The dependent variables of this investigation are therefore amongst the commonly used proxies 
for determining patent “quality”. The following variables have been selected for this purpose in 
this study: the number of patent forward citations [NbFCit5t], the number of claims [NbClaimst], 
1 minus the Herfindahl index of forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t], which is an index of the 
diversity of the patent classes of the pool of patents that cite a particular patent, and 1 minus the 
Herfindahl index of backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt], which is a measure of the diversity of 
the patent classes of the prior knowledge that a particular patent cites. 
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4.3 Independent variables 
The variable Grant3t measures the average amount of grants raised by each academic inventor 
residing in Quebec over the 3 years prior to the patent application.5 Similarly, Contract3t 
measures the amount of contract funding raised over the past 3 years, averaged among the 
Quebec academic inventors named on the patent document6. Payne and Siow (2003) found a 
small but positive impact of funding on the rate at which researchers have contributed patents. 
Separating grants from contracts, Beaudry and Kananian (2013) concluded that grants have little 
or no effect on the number of patent citations, finding an inverted U-shaped relationship with the 
number of claims. Thus, Beaudry and Kananian’s (2013) outcomes suggest a substitution effect 
between grants and contracts. Contracts, however, have a positive impact on both the number of 
citations and the number of claims.  
The scientists and inventors team itself may influence the quality of the resulting patent, as 
scientists and inventors tend to work in a group and do not generally work alone. Beaudry and 
Schiffauerova (2011) assessed the impact of the network characteristics of Canadian 
nanotechnology inventors on patent quality measured by the number of claims. The researchers 
discovered that more central individuals in terms of betweenness centrality (i.e., good 
intermediaries) produce a higher patent quality (Beaudry and Schiffauerova (2011). Conversely, 
J. C. Wang, Chiang, and Lin (2010) found that high brokerage has a negative impact on the 
patent renewal decision, where high brokerage is similar to the intermediary position and 
measured by betweenness centrality.  
In these studies, the network vertices represent the scientists or inventors, and the edges 
between the vertices correspond to the collaborative links between scientists or inventors leading 
to articles or patents (Carrington, Scott, & Wasserman, 2005). The co-authorship and co-
                                                
5 We have no means by which to evaluate the amount of funding raised by out of Quebec inventors and invested by 
the assignees. This variable is a control for the capacity of the academic team to raise funds.  
 
6 All grants and contracts monetary values have been deflated using the consumer price index to consider constant 
dollar values. 
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invention networks of scientists and inventors were respectively mapped in this study by using 
the social network analysis software Pajek. 
Certain intermediary nodes are indeed crucial for bridging between various clusters and sub-
clusters to diffuse information, knowledge and financial resources between different players 
(Ebadi & Schiffauerova, 2015). Betweenness centrality is a measure that identifies such 
gatekeepers in the network (Ebadi & Schiffauerova, 2015). Betweenness centrality shows the 
frequency of the node located between pairs of other nodes, occupying the shortest path of a 
graph (Szczepański, Michalak, & Rahwan, 2016). Essentially, betweenness centrality is a way to 
measure control of flow, knowledge in our case, in the network (Ebadi & Schiffauerova, 2015; 
Freeman, 1978; Marquetoux et al., 2016; Szczepański et al., 2016). Technically, betweenness of 
node k is defined as the share of time that node i can reach to node j through node k on the 
shortest path between node i and node j (Borgatti, 2005; Ebadi & Schiffauerova, 2015). 
Betweeness centrality is calculated by a formula, presented below, where i and j occupy a 
network as non-adjacent nodes (Ebadi & Schiffauerova, 2015): 
  Equation 4.1 
A high value of betweenness centrality for node k characterizes the essential control of node k 
in diffusing the flow between two other non-adjacent nodes, represented by node i and j (Ebadi 
& Schiffauerova, 2015; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
A clustering coefficient identifies the probability that node i and j are connected to node k, 
when node i and j are directly connected to each other (Marquetoux et al., 2016). The clustering 
coefficient shows the cliquishness of the network (Ebadi & Schiffauerova, 2015; Marquetoux et 
al., 2016; Watts & Strogatz, 1998). Scholars with a high clustering coefficient tend to tightly 
cluster to increase their connectivity; as a result, knowledge can transfer rapidly among players 
(Ebadi & Schiffauerova, 2015). The clustering coefficient specifies the triangle of actors who 
build a cluster, and it is calculated by the local clustering coefficient (Ebadi & Schiffauerova, 
2015).The local clustering coefficient of a node i is measured by the number of two adjacent 
nodes that connect to node i to build a cluster as triangle nodes, divided by the number of all 
three nodes that are connected together in the cluster (Watts & Strogatz, 1998), as presented 
below: 
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Thus, the overall clustering coefficient is calculated by the average of local clustering 
coefficients divided by the number of nodes representing vertices in the network of players, as 
demonstrated by the formula: 
 Equation 4.2 
In this study, to characterize the researchers’ positions within three-year7 interactive networks, 
a number of indicators were constructed: betweenness centrality (BtwCentArt3t) and cliquishness 
attributes (CliqnessArt3t), of individual scientists both belonging to the co-publication network, 
averaged over all inventors of a particular patent. Furthermore, the co-invention network was 
characterized by a third and a fourth variables: Betweenness centrality (BtwCentPat3t) measures 
the importance of an inventor as an intermediary in the co-invention8 network (Freeman, 1978), 
averaged over all academic inventors of a given patent; Cliquishness represents the likelihood 
that the direct neighbours of researchers are also connected to each other (Nooy, Mrvar, & 
Batagelj, 2011) in the co-invention network (CliqnessPat3t), averaged over all researchers of a 
given patent. 
The literature generally finds individuals who are most productive in terms of technological 
outputs generally produce most papers (Balconi & Laboranti, 2006; Calderini, Franzoni, & 
Vezzulli, 2007; Meyer, 2006; Van Looy, Ranga, Callaert, Debackere, & Zimmermann, 2004). 
The intrinsic individual quality is probably what drives this high production and constitutes a 
latent variable in this analysis. It is therefore important to measure this quality. The average 
                                                
7 The time window for building the networks differs from one study to another, when collaboration history is 
reviewed. Schilling and Phelps (2007) used 3-year windows to map the firm collaboration network. In contrast, 
Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) estimated 5-year windows. Thus, different combinations of 3- and 5-year subnetworks 
were calculated in this study to build the network metrics, and the 3-year subnetworks were chosen as the most that 
yielded the most consistent result. 
8 The average betweenness centrality of scientists in the co-invention network is also calculated; but as this variable 
never showed any significance in the results, it was eliminated from the models.  
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number of article citations obtained by academic inventors in the past 3 years is calculated as a 
first proxy of “scientific quality” in this analysis (ArtCit3t) as quality on the science side may 
drive quality on the technology side. A second proxy for individual quality is associated with the 
type/reputation of the research chair held by academic inventors in their careers. According to 
this measurement, the variable (MaxChairt) is defined as an ordinal variable, taking the value 0 if 
an academic inventor never held a chair, the value 1 for an industrial chair, the value 2 for an 
NSERC or CIHR chair and the value 3 for a Canada research chair.  
Furthermore, the “career” age (Aget) of a scientist is included as a proxy for real age, as the 
impact of the scientist’s age on patent quality is estimated. Career age corresponds to the average 
age during the whole period in which an inventor appears in the database from raising funds, 
publishing articles or patenting. This control variable expresses the fact representing older 
scientists maybe more creative (Cole & Cole, 1973; Kyvik & Olsen, 2008; Merton & 1973). 
Conversely, particular researchers believe scholars may make their most important discoveries 
before the age of 40 (C. W. Adams, 1946; Gieryn, 1981; Stern, 1978; Zuckerman, 1977).  
 
4.3.1 Patent–paper pairs methodology 
Several researchers have employed various methodologies to construct patent–paper pairs. 
Murray and Stern (2007) tried to match the articles and papers published in Nature 
Biotechnology Journal by asking experts to find the connection between the matched articles and 
papers. Ziedonis (2012) used an “Inventor-based matching” algorithm to extract the patent–paper 
pairs. Ziedonis’s (2012) algorithm is structured around the names of inventors who participated 
in both patenting and publishing. Two assumptions were necessary for this methodology: first, 
inventors who contributed to publications were considered as the link between science and 
technology; second, the patent application year was close to the publication date, within 2 years 
either side of the patent application date (Ziedonis, 2012). While Murray and Stern (2007) 
limited their patent–paper pairs to one patent linked to one publication, Ziedonis (2012) matched 
a number of common publications to a single given patent. 
A number of researchers used text-mining tools to find inventors who were also named as 
authors in a similar domain (Lissoni, Montobbio, & Zirulia, 2013). Lissoni and Montobbio 
 55 
(2006) selected the potential patent–paper pairs as those for which at least one inventor published 
scientific articles during the period [t - 2, t + 2], where t corresponds to the patent’s application 
date. In one of their methods (they compared five), Lissoni and Montobbio (2006) calculated the 
cosine similarity between the patent and paper documents to measure content similarity. Lissoni 
and Montobbio (2006) identified the top 10% of potential patent–paper pairs as the actual patent–
paper pairs, with similarity measures ranging from 0.145 to 0.75. Ducor (2000), however, 
discovered that authors were not always matched with the inventors who published (Haeussler & 
Sauermann, 2013).  
A similar methodology to Magerman et al. (2011, 2015) was used in this study. In Magerman 
et al.’s (2011, 2015) methodology, content similarity was measured to analyze the similarity of 
titles and abstracts of patents and papers, where at least one inventor was listed as an author of 
the publication. All the words of these documents were first indexed, and then evident stop 
words were removed. The vector space was created based on a document-by-term matrix 
generated from the patent and paper documents (Magerman et al., 2011, 2015; Salton, Wong, & 
Yang, 1975). The patent and article documents occupied the rows of the matrix, and particular 
distinctive terms extracted from the documents were added as the columns (Magerman et al., 
2011, 2015). Then, a Term Frequency and Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) method was 
used as a classic data mining technique (Magerman et al., 2011, 2015). Term Frequency and 
Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) was used to find the term frequencies of the words in the 
documents, in order to measure the similarities between the patent and paper documents 
(Magerman et al., 2011, 2015).  
In our research, the potential patent–paper pairs were first identified by selecting the patents 
originated by the authors-inventors network. According to our examination, 22,688 potential 
biotechnology patent–paper pairs were therefore extracted, with at least one of the inventors 
publishing at least one article in the period [t - 2, t + 2], where t corresponds to the patent 
application date. Moreover, 20,003 patent–paper pairs were discovered as potential 
nanotechnology patent–publication pairs originating in Canada. The text mining software 
Rapidminer was used to calculate the cosine similarity between the paired patent and paper 
documents. In this test, the similarity measures ranged from 0 to 0.78 for biotechnology, and 
from 0 to 0.53 for nanotechnology (theoretically, similarity measures range from 0 to 1). As with 
the methodology of Lissoni and Montobbio (2006), patent–paper pairs were selected from the top 
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10 percentile of the similarity in our observation. This roughly corresponds to a similarity 
measure of 0.30 for both biotechnology and nanotechnology samples. A dummy variable (dPPP) 
was created, taking the value 1 if the patent had a paper counterpart (i.e., the patents and papers 
are similar enough according to the top 10 percentile measure) and 0 otherwise. Then, this 
threshold was examined to see whether it yielded significant results in the regression models. 
Accordingly, 249 actual nanotechnology patent–paper pairs and also 376 biotechnology patent–
paper pairs9,10 were discovered in Canada, while the 0.30 threshold was used to measure the 
similarity. Because of the poor performance of this dummy variable in our regressions, and that 
regarding the threshold selected, we reverted to using the original measure of similarity in our 
regressions (Similarity). Results using the dummy variable dPPP, will therefore not be reported 
in this thesis.  
 
4.3.2 Patent–grant pairs methodology 
A review of the literature reveals a lack of attention to the topic of patent–grant pairs. To 
research this linkage, we measured the similarity of grants titles (from the Tri-Council Agency 
database) and patent titles (extracted from the USPTO database) using Rapidminer. First, we 
found the inventors (associated with our patent sample) who received grants from the federal 
government. Then, to increase our selection accuracy we applied the condition below to narrow 
the time window, in order to find the linkage between a patent and its relevant grants: 
[Year patent application-2] <= Year grant<= [Year patent application] 
The potential patent–grant pairs were therefore selected where public grants were assigned to 
inventors during a maximum of two years preceding the patent application year, and no further 
than the patent application year. Then, to improve the selection process, we assessed the 
similarity of the field associated with both patents and grants. We deleted the potential patent–
                                                
9 These patent–paper pairs were all checked individually to ensure that no two individuals with the same name were 
mistakenly associated in patent–paper pairs. 
10 Note that the nanobiotechnology field overlaps both biotechnology and nanotechnology; hence the total number of 
patent–paper pairs (PPP) found is less than the sum of both numbers of PPP.!
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grant pairs where inventors received grants in the biotechnology domain and generated patents in 
nanotechnology, or vice versa. We also kept the instances of inventors who received grants in 
either nanotechnology or biotechnology and generated patents in the combined field of 
nanobiotechnology which intersects both fields. 
In our sample, there were 1,110 patents, which were associated with 4,131 patent–scientist 
pairs. We merged our patent–scientist pairs table (including those 4,131 records) with the Tri-
Council Agencies database including 202,586 records, yielding 10,768 lines. Therefore, we 
applied the above-mentioned procedure to find potential patent–grant pairs, yielding 1,456 lines. 
Then, we measured the content similarity of titles of patents and grants belonging to potential 
patent–grant pairs that were extracted so far. Finally, we aggregated our data according to the 
patent identification and calculated the maximum and minimum similarity measure for each 
patent. As a result, we had a sample covering 1,110 observations including the maximum and 
minimum similarity, which arose from the patents and grants for each unified patent. Finally, we 
checked the significance of the similarity variable in our analysis model to find the threshold of 
the similarity between patents and grants. Various similarity values were tested, ranging from 
0.05 to 0.5. Finally, the threshold similarity of 0.1 was selected as a limit of the similarity. In this 
research, we generated a dummy variable associated with the patent–grant pairs. It equals 1 when 
the patent is part of a patent–grant pair, otherwise 0. Accordingly, 41 patent–grant pairs were 
identified in this research. In our measurement models, we used patent–grant pairs as a dummy 
variable and not as a similarity variable. 
 
4.4 Model specification 
4.4.1 Impact of patent–paper pairs on patent quality 
To analyze the impact of the patent–paper similarity [Similarity] variable on patent quality, 
several methods have been applied in this research. We used the Wu-Hausman test to find 
whether there is endogeneity in our model. The number of forward citations (NbFCit5t), the 
number of claims (NbClaimst) (both transformed by taking the natural logarithm) 1 minus the 
Herfindahl index of backward citations (HerfIndexBWCitt) and 1 minus the Herfindahl index of 
forward citations (HerfIndexFCit5t) were measured as the dependent variables. According to the 
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results, our model (including the patent–paper similarity attribute) does potentially suffer from 
endogeneity problems, when the number of claims (NbClaimst) and 1 minus the Herfindahl index 
of forward citations (HerfIndexFCit5t) are examined as the dependent variables 
(HerfIndexBWCitt and HerfIndexFCit5t are both normal continuous variables; therefore we didn’t 
apply logarithms for both Herfindahl variables). 
There are several possible explanations for this endogeneity. First, unobserved heterogeneity 
may plague the analysis because of poor data quality. Accordingly, an effort was made to clean 
the data to accurately match the name of scientists and inventors in this research. This step was 
performed manually and as such is not immune from human errors. Second, the number of patent 
citations was assumed to be linked to the total average of contracts received by academic 
inventors (Contract3t). However, the contracts are also probably related to the amount of grants 
raised (Grant3t) (Beaudry & Schiffauerova, 2011), which is one of the explanatory variables in 
this test. Thus, the contracts were observed as an endogenous variable in this examination.  
To correct for potential endogeneity, the two-stage least-squares (IVRegress 2SLS) regressions 
were estimated. The average amount of contracts (in constant CAD$) raised over three years 
(Contract3t) is highly correlated with particular variables, which are treated as instruments. 
Three instrumental variables are used to estimate the average amount of contracts: the average 
amount of past contracts received in the same university (Contract3Ut-2), the average amount of 
grants for equipment and infrastructure obtained by inventors (GrantEI3t-1), and the number of 
innovation loops (Loopt). The average amount of past contracts received in the same university 
(Contract3Ut-2) shows that universities that traditionally collaborate a great deal with industry are 
probably closer to the so-called third mission of universities. The average amount of grants for 
equipment and infrastructure raised by academic-inventors (GrantEI3t-1) is related to the sharing 
of important biotechnology and nanotechnology infrastructure that is often encouraged to ensure 
the survival of these laboratories. The number of innovation loops (Loopt), as suggested by 
Beaudry and Kananian (2013), measures the number of times academic inventors received funds 
from companies for research purposes, when these firms simultaneously own these patents. Thus, 
researchers having closer links with industry are likely to attract more contracts.  
In this analysis, various lag structures were estimated for the instrumental variables. A two-
year lag was selected for universities’ past contracts (Contract3Ut-2). Likewise, for the equipment 
 59 
and infrastructure grants (GrantEI3t-1), a one-year lag yields the most consistent results. 
Moreover, we used the Sargan test to verify whether our instrumental variables were valid, the 
tests confirms that our instrumental variables are valid. Please refer to Table E.1–Table E.2. We 
used the IVRegress 2SLS procedure to account for potential endogeneity (these results are 
summarized in Table E.1, Table E.2, Table 6.3, and Table 6.5). 
Equation 4.3 below presents the instrumental variable model where the average of contracts 
(Contract3t) is the endogenous variable, and where the instrumental variables include 
universities’ past contracts (Contract3Ut-2), equipment and infrastructure grants (GrantEI3t-1), 
and number of innovation loops (Loopt). This is the first stage of the 2SLS regression. The 
second stage of the model estimates the number of forward citations [NbFCit5t], the number of 
claims [NbClaimst], 1 minus the Herfindahl index of forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] and 1 
minus the Herfindahl index of backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] (see Equation 4.4).  
 Equation 4.3 
 
Equation 4.4 
Understandably, not all models will exhibit endogeneity problems, and as such, only Equation 
4.4 will be estimated, i.e. without the first stage equation). The Wu-Hausman test results imply 
there is no endogeneity for number of forward citations (NbFCit5t) and 1 minus the Herfindahl 
index backward citations (HerfIndexBWCitt) (refer to appendix Table E.1–Table E.2). 
As robustness checks, we also estimated models on the number of citations and claims (as 
opposed to the natural logarithm of these two measures) using Poisson regressions. A Poisson 
model is demonstrated below in Equation 4.5, where y represents the dependent variable and x 
the independent variable: 
Contract3t = f (Contract3Ut-2, GrantEI3t, Loopt, 2nd stage)
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  where β is the coefficient and ε is a residual Equation 4.5 
 
Equation 4.6 
 
Equation 4.7 
Our models suffered from over-dispersion and we couldn’t use the Poisson model in our 
analysis. We therefore had to estimate negative binomial regressions which do not impose that 
the mean is equal to the variance as it is the case in Poisson regressions. The negative binomial 
regression (nbreg) is demonstrated below: 
 
Equation 4.8 
 
If α = 0 then the Poisson models is the appropriate model; otherwise, if then there is 
over-dispersion, and negative binomial regression (nbreg) is the correct model. Beta as the 
regression coefficient is a measure of how strongly each predictor variable influences the 
dependent variable.  
Finally, all the variables have been transformed by Z Score grand mean centered to normalize 
the variables and hence minimize multicollinearity problems when using interactive variables (Z 
= x – µ / σ, µ = mean and σ = standard deviation) to measure impact of patent–paper similarity 
on patent quality. The corresponding results are shown in Table 6.2 (NbFCit5t), Table 6.3 
(NbClaimst), Table 6.4 (HerfIndexBWCitt), and Table 6.5 (HerfIndexFCit5t).  
 
 
y = β0 +βx +ε
P(Yi = yi ) = expλ(xi ).
λ(xi )
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E(yi | xi ) = λi = exiβ
E(yi | xi ) =Var[yi | xi ]= λi
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E(yi | xi ) =Var[yi | xi ]= λi
Var[yi | xi ]= E(yi | xi )(1+α[E(yi | xi )])
α ≠ 0
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4.4.2 Impact of public assignees versus industrial assignees on patent quality 
To compare the quality of patents assigned to the public sector with patents privately held by 
corporations, several models were used in this study. Whether to use the Tobit model or the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method was addressed as a primary question in the analysis. Since 
there is a significant number of 0 values, the Tobit model (left censored) was chosen as the more 
appropriate model to analyze the natural logarithm of the number of forward citations 
[NbFCit5t], 1 minus the Herfindahl index of forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t], and 1 minus the 
Herfindahl index of backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt]. The Tobit model is the econometrics 
model initially proposed by Tobin (1958) to demonstrate the relationship between a non-negative 
dependent variable (yi) and independent variables (xi). Finally, the Tobit regression model was 
used for the natural logarithm of number of claims [NbClaimst].  
 
 
Equation 4.9 
  if   Equation 4.10 
Where µ is a normal distribution with Means=0 and Variance=σ2 : 
 Equation 4.11 
 
y* represents a latent model, x demonstrates the independent variables, and y is a linear 
combination of independent variables (X1, X2,..., Xm). 
To measure the impact of patent ownership structure on NbFCit5t, NbClaimst, HerfIndexBWCitt, 
and HerfIndexFCit5t, Equation 4.4 was used. We used the square root of the clustering 
coefficient of the co-publication network (all averaged) to normalize this variable. Moreover, the 
natural logarithm of betweenness centrality of both co-publication and co-invention network is 
measured in the final model in order to normalize centrality variables. We tested the square effect 
of each variable to examine both the linear and non-linear effect of the variables (quadratic 
effect). Therefore, we added the square variables when there was a significant effect. Finally, we 
added the interactive variables to measure the impact of academic or government assignees on 
Y = β0 +β1X1 +β2X2 +β3X3 +...+βmXm
yit = yit
∗
yit = 0
yit
∗ > 0
yit
∗ ≤ 0
yit
∗ = βxit +µit
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patent quality, when inventors were situated in a highly centralized co-invention and co-
authorship network. As a next step, we tested whether there is endogeneity in our model or not. 
Once again, the IVRegress 2SLS method was the most appropriate model for the analysis. To 
analyze the endogeneity, IVRegress was used along with the Wu-Hausman and Sargan tests. 
Results are shown in Table F.1–Table F.4 in the appendix. The Wu-Hausman test’s results 
illustrate that there is no endogeneity for the number of forward citations [NbFCit5t], the number 
of claims [NbClaimst], or 1 minus the Herfindahl index of forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] 
and 1 minus the number of Herfindahl index of backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt]. The 
results are identified in Table F.1 (number of forward citations [NbFCit5t]), Table F.2 (number of 
claims [NbClaimst]), Table F.3 (Herfindahl index of backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt]), and 
Table F.4 (Herfindahl index of forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t]) in the appendix. For both the 
Wu-Hausman and Sargan tests we investigated two potential endogenous variables: the average 
dollar amount of contracts (Contract3t) and of grants (Grant3t) as an endogenous variables. 
We selected two groups of variables to measure the two different models for endogeneity in 
our analysis. First, we considered the average value of contracts (Contract3t) as an endogenous 
variable, and Contract3Ut-2, GrantEI3t-1, and Loop as instrumental variables, as discussed in the 
previous section 4.4.1. Second, instead of average value of Contract (Contract3t), we assumed 
the average value of grants that inventors received in a given year (Grant3t) as an endogenous 
variable. The average value of former grants that the same university obtained (Grant3Ut-1), and 
the average value of grants for equipment and infrastructure received by inventors (GrantEI3t-2) 
were treated as instrumental variables. According to the Sargan test results, our instrumental 
variables were valid in both models. However, the Wu-Hausman test results demonstrate that 
endogeneity is not apparent or not appropriately measured in the second approach, where the 
average value of grants that inventors received (Grant3t) was assumed as an endogenous 
variable. 
Then, we measured the robustness of our model. The number of forward citations (NbFCit5t) 
and number of claims (NbClaimst) are both count measures. Moreover, in our observations, there 
were a significant number of forward citations (NbFCit5t) assigned to 0 (543 observations out of 
1110). Therefore, the Zero-inflated negative binomial (Zinb) method was assumed to be an 
appropriate measurement for the forward citations (NbFCit5t) (as a dependent variable), where 
there is an excess of zeros in the dependent variable. We compared the Zinb test versus the 
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standard negative binomial method to find which technique was most appropriate for the number 
of forward citations (NbFCit5t). The Vuong test systematically rejected the standard negative 
binomial method for forward citations (NbFCit5t). Accordingly, the Zinb method was chosen as 
the correct method to analyze the number of forward citations (NbFCit5t). The Zinb test results 
are shown in Table B.1–Table B.3 of the appendix. The Zero-inflated negative binomial (Zinb) 
model is present below: 
 
  with probability of qi 
  
with probability of (1-qi)
 
Equation 4.12 
Where λ respects the equations below for binomial negative: 
   if  
 
Equation 4.13 
 
Once again, as our model suffered from over-dispersion, so the Zero-inflated Poisson model 
(Zip) was not applicable to the number of forward citations (NbFCit5t) or to the number of 
claims (NbClaimst). 
The Herfindahl index of forward citations (HerfIndexFCit5t) and backward citations 
(HerfIndexBWCitt) were continuous dependent variables for which there was no “found” 
endogeneity, and therefore standard OLS regression models were selected for them.  
Similarly to the previous section, the final model used Tobit for the (NbFCit5t) variable, since 
48% of the total of forward citations (NbFCit5t) sample (543 out of 1110 patent observations) 
equals 0, as results are shown in Table 6.8. To determine whether public assignees are involved 
in fewer multidisciplinary domains compared to industrial assignees, we used the Herfindahl 
index indicator—either the Herfindahl index of backward citations (HerfIndexBWCitt), results 
are determined in Table 6.10, or the Herfindahl index of forward citations (HerfIndexFCit5t) 
variables, results are implied in Table 6.11.  
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4.4.3 Impact of patent–grant pairs on patent quality  
To measure impact of patent–grant pairs on NbFCit5t, NbClaimst, HerfIndexBWCitt, and 
HerfIndexFCit5t, Equation 4.4 was used.  
To assess the impact of the dummy variable associated with patent–grant pairs on patent 
quality, we first tested for endogeneity and robustness. The Wu-Hausman test outcomes reveal 
that endogeneity is not present in our model, when (Grant3t) was examined as the endogenous 
variable. Therefore, considering the significant number of zeros, we used Tobit for NbFCit5t, 
HerfIndexBWCitt, and HerfIndexFCit5t. We used the natural logarithm of NbFCit5t to normalize 
this variable. HerfIndexBWCitt and HerfIndexFCit5t were multiplied by 100. We used OLS 
regressions for the natural logarithm of NbClaimst  as there is always at least one claim for the 
patent and there was no 0 assigned to this variable. The corresponding results are presented in 
Table 6.15 (NbFCit5t), Table 6.16 (NbClaimst), Table 6.17 (HerfIndexBWCitt), and Table 6.18 
(HerfIndexFCit5t). 
Previous researchers have attempted to investigate the factors bridging science and technology. 
Among these factors, grants and contracts, joint invention and authorship, and specific features 
of individual scholars (e.g., reputation and career age) have been highlighted. In advanced 
biotechnology and nanotechnology, scholars deeply and broadly engage in U–I collaborations 
(Lee, 2016). Scientists and firms are not bound by their collaboration networks in local areas but 
have expanded their partnership areas to distant universities, corporations, and individuals to 
provide better opportunities, tapping the skills and knowledge of their distant partners (Lee, 
2016). Past literature shows an increasing trend for joint invention and publication activities 
among scientists at firms and universities (Lee, 2016; Wuchty, Jones, & Uzzi, 2007).  Teams are 
more productive in accumulating knowledge and encouraging better innovation performance at 
universities and corporations (Singh & Fleming, 2009). Scholars located in the center of the 
collaborative network have access to strategic information and can control and widely distribute 
information flow in the network.  
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 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS CHAPTER 5
Before presenting the results, the descriptive statistics of variables are briefly presented in 
Table 5.1. Moreover, the correlation matrix is provided in Table K.1–Table K.3 in the appendix. 
The examination of these descriptive statistics should give us insight and the anticipated results 
presented in the sixth chapter of this thesis. 
Table 5.1 : Descriptive statistics 
Variable Nb Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
     NbFCit5t 1110 1.4649 2.7838 0 42 
NbClaimst 1110 18.4153 16.1117 1 151 
HerfIndexFCit5t 1110 0.8213 0.2602 0 1 
HerfIndexBWCitt  1110 0.7253 0.2978 0 0.9872 
Independent variables 
     Grant3t a 1110 316,827.7 1,021,492 0 8,170,096 
Aget a 1110 12.7511 4.2974 1 21 
MaxChairt b 1110 0.5162 0.8689 0 3 
ArtCit3ta 1110 17.1270 41.2803 0 712 
BtwCentArt3ta 1110 4.801 10.318 0 76.6230 
CliqnessArt3t  a 1110 22.6845 14.3057 0 117.8727 
BtwCentPat3t a 1110 299.814 880.071 0 6466.6890 
CliqnessPat3t a 1110 5,583.617 3764.399 0 10,000 
dNanoEx 1110 0.1640 0.3704 0 1 
dGovAssigneet d 1110 0.0315 0.1748 0 1 
dAcAssigneetd 1110 0.1604 0.3671 0 1 
dPGP 1110 0.0369 0.1887 0 1 
Similarityt 1110 0.1494 0.1458 0 0.7773 
Endogenous variables 
     Contract3t a, c 1110 240,149.2 1,078,342 0 10,600,000 
Instrumental variables 
     Contract3Ut-2 a, c 1110 22,564.86 26,837.2 0 95,158.06 
GrantEI3t-1 a, c 1110 17,570.03 130,513.9 0 2,561,704 
Loop e 1110 0.2252 0.4179 0 1 
Notes: (a) All the variables have been averaged over all academic inventors that contributed to a given patent; (b) Only 
this variable uses the maximum value of all academic inventors (MaxChair); (c) Only endogeneity exist in the model 
including patent–paper similarity, there is no endogeneity for the model associated to patent–grant pairs and also the 
model to measure the impact of patent ownership structure on patent quality; (d) These variables are calculated 
according to the exclusive government assignees (dGovAssigneet) and exclusive academic assignees (dAcAssigneet); 
(e) This variable is the independent variable for  the model to assess the impact of patent ownership structure on 
patent quality and it is the instrumental variable for  the model including patent–paper similarity. 
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5.1 Patent–paper pairs 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the total number of patents and the number of those belonging to patent–
paper pairs in the fields of biotechnology and nanotechnology, over the period examined in the 
regression analysis. This graph shows a highly volatile evolution of the number of patents over 
the years, while 20% of these patents were linked to patent–paper pairs (demonstrated in Figure 
5.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that patents that were part of patent–paper pairs were generally less cited 5 
years after their official grant year, suggesting that their quality is less than those that do not have 
such links. This graph supports our results presented in Table 6.2, which shows the negative 
impact of patent–paper pairs on patent citation. Figure 5.2 shows the decreasing trend of patent–
paper pairs over time. The difference between the number of citations of patents belonging to 
patent–paper pairs and citation of patents not linked to publications also decreases until finally 
the numbers converge in 2005 (NbFCit5t PPP - NbFCit5t Non-PPP = 0.0157, t = 2005). This graph 
shows that if we increase our time window beyond 2005, there will likely be no significant 
difference between patents belonging to patent–paper pairs and patents without such a link, as 
stated in the discussion of future research in Chapter 7. 
 
 Figure 5.1 : Total number of patents generated by academic inventors in Canada and total 
of patent–paper pairs for biotechnology and nanotechnology in Quebec. 
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According to our results indicated in Table 6.3, patent–paper pairs should have a negative 
impact on number of claims. However, as is shown in Figure 5.3, this difference is very slight. 
As we discussed above, if we observe results over a longer period, the difference might tend to 
be not significant beyond 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 : Total number of citations after 5 years per patent, for patents that are part of a 
patent–paper pair or not, in the combined fields of biotechnology and 
nanotechnology in Quebec. 
 
Figure 5.3 : Total number of claims per patent, for patents that are part of a 
patent–paper pair or not, in the combined fields of biotechnology and 
nanotechnology in Quebec. 
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5.2 Publics assignees versus industrial assignees 
Approximately 30% of patents in the study were assigned to academic institutions (shown in 
Figure 5.4). In this study, we observed academic assignees, government assignees, and industrial 
assignees. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As represented in Figure 5.5, patents assigned to universities and other research facilities 
received fewer citations than patents assigned to non-academic patentees. This graph supports 
our results presented in Table 6.8; that is, a negative impact of academic assignees on patent 
forward citations. Likewise, the government patentees tended to receive fewer citations than non-
government patentees, as presented in Figure 5.7. Thus, patents assigned to public patentees 
received less citations than patents assigned to the non-public patentees. Our results presented in 
Table 6.8–Table 6.9 substantiate the graphs in Figure 5.5–Figure 5.8. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 : Total number of patents by type of assignee (academic, government, industrial, 
hospital and individual assignee) in biotechnology and nanotechnology in Canada. 
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Figure 5.6 : Total number of claims per patent for type of assignee (academic-
assignee and non-academic assignee) in biotechnology and 
nanotechnology in Canada. 
 
Figure 5.5 : Total number of citations per patent for type of assignee (academic-assignee 
and non-academic assignee) in biotechnology and nanotechnology in 
Canada. 
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Figure 5.7 : Total number of citations per patent for type of assignee 
(government-assignee and non-government assignee) 
in biotechnology and nanotechnology in Canada. 
 
Figure 5.8 : Total number of claims per patent for type of assignee (government-assignee and 
non-government assignee) in biotechnology and nanotechnology in Canada. 
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As Figure 5.9 reveals, patents privately assigned to industry obtained more forward citations 
than those assigned to public patentees. We expected this result, as we compared the patent 
citations associated with public patentees (including university and government) with patents 
assigned to industrial assignees (refer to Table 6.8).  
 
 
Figure 5.9 : Total number of citations per patent for industrial and non-industrial 
assignees in biotechnology and nanotechnology in Canada. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 : Total number of claims per patent for industrial and non-industrial assignees 
in biotechnology and nanotechnology in Canada. 
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5.3 Patent–grant pairs 
As implied in Figure 5.11, patent–grant pairs negatively affect patent citations. That is, patents 
that are part of patent–grant pairs obtain fewer citations than patents without such a link, as 
indicated in Table 6.15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 : Total number of forward citations for patent–grant pairs and non-patent–grant 
pairs. 
Figure 5.12 : Total number of claims for patent–grant pairs and non-patent–grant pairs. 
 
 73 
As Figure 5.13 determines the average amount of public funding (operating costs and 
infrastructure grants) and private funding (contracts) in constant Canadian dollars obtained per 
academic inventor. Beaudry and Allaoui (2012) discovered a slightly higher proportion of grants 
compared to contracts. This sample eliminates scientists that do not patent, and that may not have 
as close a link with industry as their academic inventor colleagues.  
 
 
Gress (2010) analyzed the USPTO patent citation trend for the period 1963–2002, measuring 
patent originality by the number of forward citations, and patent generality by the number of 
backward citations. A patent backward citation is generated once when a patent is issued, while 
patent forward citations are continuously being added over time (Gress, 2010). Another 
difference between generating patent forward citations and backward citations is associated with 
the citation procedure. Backward citations are generated when a patent was filed, while for 
forward citations, we have the whole dataset and therefore are able to measure the number of 
patent citations in subsequent patents going back to the year that a focal patent was granted. 
 
Figure 5.13 : Average amount (for each patent) of contracts and grants (in constant 
Canadian dollars) which academic inventors received in Quebec for 
the combined fields of biotechnology and nanotechnology. 
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Gress (2010) calculated the ratio of patent forward citations to backward citations in different 
domains. According to Gress’s (2010) research, the ratio of forward citations to backward 
citations radically decreased for specific domains including Mechanical, Chemical, Electrical, 
Drugs and medical, Computers and communications. The computer and software domain slowly 
expanded its influence until reaching a peak in 1999; then its ratio suddenly decreased to the 
situation pre-1975. Gress (2010) implies that this descent can be explained by the increasing 
accuracy of either citing or classifying the patents. 
Our descriptive data shows a negative trend for the forward citations of patents associated with 
patent–paper pairs, either public and private assignees, and patent–grant pairs. Therefore, we 
examined the ratio of forward citations to backward citations for patents generated by academic 
inventors (residing in Canada) in the biotechnology and nanotechnology domains, with graphs 
presented in Figures 5.14–5.16. 
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Figure 5.14 : Forward citation to backward citation ratio in nanotechnology and 
biotechnology in Canada. 
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Our results reveal a negative trend of the ratio of forward citations to backward citations. It 
seems patents tend to summarize former knowledge as the prior art of the patents instead of 
offering novel ideas.  According to Gress’s (2010) studies, the negative trend of this ratio 
demonstrates that patents are becoming more general (generality measured by backward 
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citations) instead of more original (originality measured by the forward citations). There are 
several potential explanations for the negative trend of forward citations in biotechnology and 
nanotechnology. The first explanation is mentioned above—increasing generality of patents 
instead of the originality. Further, the negative trend of forward citations might be related to the 
proximity of corporations. Gittleman’s (2007) findings show that geographical proximity among 
biotechnology firms leads the patents (generated by the corporations) to be highly cited in 
subsequent patents. However, the collaboration of the distant partners mostly leads to the papers 
that are cited in the patents (Gittelman, 2007).  Therefore, there are several other potential 
explanations that can be investigated.  
It is not essentially accurate to conclude that the novelty of the patents in biotechnology and 
nanotechnology in Canada decreased because of the negative trend of the forward citations as the 
originality measure, and this question can be studied in further research. It would be interesting 
to find out whether the negative forward citation trend is more related to the novelty of the 
patents (measured by forward citations as the originality factor), or, indeed whether it is more 
associated with a change in patenting policy.  
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 RESULTS CHAPTER 6
 
This section presents the results for the impact of patent–grant pairs, patent–paper pairs and 
academic and government assignees on patent “quality” as measured by the number of forward 
citations (NbFCit5t), the number of claims (NbClaimst), 1 minus the Herfindahl index of forward 
citations (HerfIndexFCit5t) and 1 minus the Herfindahl index of backward citations 
(HerfIndexBWCitt). 
 
6.1 Impact of patent–paper pairs on patent quality 
The results of evaluating impact of patent–paper pairs on patent quality are presented in Table 
6.2–Table 6.5. Table 6.1 presents a summary of the analysis models applied in this study to 
measure the impact of patent–paper pairs on patent quality.  
Table 6.1 : Summary of measurement models used to examine the impact of patent and paper 
similarity (associated to patent–paper pairs) [Similarityt] on patent quality 
 Endogeneity test Analysis models 
Number of forward 
citations  
2SLS  regression 
(ivregress) [NbFCit5t] 
Regression (regress) [NbFCit5t] 
Number of claims  2SLS  regression 
(ivregress) [NbClaimst] 
2SLS regression (ivregress) [NbClaimst]: There is 
endogeneity 
First regression: Regress [Contract3t] a 
Herfindahl index of 
forward citations  
2SLS  regression 
(ivregress) 
[HerfIndexFCit5t] 
2SLS regression (ivregress) [HerfIndexFCit5t]: 
There is endogeneity 
First regression: Regress [Contract3t] a 
Herfindahl index of 
backward citations  
2SLS  regression 
(ivregress)  
[HerfIndexBWCitt] 
Regression (regress)   [HerfIndexBWCitt] 
 
As mentioned in the fourth chapter, we used the Sargan test to measure whether our 
instrumental variables were valid or not. Then, we applied the Wu-Hausman test to assess 
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whether we could reject H0 that the variables that are exogenous. Our findings show that our 
instrumental variables are valid (indicated in Table 6.3 and Table 6.5) and that according to the 
Wu-Hausman test, we can reject H0 for the number of number of claims [NbClaimst] and 
Herfindahl index of forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t], implying that we can reject the H0 that 
there are exogenous variables in these models. Therefore, the results demonstrate endogeneity for 
the number of claims [NbClaimst] and 1 minus the Herfindahl index of forward citations 
[HerfIndexFCit5t], when the average value of contracts (Contract3t) is considered as the 
endogenous variable (indicated in Table 6.3 and Table 6.5). Accordingly, [Contract3t] is an 
endogenous variable, instrumented by [Contract3Ut-2], [GrantEI3t-1], and [Loop]. Endogeneity 
results of forward citations and Herfindahl index of backward citations (as the dependent 
variables) are presented in Table E.1 and Table E.2 in the appendix. Our results show there is no 
endogeneity for forward citations and Herfindahl index of backward citations, while average 
value of contracts (Contract3t) is measured as the endogenous variable.  
Our results show there is a negative impact of patent–paper pairs [Similarityt] on patent quality, 
as presented in Table 6.2–Table 6.5. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 5 regarding number of 
forward citations and number of claims. We cannot accept Hypothesis 5 considering Herfindahl 
index of forward and backward citations, since they are not significant. 
Our results demonstrate that patents generated by a highly centralized co-publication network 
[BtwCentArt3t] positively affect the number of forward citations, but have a negative effect when 
the patent is assigned to the university [dAcAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t]. The impact of a patent 
that is located in a highly centralized co-invention network on the number of forward citations is 
not significant, but it is positive when the patent is linked to the publications [Similarityt × 
BtwCentPat3t]. Our outcomes reveal that the patent–paper pair has a negative impact on patent 
forward citation, but when the inventors are situated in a highly centralized co-invention 
network, the results change to be positive, as shown in Table 6.2. Regarding the number of 
claims, inventors located in a highly centralized co-invention network tend to obtain a higher 
number of claims, but when the centrality is further boosted the number of claims diminishes, as 
presented in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.2 : Impact of patent and paper similarity (associated with patent–paper pairs) on the 
number of forward citations [NbFCit5t] – Regression results 
Variables FC (1)  FC (2)   
[Contract3t] a 0.0321 0.0331 
  (0.0255) (0.0253) 
[Grant3t] a -0.0426 -0.0075 
  (0.0302) (0.0280) 
[Aget] a -0.1754 *** -0.1773 *** 
  (0.0221) (0.0220) 
[Aget a]2  -0.0640 *** -0.0647 *** 
  (0.0158) (0.0157) 
[MaxChairt ] a 0.0218 0.0035 
  (0.0237) (0.0209) 
[ArtCit3t] a -0.0443 * -0.0471 * 
  (0.0244) (0.0245) 
[BtwCentArt3t ] a 0.0711 *** 0.0495 ** 
  (0.0262) (0.0244) 
[BtwCentPat3t] a -0.0251 0.0039 
  (0.0364) (0.0348) 
[(BtwCentPat3t)a]2 -0.0418 -0.0440 * 
  (0.0261) (0.0265) 
dAcAssigneet -0.1046 * -0.1341 ** 
  (0.0613) (0.0543) 
dNanoEx 0.3340 *** 0.3280 *** 
  (0.0569) (0.0572) 
Similarityt a -0.0429 ** -0.0448 ** 
  (0.0218) (0.0222) 
dAcAssigneet × [Grant3t] a  0.1130 *  
  (0.0607)  
dAcAssigneet ×  MaxChairt a -0.0895 *  
  (0.0496)  
dAcAssigneet × [BtwCentArt3t] a  -0.1023 *  
  (0.0543)  
dAcAssigneet × [BtwCentPat3t] a  0.1359 *  
  (0.0719)  
Similarityt × [Grant3t] a   0.0492 * 
   (0.0270) 
Similarityt a × [MaxChairt] a  -0.0056 
   (0.0232) 
Similarityt a × [BtwCentArt3t] a   -0.0013 
   (0.0228) 
Similarityt a × [BtwCentPat3t] a   0.0418 * 
   (0.0246) 
Constant 0.6957 *** 0.6920 *** 
  (0.0392) (0.0397) 
Nb observations 1083 1083 
Log Likelihood -1081.4 -1084.23 
R2 0.12197 0.11738 
R2 Adjusted 0.10879 0.10413 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: (a) All the variables have been calculated by Z Score (Z) = x – µ / σ, µ=mean and σ = standard deviation. 
Moreover, ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6.3 : Impact of patent and paper similarity (associated with patent–paper pairs) on the 
number of claims [NbClaimst] – IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) results 
Variables CL (1) CL (2) 
[Contract3t] a -0.2352 *** -0.2427 *** 
  (0.0904) (0.0864) 
[Grant3t] a 0.1464 ** 0.1184 ** 
  (0.0582) (0.0528) 
[Aget] a 0.0669 ** 0.0694 ** 
  (0.0275) (0.0275) 
[Aget a] 2  -0.0149 -0.0105 
  (0.0200) (0.0197) 
[MaxChairt ] a 0.0124 0.0086 
  (0.0296) (0.0263) 
[ArtCit3t] a -0.0206 -0.0191 
  (0.0314) (0.0312) 
[BtwCentArt3t ] a -0.0811 ** -0.0668 ** 
  (0.0327) (0.0301) 
[BtwCentPat3t] a 0.1586 *** 0.1492 *** 
  (0.0484) (0.0457) 
[(BtwCentPat3t)a]2 -0.1514 *** -0.1453 *** 
  (0.0363) (0.0361) 
dAcAssigneet 0.0353 -0.0172 
  (0.0770) (0.0684) 
dNanoEx 0.3410 *** 0.3400 *** 
  (0.0716) (0.0717) 
Similarityt a -0.0608 ** -0.0695 ** 
  (0.0271) (0.0275) 
dAcAssigneet × [Grant3t] a  -0.1784 **  
  (0.0772)  
dAcAssigneet ×  MaxChairt a 0.0118  
  (0.0619)  
dAcAssigneet × [BtwCentArt3t] a  0.0638  
  (0.0705)  
dAcAssigneet × [BtwCentPat3t] a  0.0048  
  (0.0894)  
Similarityt × [Grant3t] a   0.0288 
   (0.0334) 
Similarityt a × [MaxChairt] a  -0.0623 ** 
   (0.0287) 
Similarityt a × [BtwCentArt3t] a   0.0172 
   (0.0285) 
Similarityt a × [BtwCentPat3t] a   -0.0452 
   (0.0305) 
Constant 2.7034 *** 2.6902 *** 
  (0.0550) (0.0545) 
Nb Observations 1083 1083 
Chi Square 98.5088 101.7190 
R2 0.0487 0.0483 
R2 Adjusted 0.0345 0.0340 
Wu-Hausman 0.0202  0.0121  
Sargan 0.1646  0.2773  
Notes: (a) All the variables have been calculated by Z Score (Z) = x – µ / σ, µ=mean and σ = standard deviation. 
Moreover, ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6.4 : Impact of patent and paper similarity (associated with patent–paper pairs) on the 
Herfindahl index of backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Regression results 
Variable HBC (1)  HBC (2)   
[Contract3t] a 0.0156 * 0.0184 ** 
  (0.0083) (0.0082) 
[Grant3t] a -0.0195 ** -0.0153 * 
  (0.0096) (0.0090) 
[Aget] a 0.0178 ** 0.0170 ** 
  (0.0071) (0.0071) 
[Aget a]2  0.0080 0.0093 * 
  (0.0051) (0.0051) 
[MaxChairt ] a 0.0063 0.0013 
  (0.0077) (0.0068) 
[ArtCit3t] a 0.0050 0.0041 
  (0.0079) (0.0079) 
[BtwCentArt3t ] a 0.0176 ** 0.0077 
  (0.0084) (0.0079) 
[BtwCentPat3t] a 0.0040 0.0144 
  (0.0117) (0.0112) 
[BtwCentPat3t]2 -0.0102 -0.0162 * 
  (0.0084) (0.0086) 
dAcAssigneet 0.0080 -0.0010 
  (0.0195) (0.0177) 
dNanoEx -0.0062 -0.0069 
  (0.0181) (0.0182) 
Similarityt a -0.0035 -0.0030 
  (0.0072) (0.0073) 
dAcAssigneet × [(Grant3t) a]  0.0161  
  (0.0198)  
dAcAssigneet ×  MaxChairt a -0.0271 *  
  (0.0163)  
dAcAssigneet × [(BtwCentArt3t ) a ] -0.0576 ***  
  (0.0180)  
dAcAssigneet × [(BtwCentPat3t) a ] 0.0486 **  
  (0.0227)  
Similarityt × Grant3t  -0.0006 
   (0.0086) 
Similarityt a × [MaxChairt] a  -0.0009 
   (0.0075) 
Similarityt a × [(BtwCentArt3t) a ]  -0.0106 
   (0.0075) 
Similarityt a × [(BtwCentPat3t) a]   0.0202 ** 
   (0.0079) 
Constant 0.7971 *** 0.8003 *** 
  (0.0127) (0.0128) 
Nb observations 986 986 
Log Likelihood 174.679 172.31 
R2 0.0350 0.0303 
R2 Adjusted 0.0190 0.0143 
P value 0.0043 0.0177 
Notes: (a) All the variables have been calculated by Z Score (Z) = x – µ / σ, µ=mean and σ = standard deviation. 
Moreover, ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 6.5 : Impact of patent and paper similarity (associated with patent–paper pairs) on the 
Herfindahl index of forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] – IV Regression Two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) results 
Variables HFC (1)   HFC (2)   
[Contract3t] a -0.0690 ** -0.0682 ** 
  (0.0293) (0.0279) 
[Grant3t] a 0.0220 0.0158 
  (0.0189) (0.0171) 
[Aget]a 0.0151 * 0.0163 * 
  (0.0089) (0.0089) 
[Aget a]2  0.0013 0.0032 
  (0.0065) (0.0064) 
[MaxChairt ] a 0.0127 0.0116 
  (0.0096) (0.0085) 
[ArtCit3t] a 0.0111 0.0128 
  (0.0102) (0.0101) 
[BtwCentArt3t] a -0.0016 -0.0034 
  (0.0106) (0.0097) 
[BtwCentPat3t] a 0.0209 0.0185 
  (0.0157) (0.0147) 
[(BtwCentPat3t)a]2 -0.0159 -0.0191 
  (0.0118) (0.0116) 
dAcAssigneet -0.0008 -0.0010 
  (0.0250) (0.0221) 
dNanoEx -0.0411 * -0.0411 * 
  (0.0232) (0.0231) 
Similarityt a 0.0063 0.0083 
  (0.0088 ) (0.0089) 
dAcAssigneet × [Grant3t] a -0.0232  
  (0.0250)  
dAcAssigneet ×  [MaxChairt]a -0.0008  
  (0.0201)  
dAcAssigneet × [BtwCentArt3t] a  -0.0056  
  (0.0229)  
dAcAssigneet × [BtwCentPat3t] a  -0.0091  
  (0.0290)  
Similarityt × [Grant3t] a   -0.0088 
   (0.0108) 
Similarityt a × [MaxChairt] a  -0.0248 *** 
   (0.0093) 
Similarityt a × [BtwCentArt3t] a   0.0098 
   (0.0092) 
Similarityt a × [BtwCentPat3t] a   0.0017 
   (0.0098) 
Constant 0.8388 *** 0.8387 *** 
  (0.0178) (0.0176) 
Nb Observations 1083 1083 
Chi Square 17.4014 28.5234 
P value 0.3601 0.0274 
Wu-Hausman 0.0088  0.0062 
Sargan 0.6142  0.7087 
Notes: (a) All the variables have been calculated by Z Score (Z) = x – µ / σ, µ=mean and σ = standard deviation. 
Moreover, ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
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Table 6.6 : Summary of results for the impact of patent–paper pairs similarity 
 Forward 
citations 
[NbFCit5t] 
 
Herfindahl index of 
forward citations 
[HerfIndexFCit5t]  
Number of claims 
[NbClaimst] 
 
Herfindahl index 
of backward 
citations 
[HerfIndexBWCitt]  
Similarityt a Significant 
and negative 
(--) 
Not significant Significant and negative 
(--) 
Not significant 
Notes: a) All the variables have been calculated by Z Score (Z) = x – µ / σ, µ=mean and σ = standard deviation. 
Futhermore, +++, ++, + as well as ---, --, - show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in 
different directions (positive or negative), for instance: -0.8190 ***  (indicated by ---), -2.1959 * (identified by -
), and 28.1833 *** (determined by +++). 
 
 
 
 
 
Our results demonstrate that inventors occupying a highly centralized co-publication network 
positively affect technological breadth, measured by the Herfindahl index of patent backward 
citations. This finding reveals that inventors who are located in a highly centralized co-
publication network tend to engage in more technology domains. However, when a university 
owns the patent, the results of the highly centralized co-publication network on the technology 
concentrations are negative. A highly centralized co-invention network positively acts on 
technological breadth while interacting either with academic assignees [dAcAssigneet × 
BtwCentPat3t] or patent–publication pairs [Similarityt × BtwCentPat3t], though without 
interacting with other variables it does not have a significant effect. 
6.2 Impact of patent ownership structure on patent quality 
All results associated with the impact of patent ownership structure are presented in Table 6.8–
Table 6.11. Furthermore, we measured the robustness of our model as well as tested for potential 
endogeneity. Results are shown in the appendix F in Table F.1–Table F.4 for the endogeneity 
tests and in Table B.1–Table B.7 for the robustness checks. Our results demonstrate that although 
our instrumental variables are valid (see Sargan test results in Table F.1–Table F.4), potential 
endogeneity does not seem to be present in our model when the average amount of grants 
(Grant3t) is measured as an endogenous variable (see the Wu-Hausman test in Table F.1–Table 
F.4). The summary of measurement models used in this analysis is shown in Table 6.7 below to 
assess the impact of patent ownership structure on patent quality.  
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Table 6.7 : Summary of measurement models applied (in this study) to assess the impact of 
public assignees versus industrial assignees on patent quality 
 Endogeneity Test Robustness Test Final models 
Number of forward 
citations  
 
2SLS  regression 
(ivregress) [NbFCit5t] 
 
Zero-inflated binomial 
regression (zinb) 
(NbFCit5t) 
Tobit regression 
(tobit) [NbFCit5t] 
 
Number of claims  
 
2SLS  regression 
(ivregress) [NbClaimst] 
Negative binomial 
regression (nbreg) 
(NbClaimst) 
Regression (regress) 
[NbClaimst] 
Herfindahl index of 
forward citations  
2SLS  regression 
(ivregress)   
[HerfIndexFCit5t] 
Regression (regress) 
[HerfIndexFCit5t] 
Tobit regression 
(tobit)  
[HerfIndexFCit5t] 
Herfindahl index of 
backward citations  
2SLS  regression 
(ivregress) 
[HerfIndexBWCitt] 
Regression (regress) 
[HerfIndexBWCitt] 
Tobit regression 
(tobit)  
[HerfIndexBWCitt]  
 
The results to assess the impact of patent ownership structure on patent quality are summarized 
in Table 6.13 below. We generated the dummy variable [dAcAssigneet] to define exclusive 
academic assignees, as well as the [dGovAssigneet] variable to determine exclusive government 
assignees in our analysis. The industrial assignee is considered as the omitted variable in this 
study, therefore in our model we compared the impact of public assignees (including universities 
and government) with that of industrial assignees, on patent quality. As our findings demonstrate, 
the patents publicly held by academic assignees and government obtained fewer citations than 
those privately assigned. Furthermore, our outcomes reveal the public patentees were involved in 
less diversified technology domains than industrial patentees were. Therefore, we validate 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 in terms of negative impact of public patentees on patent forward citations 
and Herfindahl index of backward citations. We cannot accept Hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding 
number of claims and Herfindahl index of forward citations, as these results are not significant.  
Our results show that the average of grants [Grant3t] has a negative impact on technological 
breadth (Herfindahl index of backward citations); however, the increasing amount of grants that 
academic inventors received caused the Herfindahl index of backward citations to increase. 
Career age of academic inventors [Aget] positively affects the patent forward citations; 
nevertheless, career age negatively affects patent forward citations to a high degree.  Conversely, 
career age has a negative impact on technological concentration; but academic inventors with 
high career age obtain greater technological breadth. Academic inventors situated in highly 
centralized co-publication networks [BtwCentArt3t] obtain less technological breadth, although 
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by increasing betweenness centrality, they engage in more technology domains. Inventors who 
occupy highly clustering coefficients [CliqnessPat3t] in co-invention network receive more 
claims, though by increasing the clustering coefficient, they obtain fewer claims. 
Our results suggest that patents generated by inventors in a highly centralized co-publication 
network and owned by a university [dAcAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t] have a positive impact on the 
number of claims, while [BtwCentArt3t] is not significant without interacting with other 
variables, as demonstrated in Table 6.9. Moreover, our outcomes imply that both scientists’ 
career age and academic ownership have a negative impact on technological breadth; however, 
when these variables are multiplied as interactive variables, the results are positive. When the 
career age is highly boosted, the patents generated by inventors with high career age and owned 
by the university have a non-significant effect on technological breadth, as shown in Table 6.10. 
Similar to the results we obtained regarding the impact of patent–publication pairs on patent 
quality, patents situated in a highly centralized co-publication network have a negative impact on 
technological breadth as measured by the Herfindahl index of backward citations, when 
interacting with academic assignees. Likewise, patents that are owned by the university and 
issued by inventors positioned in a highly centralized co-publication network have a negative 
impact on technological breadth, even when co-publication centrality is boosted. Conversely, 
patents that are situated in a highly centralized co-invention network are associated with higher 
technology concentration when interacting with university ownership, as demonstrated in Table 
6.10.  
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Table 6.8 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of forward 
citations [NbFCit5t] – Tobit results 
Variables  FC (3) FC (4) FC (5) FC (6) FC (7) 
Grant3t 0.0039 0.0042 0.0047 0.0046 0.0037 
  (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0082) (0.0080) (0.0080) 
Aget 0.2770 *** 0.2800 *** 0.2797 *** 0.2857 *** 0.2798 *** 
  (0.0391) (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0392) (0.0388) 
[Aget]2 -0.0136 *** -0.0138 *** -0.0138 *** -0.0140 *** -0.0138 *** 
  (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) 
MaxChairt  0.0248 0.0214 0.0213 0.0202 0.0203 
  (0.0449) (0.0448) (0.0448) (0.0447) (0.0447) 
ArtCit3t -0.0699 ** -0.0656 ** -0.0658 ** -0.0651 ** -0.0645 ** 
  (0.0288) (0.0287) (0.0288) (0.0287) (0.0287) 
BtwCentArt3t  0.0803 * 0.0776 0.0769 0.0750 0.0825 * 
  (0.0476) (0.0474) (0.0475) (0.0474) (0.0476) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.1557 * -0.1509 * -0.1480 * -0.1588 * -0.1478 * 
  (0.0831) (0.0829) (0.0836) (0.0829) (0.0829) 
[CliqnessArt3t ]2 0.0167 ** 0.0162 ** 0.0159 ** 0.0170 ** 0.0161 ** 
  (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0234 -0.0326 * -0.0320 * -0.0330 * -0.0335 * 
  (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0185) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Loop -0.0777 -0.0583 -0.0600 -0.0605 -0.0564 
  (0.0959) (0.0977) (0.0978) (0.0975) (0.0976) 
dNanoEx 0.5375 *** 0.5390 *** 0.5387 *** 0.5494 *** 0.5415 *** 
  (0.1024) (0.1019) (0.1019) (0.1020) (0.1018) 
dGovAssigneet  -0.4503 ** -0.3659 2.7605 -0.2087 
   (0.2247) (0.3820) (2.0556) (0.3334) 
dAcAssigneet   -0.2158 * -0.2161 * -0.2118 * -0.2164 * 
   (0.1111) (0.1111) (0.1109) (0.1110) 
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t   -0.0111   
    (0.0408)   
dGovAssigneet × Aget    -0.5010  
     (0.3570)  
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2    0.0179  
     (0.0147)  
dGovAssigneet ×      -0.2294 
BtwCentArt3t     (0.2374) 
Constant -0.7954 *** -0.7435 *** -0.7485 *** -0.7708 *** -0.7530 *** 
  (0.2761) (0.2751) (0.2757) (0.2760) (0.2750) 
Constant (Sigma) 1.1320 *** 1.1263 *** 1.1263 *** 1.1244 *** 1.1256 *** 
 (0.379) (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0376) (0.0376) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 135.78 143.07 143.15 145.97 144.02 
Pseudo R2 0.0515 0.0542 0.0543 0.0553 0.0546 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
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Table 6.9 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of claims 
[NbClaimst] – Regression results 
Variables CL (3)  CL (4)  CL (5)  CL (6)  
Grant3t 0.0021 0.0009 0.0041 0.0038 
  (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0057) 
Aget 0.0119 ** 0.0130 ** 0.0133 ** 0.0123 * 
  (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0066) (0.0067) 
MaxChairt  -0.0019 -0.0037 -0.0004 -0.0006 
  (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0293) (0.0293) 
ArtCit3t -0.0370 ** -0.0362 * -0.0378 ** -0.0371 ** 
  (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0187) 
BtwCentArt3t  -0.0377 -0.0201 -0.0398 -0.0355 
  (0.0325) (0.0309) (0.0326) (0.0330) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.0372 ** -0.0352 ** -0.0369 ** -0.0362 ** 
  (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0179) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0180 -0.0219 -0.0174 -0.0175 
  (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0139) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
[CliqnessPat3t]2 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Loop -0.0610 -0.0626 -0.0573 -0.0539 
  (0.0635) (0.0638) (0.0639) (0.0641) 
dNanoEx 0.4014 *** 0.3966 *** 0.3977 *** 0.3972 *** 
  (0.0670) (0.0671) (0.0671) (0.0673) 
dGovAssigneet  -0.0110 -0.0164 -0.0115 -0.0789 
  (0.1415) (0.1417) (0.1416) (0.5990) 
dAcAssigneet  -0.1926 * -0.0913 0.0811 0.0661 
  (0.1020) (0.0797) (0.2337) (0.2345) 
dGovAssigneet  × Grant3t    -0.0205 
     (0.0282) 
dGovAssigneet × Aget    0.0185 
     (0.0425) 
dGovAssigneet ×     -0.1044 
BtwCentArt3t    (0.1537) 
dGovAssigneet ×     0.1751 
BtwCentPat3t    (0.1548) 
dAcAssigneet  × Grant3t   -0.0193 -0.0189 
    (0.0148) (0.0149) 
dAcAssigneet × Aget   -0.0116 -0.0107 
    (0.0159) (0.0160) 
dAcAssigneet ×  0.1230 *  0.1452 ** 0.1411 * 
BtwCentArt3t (0.0714)  (0.0736) (0.0739) 
dAcAssigneet ×   0.0286 0.0264 0.0289 
BtwCentPat3t  (0.0414) (0.0424) (0.0425) 
Constant 2.5315 *** 2.4987 *** 2.5003 *** 2.5067 *** 
  (0.1301) (0.1286) (0.1349) (0.1360)  
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110  
Log Likelihood -1333.14 -1334.40 -1331.78 -1330.30 
R2 0.0804 0.0783 0.0827 0.0851 
R2 Adjusted 0.0687 0.0665 0.0684 0.0674 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6.10 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results   
Variables HBC (3)  HBC (4)  HBC (5)  HBC (6)  
Grant3t -3.5835 *** -4.0213 *** -4.1213 *** -3.9320 *** 
  (0.8930) (0.8809) (0.9198) (0.9436) 
[Grant3t]2 0.2913 *** 0.3276 *** 0.3333 *** 0.3168 *** 
  (0.0723) (0.0709) (0.0744) (0.0767) 
Aget -2.4630 *** -2.3854 *** -3.1368 *** -3.0260 *** 
  (0.8743) (0.8710) (0.9469) (0.9524) 
[Aget]2 0.1560 *** 0.1482 *** 0.1742 *** 0.1707 *** 
  (0.0373) (0.0372) (0.0403) (0.0406) 
MaxChairt  -1.4641 -1.7369 -1.6456 -1.7210 
  (1.1762) (1.1659) (1.1638) (1.1648) 
ArtCit3t 1.1789 0.9448 0.9968 1.0385 
  (0.7376) (0.7362) (0.7338) (0.7357)  
BtwCentArt3t  -19.3000 *** -15.1000 *** -15.1000 *** -14.8000 *** 
  (5.0120) (4.5945) (4.5974) (4.6214) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 3.3418 *** 2.4069 *** 2.5053 *** 2.5115 *** 
  (0.9533) (0.8669) (0.8693) (0.8733) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.3740 0.5006 0.4969 0.5355 
  (0.7123) (0.7121) (0.7100) (0.7128) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.9332 * 0.5825 0.5581 0.4888 
  (0.4812) (0.4922) (0.4954) (0.5018) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Loop 1.8986 2.7843 2.2537 2.2075 
  (2.5088) (2.5089) (2.5122) (2.5124) 
dNanoEx 4.2932 4.0600 3.9541 4.1029 
  (2.6672) (2.6592) (2.6510) (2.6630) 
dGovAssigneet -15.9000 *** -16.7000 *** -16.6000 *** 41.9676 
  (5.6721) (5.6604) (5.6294) (54.9805) 
dAcAssigneet -3.0103 -10.9000 *** -40.7000 *** -39.7000 *** 
  (4.0612) (3.1551) (13.3118) (13.3060) 
dGovAssigneet ×     -1.4342 
Grant3t    (5.3341) 
dGovAssigneet ×     0.0676 
[Grant3t]2    (0.4357) 
dGovAssigneet × Aget    -6.3567 
     (9.3957) 
dGovAssigneet ×     0.1902 
[Aget]2    (0.3775) 
dGovAssigneet ×     14.2206 
BtwCentArt3t    (41.3865) 
dGovAssigneet ×      -4.7572 
[BtwCentArt3t]2    (8.8873) 
dGovAssigneet ×     5.3655 
BtwCentPat3t    (6.4303) 
dAcAssigneet  ×    4.4057 4.2226 
Grant3t   (2.9462) (2.9490) 
dAcAssigneet  ×    -0.3459 -0.3293 
[Grant3t]2   (0.2361) (0.2364) 
dAcAssigneet × Aget   4.4044 * 4.2923 * 
    (2.3324) (2.3323) 
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Table 6.10 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HBC (3)  HBC (4)  HBC (5)  HBC (6)  
dAcAssigneet ×    -0.1256 -0.1220 
[Aget]2   (0.1015) (0.1015) 
dAcAssigneet ×  14.6620  -5.4047 * -5.8158 * 
BtwCentArt3t (11.6808)  (3.0493) (3.0678) 
dAcAssigneet ×   -3.6725 *    
[BtwCentArt3t]2 (2.2062)    
dAcAssigneet ×   4.9531 *** 4.4546 *** 4.5128 *** 
BtwCentPat3t  (1.6185) (1.6500) (1.6497) 
Constant 67.1451 *** 68.6378 *** 73.6572 *** 72.5337 *** 
  (6.1761) (6.0907) (6.5620) (6.5913) 
Constant (Sigma) 31.7717 *** 31.7001 *** 31.5222 *** 31.4730 *** 
  (0.7538) (0.7521) (0.7477) (0.7466) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 124.85 129.23 141.88 145.71 
Pseudo R2 0.0125 0.0129 0.0142 0.0146 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Our results show that both government assignees and the betweenness centrality of the co-
invention network have a non-significant effect on the number of Herfindahl index forward 
citations. However, patents generated by academic inventors in a highly centralized co-invention 
network and owned by the government contribute to a higher Herfindahl index of forward 
citations [dGovAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t], as demonstrated in Table 6.11.  
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Table 6.11 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] – Tobit results   
Variables HFC (3)  HFC (4)  HFC (5) HFC (6)  
Grant3t -0.2792  -0.2794 -0.2959 -0.3822 
  (0.2535)  (0.2544) (0.2705) (0.2767) 
Aget -6.9125 *** -6.9137 *** -7.4708 *** -7.1349 *** 
  (1.2185) (1.2169) (1.3515) (1.3499) 
[Aget]2 0.3344 *** 0.3344 *** 0.3511 *** 0.3318 *** 
  (0.0515) (0.0516) (0.0568) (0.0567) 
MaxChairt  0.6352 0.6353 0.6641 0.8310 
  (1.4049) (1.4049) (1.4060) (1.3980) 
ArtCit3t 5.9378 ** 5.9339 ** 5.8178 ** 5.3950 ** 
  (2.3228) (2.3324) (2.3352) (2.3263) 
[ArtCit3t]2 -1.1408 ** -1.1405 ** -1.1142 * -1.0112 * 
  (0.5657) (0.5667) (0.5681) (0.5655) 
BtwCentArt3t  -0.3917 -0.4006 -0.3776 -0.3792 
  (1.5484) (1.4885) (1.5568) (1.5625) 
CliqnessArt3t  -1.1490 -1.1480 -1.1591 -1.2072 
  (0.8480) (0.8507) (0.8518) (0.8500) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.7224 0.7204 0.7421 0.6001 
  (0.5846) (0.5990) (0.6076) (0.6103) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Loop -4.2984 -4.2880 -4.1883 -3.8730 
  (3.0528) (3.0678) (3.0840) (3.0662) 
dNanoEx -6.9714 ** -6.9721 ** -6.9275 ** -7.2082 ** 
  (3.2447) (3.2459) (3.2482) (3.2392) 
dGovAssigneet -2.9347 -2.9374 -2.8446 43.8251 
  (6.8528) (6.8558) (6.8506) (71.0542) 
dAcAssigneet 2.5975 2.4746 -17.5000 -17.6000 
  (4.9149) (3.8314) (17.0338) (16.9270)  
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t    0.0622 
     (1.3830) 
dGovAssigneet × Aget    -15.9000 
     (12.6867) 
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2    0.7704 
     (0.5420)  
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t    11.7813 
     (7.4346) 
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t    26.3748 ** 
     (12.5475) 
dAcAssigneet  × Grant3t   0.1974 0.2751 
    (0.7562) (0.7536) 
dAcAssigneet × Aget   2.6291 2.2809 
    (3.1468) (3.1263) 
dAcAssigneet × [Aget]2   -0.0703 -0.0511 
    (0.1365) (0.1356) 
dAcAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t -0.0841  -1.3988 -1.3352 
  (3.4311)  (3.5635) (3.5497) 
dAcAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t  0.0466 -0.4194 -0.2170 
   (2.0972) (2.1298) (2.1178) 
Constant 122.0000 *** 122.0000 *** 127.0000 *** 127.0000 *** 
  (8.1727) (8.0984) (8.9235) (8.9115) 
Constant (Sigma) 36.4351 *** 36.4352 *** 36.4056 *** 36.1490 *** 
  (1.0454) (1.0454) (1.0445) (1.0366) 
 91 
Table 6.11 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] – Tobit results (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HFC (3)  HFC (4)  HFC (5) HFC (6)  
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 77.3436 77.3435 79.5135 93.0638 
Pseudo R2 0.0101 0.0101 0.0104 0.0122 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
 
Below in Table 6.12, the linear and non-linear effects (quadratic effect) of variables are 
presented. We tested the quadratic effect of the independent variables and excluded the squared 
variables, when there was a non-significant effect of the (squared) variables. This helped us to 
have a better estimation and it decreased the probability of multicollinearity.  
Table 6.12 : Linear and non-linear effect (quadratic effect) of variables to measure impact of 
public assignees on patent quality 
 FC 
WO/Sq 
FC 
W/Sq 
CL 
WO/Sq 
CL 
W/Sq 
HBC 
WO/Sq 
HBC 
W/Sq 
HFC 
WO/Sq 
HFC 
W/Sq 
Grant3t     NS ---   
(Grant3t)2      +++   
Aget --- +++   +++ ---/-- +++/++/+ --- 
(Aget )2  ---    +++  +++ 
ArtCit3t       ++/+ ++ 
(ArtCit3t )2        - 
BtwCentArt3t     NS ---   
(BtwCentArt3t )2      +++/++   
CliqnessArt3t ++/+ NS       
(CliqnessArt3t)2  ++/+       
CliqnessPat3t   NS ++/+     
(CliqnessPat3t)2    --/-     
Notes: WO/Sq (without squared variable) shows the impact of a variable without squared variables (linear impact), 
while W/Sq (with squared variable) demonstrates a quadratic effect. Selected models are bold and underlined. 
Furthermore, +++, ++, + as well as ---, --, - show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in 
different directions (positive or negative), for instance: -0.8190 ***  (indicated by ---), -2.1959 * (identified by -), 
and 28.1833 *** (determined by +++). 
We tested whether patents funded by government and assigned to the universities were of a 
higher quality, as proposed in Hypothesis 2A. Our results imply that university patents funded by 
government are more diversified; however, number of claims and patent citation variables are not 
significant. Therefore, we validate Hypothesis 2A in terms of Herfindahl index of backward 
citations, but we cannot approve Hypothesis 2A for number of forward citations, number of 
claims and Herfindahl index of forward citations. 
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Moreover, our findings reveal the government patents that were surrounded by inventors in a 
highly centralized co-invention network [dGovAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t] (defined in Hypothesis 
3A) tended to likely engage in more differentiated fields. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 3A in 
terms of Herfindahl index of forward citations, while we cannot accept the hypothesis for 
number of claims, Herfindahl index of backward citations and number of forward citations. 
We cannot accept Hypothesis 3B including the negative impact on quality of government 
patents generated by inventors occupying nodes in a highly central co-publication network 
[dGovAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t]. Thus, we reject Hypothesis 3B for four patent quality 
indicators including number of claims, number of forward citations, and Herfindahl index of both 
backward and forward citations. 
Furthermore, academic inventors established in a highly centralized co-invention network 
[dAcAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t] (determined in Hypothesis 4A) were involved in diversified 
technological domains, when the patents were publicly assigned by universities. Therefore, we 
reject Hypothesis 4A considering number of Herfindahl index backward citations. We cannot 
accept Hypothesis 4A for number of claims, number of forward citations and Herfindahl index of 
forward citations. Our findings demonstrate that patents generated by inventors that occupy a 
highly centralized position in the co-publication network (BtwCentArt3t) were less diversified, 
measured by 1 minus the Herfindahl index of backward citations as the technology breadth 
(HBC). The impact of the co-publication clustering coefficient is not significant on patent 
forward citations; however highly central co-publication clusters tend to receive more citations in 
subsequent patents. Our findings show patents generated by inventors occupied in a highly 
centralized co-publication network [dAcAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t] (indicated in Hypothesis 4B) 
were associated with a greater number of claims, when these patents were publicly assigned to 
the universities, but, they were less diversified. Thus, we approve Hypothesis 4B in terms of 
number of Herfindahl index backward citations. However, we reject Hypothesis 4B considering 
number of claims. We cannot accept Hypothesis 4B for number of forward citations and 
Herfindahl index of forward citations.  
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Table 6.13 : Summary of results on impact of academic assignees and government assignees on 
patent quality 
 Forward 
citations 
[NbFCit5t] 
 
Herfindahl index of 
forward citations 
[HerfIndexFCit5t]  
Number of claims 
[NbClaimst] 
 
Herfindahl index of 
backward citations 
[HerfIndexBWCitt]  
dAcAssigneet Significant 
and negative 
(--/-) 
Not significant Not significant Significant and 
negative 
(---/--) 
dGovAssigneet Significant 
and negative 
(--/-) 
Not significant Not significant Significant and 
negative (---/--) 
dAcAssigneet  × Grant3t Not significant Not significant Not significant Significant and 
positive (+), not 
significant in the 
model without claims 
 
dGovAssigneet × 
BtwCentArt3t 
Not significant Not significant Not significant Not significant 
dAcAssigneet × 
BtwCentArt3t 
Not significant Not significant Significant and 
positive (+/++) 
Significant and 
negative (-/--) 
dGovAssigneet × 
BtwCentPat3t  
Not significant Significant and 
positive (+/++) 
Not significant Not significant 
dAcAssigneet × 
BtwCentPat3t 
Not significant Not significant Not significant Significant and 
positive (+++/++) 
Notes: +++, ++, + as well as ---, --, - show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in different 
directions (positive or negative), for instance: -0.8190 ***  (indicated by ---), -2.1959 * (identified by -), and 
28.1833 *** (determined by +++). 
 
6.3 Impact of patent–grant pairs on patent quality 
All of the results linked to patent–grant pairs are shown throughout Table 6.15–Table 6.18 in 
this section. Moreover, the results associated with endogeneity testing are shown in Table G.1–
Table G.4 in the appendix, and robustness results are indicated in Table C.1–Table C.2 (in the 
appendix). Our results demonstrate the patents belonging to patent–grant pairs obtain fewer 
forward citations than patents that are not linked to such pairs. The [dPGP] variable is significant 
and negative, as shown in Table 6.15. However, patents linked to patent–grant pairs obtain a 
higher Herfindal index of forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] (indicated in Table 6.18), as they 
are more diversified and engaged in technology fields across multiple disciplines. 
Our findings show our instrumental variables are valid (since if the p-value associated with the 
Sargan test is not significant then the instrumental variables are valid); see the Sargan test results 
in Table G.1–Table G.4. We defined four dependent variables, including: number of forward 
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citations [NbFCit5t], number of claims [NbClaimst], Herfindahl index of forward citations 
[HerfIndexFCit5t], and Herfindahl index of backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt]. According to 
the p-value associated with the Wu-Hausman test, we cannot reject H0 (defined above) for all 
four dependent variables, taking into consideration that the p-value is not significant (< 0.05). 
Thus, we cannot reject the H0. The results show the average of grants variable (Grant3t) is 
exogenous and the endogeneity doesn’t exist for the number of forward citations [NbFCit5t], 
number of claims [NbClaimst], Herfindahl index of forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t], and 
Herfindahl index of backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt]. We measured whether the variable is 
endogenous or exogenous. The summary of measurement models used in this analysis is shown 
in Table 6.14 below. 
 
Table 6.14 : Summary of measurement models used (in this research) to investigate the impact of 
patent–grant pairs on patent quality 
 Endogeneity test Robustness test Final models 
Number of forward 
citations  
2SLS  regression 
(ivregress) [NbFCit5t] 
Zero-inflated binomial 
regression (zinb) 
[NbFCit5t] 
Tobit regression 
(tobit) [NbFCit5t] 
Number of claims  2SLS  regression 
(ivregress)   [NbClaimst] 
Negative binomial 
regression (nbreg)  
(NbClaimst) 
Regression (regress) 
[NbClaimst] 
Herfindahl index of 
forward citations  
2SLS  regression 
(ivregress) 
[HerfIndexFCit5t] 
Regression (regress)   
[HerfIndexFCit5t] 
Tobit regression 
(tobit) 
[HerfIndexFCit5t] 
Herfindahl index of 
backward citations  
2SLS  regression 
(ivregress) 
[HerfIndexBWCitt] 
Regression (regress)  
[HerfIndexBWCitt] 
Tobit regression 
(tobit) 
[HerfIndexBWCitt] 
 
Our results demonstrate that patent–grant pairs appear in fewer forward citations than patents 
without such a link, as presented in Table 6.15. However, they receive a greater Herfindahl index 
of forward citations, as shown in Table 6.18. 
Moreover, as a complementary result, our outcomes reveal that while inventors receive more 
publication citations, they receive fewer patent citations in subsequent patents, as shown in Table 
6.15.  
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Table 6.15 : Impact of patent–grant pairs on the number of forward citations [NbFCit5t] – Tobit 
regression results 
Variables FC (8) FC (9) FC (10) FC (11) FC (12) 
Grant3t 0.0034 
 
0.0034 
 
0.0046 
 
0.0033 
 
0.0045  
  (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0079)  
Aget  0.2761 *** 0.2678 *** 0.2654 *** 0.2676 *** 0.2651 *** 
  (0.0389)  (0.0390)  (0.0391)  (0.0390)  (0.0392)  
[Aget]2  -0.0137 *** -0.0132 *** -0.0131 *** -0.0132 *** -0.0131 *** 
  (0.0016)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  
MaxChairt  0.0235  0.0295  0.0316  0.0294  0.0315  
  (0.0448)  (0.0447)  (0.0447)  (0.0447)  (0.0447) 
 
ArtCit3t  -0.0657 ** -0.0667 ** -0.0671 ** -0.0666 ** -0.0668 ** 
  (0.0287)  (0.0286)  (0.0286)  (0.0287)  (0.0287)  
BtwCentArt3t  0.0834 * 0.0818 * 0.0823 * 0.0823 * 0.0830 * 
  (0.0470)  (0.0468)  (0.0468)  (0.0471)  (0.0471)  
CliqnessArt3t  -0.1470 * -0.1344  -0.1357 * -0.1347  -0.1361 * 
  (0.0825)  (0.0821)  (0.0821)  (0.0822)  (0.0821)  
[CliqnessArt3t]2  0.0156 ** 0.0147 ** 0.0145 ** 0.0147 ** 0.0145 ** 
  (0.0072)  (0.0072)  (0.0072)  (0.0072)  (0.0072)  
BtwCentPat3t  -0.0294  -0.0332 * -0.0312 * -0.0333 * -0.0312 * 
  (0.0184)  (0.0184)  (0.0184)  (0.0184)  (0.0184)  
CliqnessPat3t  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
dAcAssigneet -0.2246 ** -0.2008 ** -0.2065 ** -0.2009 ** -0.2067 ** 
  (0.0929)  (0.0929)  (0.0930)  (0.0929)  (0.0930)  
dNanoEx 0.5372 *** 0.5704 *** 0.5642 *** 0.5699 *** 0.5635 *** 
  (0.1020)  (0.1022)  (0.1023)  (0.1023)  (0.1024)  
dPGPt   -0.8190 *** -2.1959 * -0.7896 ** -2.1897 * 
    (0.2467)  (1.1836)  (0.3609)  (1.1845)  
dPGPt × CliqnessArt3t      0.4069    0.4111  
     (0.2804)    (0.2825)  
dPGPt × [CliqnessArt3t]2     -0.0017    -0.0017  
     (0.0014)    (0.0015)  
dPGPt × BtwCentArt3t       -0.02938 
(0.26404) 
 -0.03475 
(0.28133) 
 
Constant -0.7296 *** -0.7007 ** -0.6915 ** -0.6999 ** -0.6902 ** 
  (0.2756)  0.2755  0.2765  0.2756  0.2767  
Sigma 1.1281 *** 1.1223 *** 1.1214 *** 1.1223 *** 1.1213 *** 
  0.03774  0.03751  0.03748  0.03751  0.03748  
Statistics           
Nb observations 1110  1110  1110  1110  1110  
Chi Square 140.986 *** 152.998 *** 155.499 *** 153.01 *** 155.514 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.0534  0.0580  0.0589  0.0580  0.0589  
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6.16 : Impact of patent–grant pairs on the number of claims [NbClaimst] – OLS regression 
results 
Variables CL (7) CL (8) CL (9) CL (10) CL (11) 
Grant3t -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002  -0.0001 -0.0001  
  (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052)  (0.0052) (0.0052)  
Aget 0.0134 ** 0.0133 ** 0.0131 ** 0.0133 ** 0.0132 ** 
  (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060)  (0.0060) (0.0060)  
MaxChairt  -0.0038 -0.0040 -0.0040  -0.0037 -0.0037  
  (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0293)  (0.0292) (0.0293)  
ArtCit3t -0.0385 ** -0.0385 ** -0.0386 ** -0.0395 ** -0.0395 ** 
  (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185)  (0.0186) (0.0186)  
BtwCentArt3t -0.0160 -0.0159 -0.0157  -0.0189 -0.0185  
  (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0308)  (0.0310) (0.0311)  
CliqnessArt3t  -0.0348 ** -0.0348 ** -0.0359 ** -0.0345 * -0.0351 * 
  (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0179)  (0.0177) (0.0179)  
BtwCentPat3t -0.0184 -0.0182 -0.0178  -0.0177 -0.0175  
  (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134)  (0.0134) (0.0135)  
CliqnessPat3t 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  
[CliqnessPat3t]2 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  
dAcAssigneet -0.0210 -0.0221 -0.0226  -0.0217 -0.0221  
  (0.0591) (0.0593) (0.0594)  (0.0594) (0.0594)  
dNanoEx 0.4024 *** 0.4007 *** 0.4000 *** 0.4016 *** 0.4011 *** 
  (0.0670) (0.0673) (0.0674)  (0.0674) (0.0674)  
dPGPt  0.0329 -0.2362  -0.0921 -0.2362  
   (0.1310) (0.5859)  (0.2008) (0.5860)  
dPGPt × CliqnessArt3t    0.0619   0.0357  
    (0.1314)   (0.1364)  
dPGPt × BtwCentArt3t     0.1211 0.1104  
      (0.1474) (0.1530)  
Constant 2.4744 *** 2.4746 *** 2.4806 *** 2.4756 *** 2.4790 *** 
  (0.1288) (0.1289) (0.1295)  (0.1289) (0.1296)  
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110  1110 1110  
Log Likelihood -1335.86 -1335.83 -1335.72  -1335.49 -1335.45  
R2 0.0759 0.0759 0.0761  0.0765 0.0766  
R2 Adjusted 0.0666 0.0658 0.0652  0.0656 0.0648  
P value 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6.17 : Impact of patent–grant pairs on the Herfindahl index of backward citations 
[HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results 
Variables HBC (7) HBC (8) HBC (9) HBC (10) HBC (11) 
Grant3t -3.7775 *** -3.7752 *** -3.7722 *** -3.8250 *** -3.8204 *** 
  (0.8847) (0.8847) (0.8855) (0.8878) (0.8879) 
[Grant3t]2 0.3135 *** 0.3132 *** 0.3129 *** 0.3180 *** 0.3176 *** 
  (0.0715) (0.0715) (0.0716) (0.0718) (0.0718) 
Aget -2.5374 *** -2.5056 *** -2.4986 *** -2.4823 *** -2.4539 *** 
  (0.8745) (0.8784) (0.8830) (0.8801) (0.8868) 
[Aget]2 0.1587 *** 0.1571 *** 0.1569 *** 0.1559 *** 0.1548 *** 
  (0.0374) (0.0376) (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0379) 
MaxChairt  -1.5190 -1.5304 -1.5307 -1.5078 -1.5083 
  (1.1754) (1.1757) (1.1757) (1.1760) (1.1760) 
ArtCit3t 1.1454 1.1448 1.1456 1.1072 1.1061 
  (0.7382) (0.7382) (0.7382) (0.7398) (0.7397) 
BtwCentArt3t -17.1000 *** -17.1000 *** -17.1000 *** -17.4000 *** -17.4000 *** 
 (4.6043) (4.6065) (4.6065) (4.6157) (4.6160) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.7635 *** 2.7756 *** 2.7756 *** 2.7929 *** 2.7939 *** 
  (0.8665) (0.8670) (0.8670) (0.8671) (0.8671) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.2715 0.2658 0.2721 0.2791 0.3021 
  (0.7164) (0.7165) (0.7210) (0.7165) (0.7219) 
BtwCentPat3t 1.1265 ** 1.1366 ** 1.1339 ** 1.1564 ** 1.1477 ** 
  (0.4795) (0.4803) (0.4815) (0.4810) (0.4821) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
dAcAssigneet -3.3943 -3.4647 -3.4632 -3.4377 -3.4300 
  (2.3738) (2.3810) (2.3810) (2.3805) (2.3806) 
dNanoEx 4.2352 4.1470 4.1525 4.2434 4.2663 
  (2.6810) (2.6909) (2.6918) (2.6940) (2.6953) 
dPGPt  1.9835 3.7538 -2.4546 3.2635 
   (5.2264) (23.2695) (7.9829)  (23.3498)  
dPGPt × CliqnessArt3t    -0.4066      -1.4134  
    (5.2080)     (5.4236)  
dPGPt × BtwCentArt3t    6.7336      7.0148  
     (9.9655)  (10.0234)  
dPGPt ×     -0.0525     -0.0494  
[BtwCentArt3t]2    (0.1660)    (0.1664)  
Constant 67.5917 *** 67.4395 *** 67.3774 *** 67.4019 ***    67.1738 *** 
  (6.1616) (6.1745) (6.2254) (6.1762) (6.2379) 
Constant (Sigma) 32.0067 *** 32.0054 *** 32.0052 *** 31.9959 *** 31.9947 *** 
  (0.7595) (0.7595) (0.7595) (0.7592) (0.7592)  
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 108.963 109.107 109.113 109.716 109.784 
Pseudo R2 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0110 0.0110 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6.18 : Impact of patent–grant pairs on the Herfindahl index of forward citations 
[HerfIndexFCit5t] – Tobit results 
Variables HFC (7) HFC (8) HFC (9) HFC (10) HFC (11) 
Grant3t -0.3369  -0.3430  -0.3430  -0.3458  -0.3458  
  (0.2479)  (0.2473)  (0.2473)  (0.2472)  (0.2472)  
Aget -7.0573 *** -6.7590 *** -6.7410 *** -6.8228 *** -6.8171 *** 
  (1.2130)  (1.2189)  (1.2213)  (1.2192)  (1.2221)  
[Aget]2 0.3392 *** 0.3230 *** 0.3224 *** 0.3261 *** 0.3259 *** 
  (0.0514)  (0.0517)  (0.0517)  (0.0517)  (0.0518)  
MaxChairt  0.6353  0.4584  0.4528  0.4290  0.4280  
  (1.4046)  (1.4028)  (1.4031)  (1.4021)  (1.4022)  
ArtCit3t 5.4109 ** 5.9396 ** 5.9238 ** 5.8975 ** 5.8945 ** 
  (2.3012)  (2.3093)  (2.3100)  (2.3050)  (2.3055)  
[ArtCit3t]2 -1.0414 * -1.1765 ** -1.1717 ** -1.1507 ** -1.1500 ** 
  (0.5622)  (0.5653)  (0.5656)  (0.5643)  (0.5644)  
BtwCentArt3t -0.2447  -0.1608  -0.1747  -0.0074  -0.0128  
  (1.4794)  (1.4745)  (1.4751)  (1.4804)  (1.4825)  
CliqnessArt3t  -1.0484  -1.1493  -1.1239  -1.1700  -1.1639  
  (0.8478)  (0.8450)  (0.8491)  (0.8446)  (0.8494)  
BtwCentPat3t 0.8149  0.9440  0.9347  0.9344  0.9324  
  (0.5795)  (0.5786)  (0.5794)  (0.5783)  (0.5791)  
CliqnessPat3t 0.0004  0.0004  0.0004  0.0004  0.0004  
  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
dAcAssigneet 2.7620  1.8908  1.9252  1.8708  1.8795  
  (2.8782)  (2.8826)  (2.8852)  (2.8804)  (2.8834)  
dNanoEx -6.9269 ** -8.0948 ** -8.0662 ** -8.2388 ** -8.2312 ** 
  (3.2444)  (3.2550)  (3.2568)  (3.2563)  (3.2584)  
dPGPt   28.1833 *** 38.6921  37.2859 *** 39.5847  
    (7.7279)  (35.6108)  (11.6503)  (35.6158)  
dPGPt ×      -2.3444    -0.5404  
CliqnessArt3t     (7.7340)    (7.9059)  
dPGPt ×         -8.7258  -8.6017  
BtwCentArt3t       (8.1139)  (8.3186)  
Constant 122 *** 120 *** 120 *** 121 *** 121 *** 
  (8.1185)  (8.1396)  (8.1633)  (8.1293)  (8.1573)  
Constant  36.4698  36.3184  36.3188  36.2921  36.2926  
 (Sigma) 1.0463 *** 1.0410 *** 1.0410 *** 1.0402 *** 1.0402 *** 
Nb observations 1110  1110  1110  1110  1110  
Chi Square 75.9482  90.3957  90.4881  91.533  91.5376  
Pseudo R2 0.0099  0.0118  0.0118  0.0120  0.0120  
P value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
We analyzed the linear and non-linear effect of variables presented in Table 6.19 below:  
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Table 6.19 : Linear and non-linear effect (quadratic effect) of variables to measure impact of 
patent–grant pairs on patent quality 
 FC 
WO/Sq 
FC 
W/Sq 
 
CL 
WO/Sq 
CL 
W/Sq 
HBC 
WO/Sq 
HBC 
W/Sq 
HFC 
WO/Sq 
HFC 
W/Sq 
Grant3t     NS ---   
(Grant3t)2      +++   
Aget  --- +++   +++ --- +/++ --- 
(Aget )2  ---    +++  +++ 
ArtCit3t        ++/+ ++ 
(ArtCit3t )2        --/- 
BtwCentArt3t      NS ---   
(BtwCentArt3t )2      +++   
CliqnessArt3t + NS       
(CliqnessArt3t)2  +       
CliqnessPat3t   NS ++/+     
(CliqnessPat3t)2    -     
Notes: WO/Sq (without square variable) shows the impact of a variable without squared variables (linear impact), 
while W/Sq (with squared variable) demonstrates a quadratic effect. Selected models are bold and underlined. 
Furthermore, +++, ++, + as well as ---, --, - show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in 
different directions (positive or negative), for instance: -0.8190 ***  (indicated by ---), -2.1959 * (identified by -), 
and 28.1833 *** (determined by +++). 
 
According to our results, we reject Hypothesis 6 in terms of number of forward citations, since 
the patents linked to patent–grant pairs [dPGPt] receive fewer citations than other patents without 
such a link. However, we accept Hypothesis 6 when considering the Herfindahl index of forward 
citations [HerfIndexFCit5t], as the patents receive more citations and are more diversified. We 
can’t accept Hypothesis 6 when considering number of claims (NbClaimst) and Herfindahl index 
of backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt], since the results are not significant. Furthermore, we 
couldn’t find any significant effect of patent–grant pairs [dPGPt] on patent quality when dealing 
with inventors who occupied in highly clustering coefficient co-publication networks [dPGPt × 
CliqnessArt3t] as well as high co-publication network centrality [dPGPt × BtwCentArt3t]. 
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Accordingly, we cannot accept Hypothesis 6A proposing that there is a relationship between the 
two measured phenomena including patent quality as the dependent variable and patent–grant 
pairs dealing with inventors who occupied nodes in the highly centralized co-publication network 
as the independent variables. In Table 6.20, the results are summarized. 
 
Table 6.20 : Summary of results for patent–grant pairs  
Variables Forward 
citations 
[NbFCit5t] 
 
Herfindahl index 
of forward 
citations 
[HerfIndexFCit5t]  
Number of 
claims 
[NbClaimst] 
 
Herfindahl index 
of backward 
citations 
[HerfIndexBWCitt]  
Patent–grant pairs [dPGPt]  Significant 
and negative 
(---/--/-) 
Significant and 
positive (+++) 
Not significant Not significant 
PGPt × CliqnessArt3t Not significant Not significant Not significant Not significant 
dPGPt × BtwCentArt3t  Not significant Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Notes: +++, ++, + as well as ---, --, - show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in different 
directions (positive or negative); for instance: -0.8190 ***  (indicated by ---), -2.1959 * (identified by -), and 
28.1833 *** (determined by +++). 
A key question in this research on patent quality concerns what the number of citations, the 
number of claims or the Herfindahl index actually measures. Is it really the patent “quality,” as is 
often claimed in the literature? Patent citations measure the “use” of the patent as prior art cited 
in other patents, which implies how other technologies build upon a specific patent. Likewise, 
claims in a patent define the extent or the scope of the protection granted by the patent. The 
Herfindahl index, as a third element of this analysis, measures the diversification of technologies 
that patents engage. This research discovered a negative impact of the patent–paper pairs on 
patent quality, including the number of forward citations and number of claims. Prior studies 
have concluded there is no significant impact of patents that have paper counterparts on patent 
citation flows (Magerman et al., 2011). Moreover, this study corroborates former findings and 
further suggests that patents owned by universities yield a smaller number of citations in the 
technology world (Lissoni et al., 2010; Sterzi, 2013). The proximity between academic science 
and applied technology is generally crucial for knowledge transfer. However, the two fields do 
not seem to hold equal importance when it comes to having an impact in the technology world. 
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This exploration found that academic inventors holding a prestigious chair negatively impact the 
number of citations of the patents to which they contribute. 
Collaboration networks among inventors are crucial to their innovation activities and their 
scientific performance, as inventors rarely work unaccompanied and isolated. Prior research have 
found that patents prevent competitors from capturing the market, while occupying better 
brokerage positions (Blind et al. 2009). To have a whole picture of knowledge transfer including 
explicit and tacit knowledge, both patent citation and measuring the network properties of the co-
invention and co-authorship networks are required. Inventors that engage in the short path with a 
high degree of centrality and clustering can broadly and rapidly spread the information between 
different partners (Xiang et al., 2013). Our results reveal that better brokerage positions will only 
go so far to improve patent quality. Network positions that are too central and intermediary are 
eventually associated with declining quality.  
Considering the impact of government assignees on patent citations, our study is consistent 
with Popp et al. (2013) and Popp (2006). The academic and government assignees obtain fewer 
citations than patents held by private-sector assignees. Furthermore, our findings show that 
patents assigned to government or universities and other research facilities engage in less 
diversified technology domains than patents that are privately held by corporations. Finally, our 
outcomes showed that patents belonging to patent–grant pairs obtained fewer patent forward 
citations, but are more diversified and engaged in multidisciplinary technology sectors, compared 
to patents not paired with grants. 
It seems the nature of government patents has changed over time (Popp, 2006). As argued by 
Kenney and Patton (2009, 2011) in assessing the Bayh–Dole Act, university ownership of 
patents may actually impede innovation commercialization in a competitive market. 
Furthermore, several scholars have examined the impact of university, government and 
corporation patentees on patent quality (Bessen, 2008; Crespi et al., 2010; Lissoni et al., 2010; 
Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002; Popp, 2006; Popp et al., 2013; Sterzi, 2013). Past researchers have 
supposed that patents assigned to government laboratories would concentrate on essential needs 
and would be more likely to be cited than patents held by private corporations (Popp, 2006; Popp 
et al., 2013). However, the results of the present research show that government patents tend to 
obtain fewer citations than privately assigned patents. This conclusion is consistent with previous 
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studies including Popp (2006) and Popp et al. (2013) which demonstrated the positive 
contribution of private assignees on patent citations in the energy sector. 
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 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS CHAPTER 7
A number of scholars have used patent data to analyze R&D outcomes, measuring firms’ 
technological position in the competitive market, patent quality and value (Petruzzelli et al., 
2015; Reitzig & Puranam, 2009). The first question that we should answer is, what is patent 
quality? Significant numbers of studies have investigated key indicators to measure patent 
quality. Duch-Brown and Costa-Campi (2015) state that patent citations reveal the intrinsic 
quality of the patents. Briggs (2015) present patent citation as the extensively common proxy of 
patent quality. With respect to former scholars, the forward citation and also the prior art of the 
patent have been used as the common measure of patent quality, showing the importance of the 
patents in knowledge spillovers (Briggs, 2015; Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003; Harhoff et al., 1999). 
Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) imply there is a positive association between a patent’s importance 
and its number of citations in subsequent patents. 
The difference in patent quality and value is blurred. Singh (2008) interchangeably used patent 
quality and value in his research. Prior works have attempted to measure patent value and 
influence in subsequent technology development, rather than the number of patents (Singh, 
2008). Some authors found that the number of patent citations is positively associated with the 
direct indicators that measure patent value, including market value (B. H. Hall et al., 2005), 
renewal rate (Harhoff et al., 1999), and expert value evaluation (Albert, Avery, Narin, & 
McAllister, 1991). Singh (2008) defined patent quality as the number of patent forward citations. 
Singh (2008) tested technological breadth as the variable to assess patent quality. Technological 
breadth was calculated by 1 minus the Herfindahl index of cited patents in a focal patent (patent 
backward citations) as the measure of patent concentration. Singh’s (2008) studies reveal that 
patents that are more diversified (higher number of Herfindahl index of backward citations) are 
of a greater quality than patents involved in fewer technology domains.   
Petruzzelli et al. (2015) used technological breadth as the indicator to measure innovation 
influence measured by the number of forward citations. Conversely, according to Petruzzelli et 
al.’s (2015) research, being involved in various technology domains doesn’t affect the patent 
citation in the biotechnology domain. However, it negatively affects the patent influence in 
subsequent innovation (measured by the number of citations) in non-biotechnology domains. 
Petruzzelli et al. (2015) reveal that patent importance and influence varies according to the 
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domain. A possible explanation of the negative impact of high technology breadth on patent 
citations would be the complexity of the integration of various technology fields (Koput, 1997), 
low technology absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Petruzzelli et al., 2015). 
However, Petruzzelli et al.’s (2015) research shows that high value of patent scope is linked to a 
greater number of forward citations non-biotechnology domain. 
In this research, we used the number of patent forward citations, the number of claims and 1 
minus the Herfindahl index of both forward and backward citations as proxies for patent quality 
indicators. We measured the impact of patent–paper pairs, patent ownership structure, and 
patent–grant pairs on patent quality, finding a negative impact on patent citations. With the 
passage of the Bayh–Dole Act, universities became involved in patenting and licensing their 
innovations, and they undertook enormous effort to set up their internal process for the 
Technology Transfer Office (TTO) to commercialize their innovations (Sampat, 2006). After the 
Bayh–Dole Act, universities have the right to decide what to patent and how to patent, giving 
universities the opportunity to license their patents for their own beneficial interest rather than for 
the public interest (Sampat, 2006).  
Some scholars consider the Bayh–Dole Act as “possibly the most inspired piece of legislation 
to be enacted in America over the past half-century,” suggesting that “more than anything, this 
single policy measure helped to reverse America’s precipitous slide into industrial irrelevance” 
(Sampat, 2006). 
While the Bayh–Dole Act has unquestionably facilitated university innovation transfer and 
commercialization in some cases, this is not true for all cases (Sampat, 2006). The importance of 
patents and commercialization of patents was not well recognized during the passage of the 
Bayh–Dole Act and afterward (Sampat, 2006). Neils Reimers, the manager of the Cohen-Boyer 
licensing program, stated: “Whether we licensed it or not, commercialisation of recombinant 
DNA was going forward.… A non-exclusive licensing program, at its heart, is really a tax… but 
it’s always nice to say ‘technology transfer’” (Reimers, 1998; Sampat, 2006).  
Likewise, regarding the ownership of the patents by the public sector (including the 
government) instead of private contractors, there are serious debates between supporters and 
opponents of private patent ownership (Sampat, 2006). Vannevar Bush (as the “Director of the 
Wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development”) stated that giving the authority to 
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private contractors to retain their rights to license patents would encourage the corporations to 
significantly engage in producing new products and to commercialize the innovations from 
government-funded projects (Sampat, 2006). Conversely, opponents of private patent ownership 
have argued that the government gives the economic power to the large corporations at the 
expense of the small firms, by offering the opportunity for the corporations to own the 
innovations (Sampat, 2006). 
Over the past quarter of the twentieth century, the corporations’ role in defining the projects for 
the universities has enormously increased. In the wake of the Bayh–Dole Act, universities can 
decide how to act to license their innovations (Sampat, 2006). By monitoring how the universities 
make decisions on licensing, and how universities consider the public interest rather than self-
interest when making such decisions, the public ownership system can be amended (Sampat, 
2006).   
Like every research, this study has some limitations. First, only the number of forward citations 
and Herfindahl index of backward and forward citations, and the number of claims were used to 
measure the patent quality in this research, since only these four indicators were accessible in the 
data for testing. There are, however, more indicators that could be used to measure patent quality, 
including the number of IPC-subclasses, patent renewals, patent families, and number of 
applicants (Goetze, 2010; Schettino et al., 2013; Seol et al., 2011). The methodology of the 
present research is consistent with previous studies. However, in order to truly measure patent 
quality, more complex indicators could be applied in further research.  
The second limitation is associated with the scope of the data. The data used in this observation 
merely covers biotechnology and nanotechnology patents originating in Canada and cannot be 
generalized to other disciplines or to other geographical regions. 
In terms of patent ownership structure, transferring technology to the private sector seems to be 
advisable, as the government and academic patents in this study tended to receive fewer citations. 
According to the results of Popp (2006) and Popp et al. (2013), U.S. government child patents, 
however, frequently obtained more citations than government parent patents. Frequently when a 
government child patent was assigned to the private sector, it cited at least one other patent that 
was assigned to the government. In light of such findings, it would be interesting to measure the 
citations of Canadian government child patents in future research. Researchers could measure the 
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quality of patents that are privately held by corporations but that cite at least one patent assigned 
to the government. Accordingly, they could integrate the government contribution (generated 
from government laboratories) in privately held patents, to apply the added value by government 
to the commercialization of patents owned by the corporations.  
Based on this study, where the citations of government patents in Canada were examined, two 
dummy variables can be defined for further research. One dummy variable can be set at 1, where 
the patent is assigned to the government in Canada, as defined in this research. A second variable, 
for the Canadian government child patents, can also be set at 1, for patents held by a private-
sector assignee and citing at least one patent that is assigned to the government in Canada. 
Patent citation in Canada across institutions including university, government and corporations 
was examined in this research. The citation of prior art might be different, however, across 
different countries. Therefore, inference of patent quality according to the prior art of the patents 
could be complicated (Alcácer, Gittelman, & Sampat, 2009). Nevertheless, evaluation of patent 
citations across different regions and nations could be applied in future research. Briggs’s (2015) 
outcomes demonstrated that patents assigned to multiple countries obtain more forward citations 
than patents issued in a single country. Briggs’s (2015) research also showed that patent co-
owners in different geographical locations increase patent quality. Accordingly, the impact of 
joint assignees on patent quality could be studied. 
In some cases the examiners and patent applicants add the prior art to patent citations. 
Accordingly, the proportion of examiners and patents applicants significantly affects the patent’s 
number of backward citations. A higher proportion of patent applicants are linked to a higher 
number of patent examiners’ citations. Therefore, the impact of the number of patent examiners 
on patent prior art citations can be investigated in future research.  
The number of examiners varies across different technology domains. In the communication 
and electronics fields there is a large number of examiners (Alcácer et al., 2009). Moreover, the 
prior art of citations is related to the technology domain, region, examiner’s experience, and 
relative proportion of examiners and patent applicants. All of these factors could be considered 
and addressed in further research to measure the quality and value of the patents associated with 
patent citations’ prior art (Alcácer et al., 2009).  
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Measurement of the Herfindahl index of the inventors’ geographical distribution can be 
addressed in a future study to investigate the impact of the inventors’ cross-regional distribution 
network on patent quality in Canada. In this research we examined the impact of network 
clustering coefficient and betweenness centrality associated with the co-invention and co-
authorship network on patent quality.  
Regarding the patent–paper pairs, we found a negative impact of patent–paper pairs on the 
number of patent citations. However, according to Magerman et al. (2015), publications that are 
linked to patents receive significantly higher citations than papers without such a link. This result 
shows that patenting doesn’t threaten scientific activity.  The impact of patent–paper pairs on 
patent quality in other high-technology domains could be further investigated. Moreover, 
measurement can be done at the individual and corporation level to determine if there is any 
difference in the results. That is, the research can compare patent–paper pairs engaging individual 
scholars with those involving scientists in public and private institutions. According to our 
descriptive data, there is a decreasing trend of patents belonging to patent–paper pairs. Figure 5.3 
shows a decreasing difference between citations of patents in patents–paper pairs and patents not 
linked to publications, with the two numbers converging by the year 2005. Likewise, as shown in 
Figure 5.4 in regard to number of claims, the difference between patent–paper pairs and patents 
without such a link tends to be not significant. Thus, increasing the research time window beyond 
2005 may show that the difference in number of citations and number of claims will change 
further over a longer period, becoming even less significant.  
Further research is clearly required to disentangle the role of academic inventors in the 
technology world, in regard to their position within the scientific and technological networks. 
What benefits accrue from university patents and from patents to which academics contribute? 
Again the researcher must ask, what is patent quality? What indicators are relevant at the 
individual patent level? This investigation has shown that all indicators are not interchangeable; 
they imply very different concepts used as proxies for quality, for lack of better indicators. The 
results obtained are highly dependent on the proxy type used to measure a particular concept. 
Empirical researchers therefore must tread with care in the realm of patent quality indicators. To 
quote Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003, pp. 1365-1366), given “the variety in constructs, 
measurements, samples, databases, industries and country settings and inconsistency in 
definitions, it is of no surprise that there appears to be hardly any clear understanding of the 
108 
concept and measurement of innovative performance.”  This research has taken due account of 
such concerns in assessing the impact of academic and government patent ownership, and of 
patent–paper pairs and patent–grant pairs, on patent quality, and finding the impacts negative. 
The results point clearly to the conclusion that academic and government patent ownership, as 
well as contributions by academic inventors, lack positive impact on patent quality.  
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APPENDIX A – VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
Table A.1 : Description of Variables 
Dependent Variables Description of Variables 
NbClaimst Log of number of claims in the patent document.  
We generated the natural logarithm of number of claims ln 
(NbClaimst). 
NbFCit5t  Log of number of forward citations in citing patents, during the 
5 years following the granting year ln (NbFCit5t +1). 
We generated the natural logarithm of number of forward 
citations with left censored. 
HerfIndexFCit5t  Herfindal index of forward citations  
This is a measure to demonstrate the technological 
concentration of the patent. High value of the HerfIndexFCit5t 
variable demonstrates that the patent involves a variety of 
technologies. We multiplied by 100 to normalize this variable 
(HerfIndexFCit5t × 100). 
HerfIndexBWCitt  Herfindal index of backward citations  
This is a measure to demonstrate the technological 
concentration of the patent as the technological breadth. High 
value of the HerfIndexBWCitt variable demonstrates that patent 
involves in varieties of technologies. We multiplied by 100 to 
normalize this variable (HerfIndexBWCitt × 100). 
Independent Variables 
Aget  Average “career” age of the academic inventors of the patent. 
This variable has been averaged over all academic inventors 
who contributed to a given patent. 
BtwCentPat3t  Average value amongst the academic inventors of the patent of 
the 3-year co-invention (patents) individual network 
betweenness centrality. 
We used the natural logarithm of betweenness centrality ln 
(BtwCentPat3t × 104 +1). This variable has been averaged over 
all academic inventors who contributed to a given patent. 
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Table A.1 : Description of Variables (Cont’d) 
Dependent Variables Variables description 
CliqnessPat3t  Average value amongst the academic inventors of the patent of 
the 3-year co-invention (patents) individual network clustering 
coefficient (cliquishness) (CliqnessPat3t × 104). 
CliqnessArt3t  Average value amongst the academic inventors of the patent of 
the 3-year co-publication (articles) individual network 
clustering coefficient (cliquishness). 
We used the square root of the clustering coefficient of the co-
publication network (all averaged) to normalize this variable 
Sqrt (CliqnessArt3t ). 
BtwCentArt3t Average value amongst the academic inventors of the patent of 
the 3-year co-publication (articles) individual network 
betweenness centrality.  
This variable has been averaged over all academic inventors 
who contributed to a given patent. We used the natural 
logarithm of betweenness centrality ln (BtwCentArt3t× 104  +1). 
Grant3t  Average value amongst the academic inventors of the patent of 
the amount of grants received by the academic inventors of the 
patent over the three years prior to the patent application.  
This variable has been averaged over all academic inventors 
who contributed to a given patent. We used the logarithm of ln 
(Grant3t +1). 
ArtCit3t  Average value amongst the academic inventors of the patent of 
the number of article citations received by their publications.  
This variable has been averaged over all academic inventors 
who contributed to a given patent ln (ArtCit3t +1). 
dAcAssigneet 
 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the assignee of the patent 
is an academic institution 
dGovAssigneet Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the assignee of the patent 
is an government 
dNanoEx Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the domain of the patent 
is exclusively nanotechnology (i.e. excluding 
nanobiotechnology) 
Similarityt Similarity between patents and papers 
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Table A.1 : Description of Variables (Cont’d and end) 
Dependent Variables Variables description 
dPGPt Dummy variables set equals 1 when the patent is linked to the 
grants (similar content) within a short time frame (maximum 2 
years) before patent application date. 
MaxChairt  Maximum value amongst the academic inventors of the patent 
of the ordinal variable representing the “best” chair occupied by 
an academic (0 = no chair, 1 = industrial chair, 2 = NSERC or 
CIHR chair, 3 = Canada Research Chair). 
Endogenous variables  
Contract3t  Average value amongst the academic inventors of the patent of 
the amount of contracts received by the academic inventors of 
the patent over the three years prior to the patent application. 
This variable has been averaged over all academic inventors 
who contributed to a given patent. We used the natural 
logarithm of average of contract received by the academic 
inventors of the patent ln (Contract3t +1). 
Instrumental variables 
Contract3Ut-2  Average value amongst the academic inventors of the patent of 
the total amount of contracts received by their university over 
the past three years. 
This variable has been averaged over all academic inventors 
who contributed to a given patent. We used the natural 
logarithm of this variable ln (Contract3Ut-2 +1). 
GrantEI3t  Average value amongst the academic inventors of the patent of 
the amount of grants for equipment and infrastructure over the 
past three years. 
This variable has been averaged over all academic inventors 
who contributed to a given patent. We used the natural 
logarithm of this variable ln (GrantEI3t +1). 
Loopt  Average value amongst the academic inventors of the patent of 
the number of innovation loops to which they have contributed 
(such a loop exists when the research of the named academic 
inventors of the patent has been funded by the assignee of the 
patent) to which they have contributed: Loopt 
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APPENDIX B –TEST ROBUSTNESS FOR PATENT OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE 
 
Table B.1 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of forward 
citations [NbFCit5t] – Zero-inflated negative binomial model results (robustness test FC (13–17)) 
Variables FC (13)  FC (14)  FC (15)  FC (16)  FC (17)  
Grant3t -0.0077 -0.0038 -0.0034 -0.0036 -0.0042 
  (0.0096) (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
Aget 0.3712 *** 0.3806 *** 0.3806 *** 0.3902 *** 0.3806 *** 
  (0.0501) (0.0498) (0.0498) (0.0502) (0.0497) 
[Aget]2 -0.0176 *** -0.0182 *** -0.0182 *** -0.0185 *** -0.0182 *** 
  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
MaxChairt  0.1234 * 0.0832 0.0824 0.0805 0.0827 
  (0.0632) (0.0640) (0.0641) (0.0640) (0.0638) 
ArtCit3t -0.0843 ** -0.0509 -0.0507 -0.0506 -0.0493 
  (0.0363) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) 
BtwCentArt3t 0.0541 0.0105 0.0100 0.0090 0.0162 
  (0.0598) (0.0620) (0.0621) (0.0621) (0.0622) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.2039 * -0.1924 * -0.1905 * -0.2035 * -0.1881 * 
  (0.1057) (0.1066) (0.1072) (0.1066) (0.1065) 
[CliqnessArt3t]2 0.0206 ** 0.0188 ** 0.0186 ** 0.0199 ** 0.0186 ** 
  (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0091) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0623 *** -0.0781 *** -0.0778 *** -0.0794 *** -0.0788 *** 
  (0.0233) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0248) (0.0247) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Loop -0.1241 -0.0749 -0.0760 -0.0760 -0.0731 
  (0.1193) (0.1214) (0.1215) (0.1213) (0.1213) 
dNanoEx 0.6402 *** 0.6262 *** 0.6268 *** 0.6362 *** 0.6322 *** 
  (0.1212) (0.1205) (0.1205) (0.1209) (0.1205) 
dGovAssigneet  -0.7768 *** -0.7124 3.3786 -0.3944 
   (0.2854) (0.4700) (2.5934) (0.4402) 
dAcAssigneet  -0.4415 *** -0.4421 *** -0.4386 *** -0.4412 *** 
   (0.1399) (0.1399) (0.1397) (0.1397) 
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t   -0.0088   
    (0.0509)   
dGovAssigneet × Aget    -0.7210  
     (0.4692)  
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2    0.0282  
     (0.0197)  
dGovAssigneet ×      -0.3743 
BtwCentArt3t     (0.3195) 
Constant -0.9836 *** -0.9006 ** -0.9049 ** -0.9417 *** -0.9211 *** 
  (0.3501) (0.3506) (0.3514) (0.3517) (0.3504) 
Inflate      
Grant3t -0.0080 0.0021 0.0019 0.0013 0.0008 
  (0.0699) (0.0568) (0.0566) (0.0575) (0.0558) 
Aget 0.1901 0.0454 0.0453 0.0473 0.0450 
  (0.1825) (0.0593) (0.0592) (0.0591) (0.0584) 
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Table B.1 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of forward 
citations [NbFCit5t] – Zero-inflated negative binomial model results (robustness test FC (13–17)) 
(Cont’d and end) 
Variables! FC (13)! FC (14)! FC (15)! FC (16)! FC (17)!
MaxChairt  2.4458 ** 0.7605 * 0.7582 * 0.7450 0.7550 * 
  (1.1628) (0.4472) (0.4456) (0.4574) (0.4427) 
BtwCentArt3t -1.6670 ** -1.9219 -1.9221 -1.8973 -1.9153 
  (0.7080) (1.1784) (1.1751) (1.1927) (1.1775) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.3738 0.0411 0.0414 0.0389 0.0433 
  (0.2418) (0.1403) (0.1400) (0.1395) (0.1373) 
ArtCit3t 0.2966 0.7215 * 0.7218 * 0.7160 * 0.7179 * 
  (0.2741) (0.4108) (0.4096) (0.4181) (0.4072) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.4346 * -0.4942 * -0.4938 * -0.4872 * -0.4949 * 
  (0.2279) (0.2772) (0.2763) (0.2783) (0.2740) 
Constant (Inflate) -9.9839 * -3.1570 ** -3.1528 ** -3.1434 ** -3.1238 ** 
  (5.2268) (1.5146) (1.5076) (1.5461) (1.4951) 
Constant (lnalpha) 0.3635 *** 0.3056 *** 0.3055 *** 0.2992 *** 0.3017 *** 
  (0.0799) (0.0908) (0.0907) (0.0920) (0.0913) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Log Likelihood -1733.70 -1727.58 -1727.57 -1726.12 -1726.89 
Chi Square 98.26 110.50 110.53 113.42 111.88 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Zero obs  543.00 543.00 543.00 543.00 543.00 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table B.2 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of forward 
citations [NbFCit5t] – Zero-inflated negative binomial model results (robustness test FC (18–21)) 
Variables FC (18)  FC (19)  FC (20)  FC (21)  
Grant3t -0.0031  -0.0043 -0.0071 -0.0039 
  (0.0100)  (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0100) 
Aget 0.3800 *** 0.3893 *** 0.3750 *** 0.3727 *** 
  (0.0498) (0.0501) (0.0499) (0.0534) 
[Aget]2 -0.0182 *** -0.0185 *** -0.0180 *** -0.0179 *** 
  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0023) 
MaxChairt  0.0818 0.0812 0.0853 0.0824 
  (0.0639) (0.0640) (0.0644) (0.0638) 
ArtCit3t -0.0502 -0.0485 -0.0518 -0.0507 
  (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) 
BtwCentArt3t 0.0079 0.0134 0.0147 0.0111 
  (0.0621) (0.0624) (0.0619) (0.0621) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.1892 * -0.1998 * -0.1905 * -0.1945 * 
  (0.1066) (0.1076) (0.1066) (0.1067) 
[CliqnessArt3t]2 0.0185 ** 0.0197 ** 0.0188 ** 0.0189 ** 
  (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0091) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0772 *** -0.0797 *** -0.0809 *** -0.0776 *** 
  (0.0247) (0.0251) (0.0247) (0.0247) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Loop -0.0778 -0.0742 -0.0734 -0.0769 
  (0.1214) (0.1213) (0.1211) (0.1223) 
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Table B.2 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of forward 
citations [NbFCit5t] – Zero-inflated negative binomial model results (robustness test FC (18–21)) 
(Cont’d and end) 
Variables! FC (18)! FC (19)! FC (20)! FC (21)!
dNanoEx 0.6272 *** 0.6402 *** 0.6302 *** 0.6278 *** 
  (0.1205) (0.1211) (0.1205) (0.1205) 
dGovAssigneet -0.6753 ** 3.8675 -0.7800 *** -0.7759 *** 
  (0.3200) (2.7428) (0.2852) (0.2853) 
dAcAssigneet -0.4408 *** -0.4357 *** -0.8545 ** -0.7481 
  (0.1398) (0.1397) (0.3464) (0.8153) 
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t  0.0340   
   (0.0600)   
dGovAssigneet × Aget  -0.7693   
   (0.5050)   
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2  0.0307   
   (0.0215)   
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t  -0.3998   
   (0.3359)   
dGovAssignee × BtwCentPat3t -0.2663 -0.4121   
  (0.3754) (0.4449)   
dAcAssigneet  × Grant3t   0.0422  
    (0.0324)  
dAcAssigneet× Aget    0.0598 
     (0.1461) 
dAcAssigneet × [Aget]2    -0.0026 
     (0.0064) 
Constant -0.9060 *** -0.9545 *** -0.8565 ** -0.8524 ** 
  (0.3505) (0.3519) (0.3519) (0.3737) 
Inflate     
Grant3t 0.0022 0.0010 0.0072 0.0025 
  (0.0567) (0.0580) (0.0592) (0.0574) 
Aget 0.0458 0.0481 0.0485 0.0454 
  (0.0591) (0.0587) (0.0622) (0.0596) 
MaxChairt  0.7581 * 0.7451 0.7988 * 0.7631 * 
  (0.4454) (0.4660) (0.4644) (0.4516) 
BtwCentArt3t -1.9246 -1.8909 -1.9298 -1.9446 
  (1.1775) (1.2172) (1.2595) (1.1883) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.0409 0.0399 0.0400 0.0380 
  (0.1395) (0.1371) (0.1500) (0.1414) 
ArtCit3t 0.7223 * 0.7110 * 0.7232 0.7315 * 
  (0.4087) (0.4203) (0.4423) (0.4156) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.4945 * -0.4899 * -0.5013 * -0.4965 * 
  (0.2762) (0.2789) (0.2948) (0.2806) 
Constant (Inflate) -3.1561 ** -3.1288 ** -3.3094 ** -3.1706 ** 
  (1.5085) (1.5701) (1.6032) (1.5321) 
Constant (lnalpha) 0.3047 *** 0.2940 *** 0.3020 *** 0.3054 *** 
  (0.0908) (0.0932) (0.0905) (0.0905) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Log Likelihood  -1727.31 -1725.05 -1726.74 -1727.50 
Chi Square 111.04 115.57 112.18 110.67 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Zero obs  543.00 543.00 543.00 543.00 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table B.3 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of forward 
citations [NbFCit5t] – Zero-inflated negative binomial model results (robustness test FC (22–25)) 
Variables FC (22)  FC (23)  FC (24)  FC (25)   
Grant3t -0.0064 -0.0046 -0.0111 -0.0125 
  (0.0104) (0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0114) 
Aget 0.3842 *** 0.3821 *** 0.3730 *** 0.3834 *** 
  (0.0498) (0.0498) (0.0532) (0.0538) 
[Aget]2 -0.0182 *** -0.0183 *** -0.0178 *** -0.0181 *** 
  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
MaxChairt  0.0837 0.0822 0.0861 0.0849 
  (0.0642) (0.0640) (0.0647) (0.0647) 
ArtCit3t -0.0434 -0.0524 -0.0455 -0.0419 
  (0.0387) (0.0384) (0.0390) (0.0394) 
BtwCentArt3t 0.0359 0.0129 0.0468 0.0513  
 (0.0640) (0.0621) (0.0644) (0.0653) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.1861 * -0.1923 * -0.1848 * -0.1927 * 
  (0.1060) (0.1065) (0.1058) (0.1067) 
[CliqnessArt3t]2 0.0186 ** 0.0189 ** 0.0188 ** 0.0198 ** 
  (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0091) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0832 *** -0.0820 *** -0.0896 *** -0.0933 *** 
  (0.0262) (0.0254) (0.0270) (0.0297) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Loop -0.0717 -0.0650 -0.0585 -0.0567 
  (0.1212) (0.1222) (0.1226) (0.1224) 
dNanoEx 0.6193 *** 0.6224 *** 0.6214 *** 0.6339 *** 
  (0.1204) (0.1206) (0.1207) (0.1220) 
dGovAssigneet -0.7803 *** -0.7836 *** -0.7899 *** 3.8427 
  (0.2850) (0.2857) (0.2849) (2.7312) 
dAcAssigneet -0.1809 -0.4828 *** -0.9506 -0.8815 
  (0.1954) (0.1530) (0.8282) (0.8271) 
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t    0.0423 
     (0.0598) 
dGovAssigneet × Aget    -0.7654 
     (0.5034) 
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2    0.0304 
     (0.0215) 
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t    -0.4542 
     (0.3342) 
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t    -0.4035 
     (0.4433) 
dAcAssigneet  × Grant3t   0.0472 0.0485 
    (0.0339) (0.0339) 
dAcAssigneet× Aget   0.0451 0.0361 
    (0.1540) (0.1538) 
dAcAssigneet × [Aget]2   -0.0014 -0.0012 
    (0.0067) (0.0067) 
dAcAssigneet× BtwCentArt3t -0.2744 *  -0.3196 ** -0.3322 ** 
  (0.1421)  (0.1475) (0.1478) 
dAcAssigneet× BtwCentPat3t  0.0534 0.0529 0.0545 
   (0.0812) (0.0834) (0.0832) 
   0.5113 0.5259 0.5125 
Constant -0.9828 *** -0.9025 ** -0.8987 ** -0.9625 *** 
  (0.3524) (0.3505) (0.3713) (0.3734)  
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Table B.3 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of forward 
citations [NbFCit5t] – Zero-inflated negative binomial model results (robustness test FC (22–25)) 
(Cont’d and end) 
Variables! FC (22)! FC (23)! FC (24)! FC (25)! !
Grant3t -0.0064 0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0051 
  (0.0548) (0.0563) (0.0583) (0.0630) 
Aget 0.0478 0.0462 0.0531 0.0570 
  (0.0549) (0.0586) (0.0575) (0.0566) 
MaxChairt  0.6844 0.7517 * 0.7240 0.6740 
  (0.4581) (0.4445) (0.4874) (0.5508) 
BtwCentArt3t -1.7426 -1.9137 -1.7461 -1.6209 
  (1.2182) (1.1782) (1.3125) (1.4179) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.0450 0.0409 0.0425 0.0398 
  (0.1257) (0.1382) (0.1319) (0.1256) 
ArtCit3t 0.6607 0.7162 * 0.6600 0.6187 
  (0.4206) (0.4103) (0.4506) (0.4784) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.4539 * -0.4849 * -0.4508 * -0.4331 
  (0.2534) (0.2733) (0.2710) (0.2668) 
Constant (Inflate) -2.9091 * -3.1333 ** -3.0872 * -2.9406 
  (1.5325) (1.5127) (1.6841) (1.8450) 
Constant (lnalpha) 0.2867 *** 0.3035 *** 0.2797 *** 0.2610 ** 
  (0.1007) (0.0914) (0.1013) (0.1168) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Log Likelihood -1725.71 -1727.37 -1724.19 -1721.44 
Chi Square 114.25 110.93 117.29 122.78 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Zero obs 543.00 543.00 543.00 543.00 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table B.4 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Regression results (robustness test HBC (12–15))   
Variables HBC (12)  HBC (13)  HBC (14)  HBC (15)  
Grant3t -3.6579 *** -3.6259 *** -3.5805 *** -3.5856 *** 
  (0.7841) 0.7806 0.7980 0.7806 
[Grant3t]2 0.2978 *** 0.2968 *** 0.2944 *** 0.2926 *** 
  (0.0632) (0.0629) (0.0644) (0.0629) 
NbClaimst 2.9728 *** 2.8988 *** 2.8976 *** 2.6623 ** 
  (1.0517) (1.0475) (1.0484) (1.0585) 
Aget -2.2616 *** -2.1145 *** -2.1241 *** -2.1391 *** 
  (0.7764) (0.7745) (0.7754) (0.7742) 
[Aget]2 0.1396 *** 0.1312 *** 0.1316 *** 0.1318 *** 
  (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0331) 
MaxChairt  -1.3123 -1.4395 -1.4480 -1.4304 
  (1.0359) (1.0320) (1.0330) (1.0315) 
ArtCit3t 0.9243 1.0090 1.0086 1.0287 
  (0.6529) (0.6513) (0.6526) (0.6510)  
BtwCentArt3t -15.4000 *** -14.1000 *** -14.1000 *** -14.1000 *** 
  (4.0541) (4.0525) (4.0577) (4.0501) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.5502 *** 2.3033 *** 2.2919 *** 2.3119 *** 
  (0.7653) (0.7654) (0.7668) (0.7650) 
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Table B.4 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Regression results (robustness test HBC (12–15)) 
(Cont’d and end) 
Variables! HBC (12)! HBC (13)! HBC (14)! HBC (15)!
CliqnessArt3t  0.4144 0.3718 0.3579 0.4490 
  (0.6334) (0.6315) (0.6327) (0.6332) 
BtwCentPat3t 1.0514 ** 0.7663 * 0.7812 * 0.7387 * 
  (0.4169) (0.4233) (0.4267) (0.4234) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Loop 1.9252 2.1148 2.0605 2.1545 
  (2.1736) (2.2173) (2.2218) (2.2161) 
dNanoEx 2.4129 2.3534 2.3181 2.4415 
  (2.4072) (2.3965) (2.4000) (2.3958) 
dGovAssigneet  -14.4000 *** -10.9000 -40.4000 ** 
   (4.9656) (8.7998) (17.9318) 
dAcAssigneet  -5.3922 ** -5.4022 ** -5.4477 ** 
   (2.4889) (2.4910) (2.4877) 
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t   -1.3230  
    (4.2070)  
dGovAssigneet × [Grant3t]2   0.0752  
    (0.3370)  
dGovAssigneet × NbClaimst    9.9747 
     (6.5996) 
Constant 60.9051 *** 62.5982 *** 62.5582 *** 63.0079 *** 
  (6.0684) (6.0867) (6.0926) (6.0892)  
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Log Likelihood -5283.18 -5277.07 -5276.94 -5275.91 
R2 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 
R2 Adjusted 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table B.5 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Regression results (robustness tests HBC (16–19)) 
Variables HBC (16)  HBC (17)  HBC (18)  HBC (19)  
Grant3t -3.6484 *** -3.5613 *** -3.6141 *** -3.5094 *** 
  0.7811 0.7865 0.7812 0.8000 
[Grant3t]2 0.2994 *** 0.2904 *** 0.2950 *** 0.2874 *** 
  (0.0629) (0.0635) (0.0630) (0.0646) 
NbClaimst 2.9519 *** 2.8640 *** 2.8740 *** 2.6436 ** 
  (1.0488) (1.0490) (1.0492) (1.0605) 
Aget -2.0508 *** -2.1041 *** -2.0986 *** -2.0707 *** 
  (0.7790) (0.7753) (0.7756) (0.7801) 
[Aget]2 0.1293 *** 0.1306 *** 0.1303 *** 0.1307 *** 
  (0.0333) (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0334) 
MaxChairt  -1.4557 -1.4587 -1.4365 -1.4733 
  (1.0327) (1.0346) (1.0324) (1.0356) 
ArtCit3t 1.0181 1.0205 1.0147 1.0638 
  (0.6515) (0.6530) (0.6516) (0.6545) 
134 
Table B.5 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Regression results (robustness tests HBC (16–19)) 
(Cont’d and end) 
Variables! HBC (16)! HBC (17)! HBC (18)! HBC (19)!
BtwCentArt3t -14.2000 *** -14.0000 *** -14.1000 *** -14.2000 *** 
  (4.0544) (4.0786) (4.0539) (4.0843) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.3037 *** 2.3009 *** 2.3091 *** 2.3236 *** 
  (0.7656) (0.7693) (0.7658) (0.7709) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.3778 0.3918 0.3755 0.4879 
  (0.6317) (0.6334) (0.6318) (0.6378) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.7660 * 0.7421 * 0.7465 * 0.7175 * 
  (0.4236) (0.4247) (0.4255) (0.4287) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Loop 2.0625 2.1421 2.1308 2.0538 
  (2.2186) (2.2193) (2.2183) (2.2225) 
dNanoEx 2.5024 2.3484 2.3828 2.6914 
  (2.4005) (2.4016) (2.3982) (2.4149) 
dGovAssigneet 37.7652 -9.6071 -15.7000 *** 31.7268 
  (46.8636) (7.6027) (5.6690) (49.1253) 
dAcAssigneet -5.3495 ** -5.4145 ** -5.4165 ** -5.3932 ** 
  (2.4906) (2.4906) (2.4903) (2.4928) 
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t    -1.8590 
     (4.7144) 
dGovAssigneet × [Grant3t]2    0.1429 
     (0.3893) 
dGovAssigneet × NbClaimst    13.7743 * 
     (8.0662) 
dGovAssigneet × Aget -7.9299   -11.2000 
  (7.7856)   (8.9052) 
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2 0.2780   0.3640 
  (0.3085)   (0.3542) 
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t  4.6194  3.8870 
   (33.1080)  (36.4719) 
dGovAssigneet ×    -1.8944  -1.1252 
[BtwCentArt3t]2  (7.0657)  (7.8615) 
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t   2.2066 0.6103 
    (4.7291) (6.1411) 
Constant 62.0143 *** 62.4970 *** 62.6476 *** 62.2379 *** 
  (6.1093) (6.0935) (6.0898) (6.1211) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Log Likelihood -5276.36 -5276.72 -5276.96 -5274.05 
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
R2 Adjusted 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table B.6 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations – Regression results (to test model robustness HBC (20–23))   
Variables HBC (20)  HBC (21)  HBC (22)  HBC (23)  
Grant3t -3.9543 *** -3.4916 *** -3.5979 *** -3.6123 *** 
  0.8043 0.7732 0.7791 0.7789 
[Grant3t]2 0.3216 *** 0.2869 *** 0.2958 *** 0.2969 *** 
  (0.0647) (0.0623) (0.0627) (0.0627) 
NbClaimst 2.9935 *** 0.4664 2.8931 *** 2.8727 *** 
  (1.0489) (1.1529) (1.0454) (1.0451) 
Aget -2.1260 *** -2.2335 *** -2.3959 *** -2.8269 *** 
  (0.7748) (0.7671) (0.7824) (0.8445) 
[Aget]2 0.1333 *** 0.1373 *** 0.1341 *** 0.1534 *** 
  (0.0331) (0.0328) (0.0330) (0.0360) 
MaxChairt  -1.3389 -1.3990 -1.4320 -1.4053 
  (1.0339) (1.0217) (1.0300) (1.0298) 
ArtCit3t 1.0494 0.8774 0.9464 0.9320 
  (0.6515) (0.6453) (0.6505) (0.6503) 
BtwCentArt3t -14.1000 *** -14.8000 *** -14.4000 *** -14.5000 *** 
  (4.0668) (4.0140) (4.0457) (4.0451) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.2941 *** 2.4087 *** 2.3154 *** 2.3342 *** 
  (0.7692) (0.7580) (0.7639) (0.7637) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.3728 0.3915 0.3595 0.3546 
  (0.6320) (0.6252) (0.6303) (0.6301) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.7361 * 0.7456 * 0.7813 * 0.7943 * 
  (0.4251) (0.4190) (0.4225) (0.4224) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Loop 1.7478 3.1189 2.4125 2.1947 
  (2.2273) (2.2048) (2.2165) (2.2215) 
dNanoEx 2.3626 2.3128 2.4555 2.3310 
  (2.3959) (2.3724) (2.3921) (2.3929) 
dGovAssigneet -14.4000 *** -14.2000 *** -14.3000 *** -14.2000 *** 
  (4.9637) (4.9158) (4.9557) (4.9546) 
dAcAssignee t -8.5723 -37.5000 *** -20.2000 *** -32.2000 *** 
  (5.5021) (7.0837) (6.8502) (11.1811) 
dAcAssignee t  × Grant3t 4.1242 *    
  (2.4502)    
dAcAssignee t  × [Grant3t]2 -0.3241 *    
  (0.1946)    
dAcAssignee t × NbClaimst  12.5190 ***   
   (2.5929)   
dAcAssigneet × Aget   1.2406 ** 3.8637 * 
    (0.5333) (2.0107) 
dAcAssignee t × [Aget]2    -0.1188 
     (0.0878) 
Constant 62.5415 *** 69.3201 *** 65.9054 *** 68.2413 *** 
  (6.0939) (6.1842) (6.2386) (6.4708) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Log Likelihood -5275.62 -5265.35 -5274.32 -5273.39 
R2 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.12 
R2 Adjusted 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table B.7 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Regression results (to test model robustness HBC (24–
27))   
Variables HBC (24)  HBC (25)  HBC (26)  HBC (27)  
Grant3t -3.4633 *** -3.7338 *** -3.7465 *** -3.5822 *** 
  0.7860 0.7785 0.8067 0.8298 
[Grant3t]2 0.2814 *** 0.3020 *** 0.2999 *** 0.2853 *** 
  (0.0635) (0.0627) (0.0653) (0.0674) 
NbClaimst 3.0140 *** 2.7911 *** 0.6050 0.2043 
  (1.0489) (1.0443) (1.1460) (1.1626) 
Aget -2.0523 *** -2.0610 *** -2.8694 *** -2.8182 *** 
  (0.7748) (0.7719) (0.8343) (0.8408) 
[Aget]2 0.1306 *** 0.1272 *** 0.1586 *** 0.1580 *** 
  (0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0355) (0.0359) 
MaxChairt  -1.4844 -1.5157 -1.3735 -1.4146 
  (1.0315) (1.0286) (1.0181) (1.0211) 
ArtCit3t 1.0886 * 0.8617 0.8244 0.8894 
  (0.6525) (0.6507) (0.6439) (0.6468) 
BtwCentArt3t -13.7000 *** -13.1000 *** -13.9000 *** -13.9000 *** 
  (4.0556) (4.0531) (4.0208) (4.0515) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.3582 *** 2.1163 *** 2.3686 *** 2.4028 *** 
  (0.7655) (0.7651) (0.7605) (0.7657) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.4057 0.4990 0.5288 0.6794 
  (0.6314) (0.6306) (0.6236) (0.6299) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.7173 * 0.4597 0.4176 0.3397 
  (0.4239) (0.4338) (0.4332) (0.4398) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Loop 1.9277 2.6764 3.0346 3.0417 
  (2.2183) (2.2170) (2.2087) (2.2131) 
dNanoEx 2.1690 2.1931 1.9599 2.3012 
  (2.3971) (2.3883) (2.3606) (2.3768) 
dGovAssignee t -14.5000 *** -14.9000 *** -14.7000 *** 19.7058 
  (4.9620) (4.9507) (4.8835) (48.2929) 
dAcAssignee t -1.1225 -9.1473 *** -68.4000 *** -68.7000 *** 
  (3.5644) (2.7758) (13.4556) (13.4848) 
dGovAssignee t × Grant3t    -1.7783 
     (4.6356) 
dGovAssignee t × [Grant3t]2    0.1454 
     (0.3828) 
dGovAssignee t × NbClaimst    16.3965 ** 
     (7.9354) 
dGovAssignee t × Aget    -10.6000 
     (8.7489) 
dGovAssignee t × [Aget]2    0.3402 
     (0.3480) 
dGovAssignee t ×     3.7172 
BtwCentArt3t    (35.8107) 
dGovAssignee t ×      -1.2110 
[BtwCentArt3t]2    (7.7180) 
dGovAssignee t ×     0.8541 
BtwCentPat3t    (6.0299) 
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Table B.7 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Regression results (to test model robustness HBC (24–
27)) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables! HBC (24)! HBC (25)! HBC (26)! HBC (27)!
dAcAssignee t  × Grant3t   4.8840 * 4.7368 * 
    (2.5720) (2.5791) 
dAcAssignee t  × [Grant3t]2   -0.3730 * -0.3591 * 
    (0.2062) (0.2068) 
dAcAssignee t × NbClaimst   12.5752 *** 12.9711 *** 
    (2.5868) (2.5950) 
dAcAssignee t  × Aget   3.9609 * 3.8884 * 
    (2.0357) (2.0392) 
dAcAssignee t × [Aget]2   -0.1175 -0.1158 
    (0.0887) (0.0889)  
dAcAssignee t ×  -4.1888 *  -5.3030 ** -5.6224 ** 
BtwCentArt3t (2.5052)  (2.6489) (2.6701) 
dAcAssignee t ×   4.3246 *** 3.5249 ** 3.5912 ** 
BtwCentPat3t  (1.4365) (1.4550) (1.4572) 
Constant 60.8792 *** 63.3674 *** 73.7807 *** 73.5680 *** 
  (6.1680) (6.0697) (6.5633) (6.6081)  
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Log Likelihood  -5275.65 -5272.48 -5253.79 -5249.93 
R2 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.15 
R2 Adjusted 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.13 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX C – TEST ROBUSTNESS FOR PATENT–GRANT PAIRS 
 
Table C.1 : Impact of patent–grant pairs on the number of forward citations [NbFCit5t] – Zero-
inflated negative binomial model results (to test model robustness FC (26–30)) 
Variables FC (26)  FC (27)  FC (28)  FC(29)  FC (30)   
Grant3t -0.0058 -0.0061 -0.0063 -0.0063 -0.0065 
  (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) 
Aget 0.3780 *** 0.3732 *** 0.3693 *** 0.3713 *** 0.3669 *** 
  (0.0499) (0.0501) (0.0503) (0.0502) (0.0504) 
[Aget]2 -0.0181 *** -0.0178 *** -0.0177 *** -0.0177 *** -0.0175 *** 
  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
MaxChairt  0.0782 0.0939 0.0968 0.0904 0.0927 
  (0.0628) (0.0640) (0.0639) (0.0638) (0.0636) 
ArtCit3t -0.0515 -0.0599 -0.0588 -0.0575 -0.0558 
  (0.0382) (0.0389) (0.0388) (0.0388) (0.0387) 
BtwCentArt3t 0.0241 0.0208 0.0266 0.0249 0.0319 
  (0.0611) (0.0614) (0.0613) (0.0616) (0.0615) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.1916 * -0.1759 * -0.1818 * -0.1782 * -0.1850 * 
  (0.1066) (0.1066) (0.1067) (0.1064) (0.1065) 
[CliqnessArt3t ]2 0.0182 ** 0.0175 * 0.0174 * 0.0176 * 0.0175 * 
  (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0091) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0718 *** -0.0770 *** -0.0742 *** -0.0770 *** -0.0741 *** 
  (0.0237) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0238) (0.0238) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
dAcAssigneet -0.3869 *** -0.3351 *** -0.3501 *** -0.3391 *** -0.3548 *** 
  (0.1157) (0.1174) (0.1176) (0.1175) (0.1175) 
dNanoEx 0.6262 *** 0.6687 *** 0.6526 *** 0.6633 *** 0.6452 *** 
  (0.1205) (0.1223) (0.1223) (0.1224) (0.1224) 
dPGP t  -0.8005 *** -3.3708 ** -0.6102 -3.3121 ** 
   (0.3048) (1.5736) (0.4251) (1.5949) 
dPGP t × CliqnessArt3t    0.5489 *  0.5921 * 
    (0.3295)  (0.3401) 
dPGP t × BtwCentArt3t    -0.2209 -0.3036 
     (0.3441) (0.3629) 
Constant -0.8934 ** -0.8819 ** -0.8510 ** -0.8742 ** -0.8408 ** 
  (0.3514) (0.3528) (0.3544) (0.3527) (0.3542) 
Inflate      
Grant3t 0.0019 0.0010 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0011 
  (0.0531) (0.0555) (0.0549) (0.0548) (0.0540) 
Aget 0.0499 0.0439 0.0433 0.0453 0.0449 
  (0.0620) (0.0658) (0.0656) (0.0647) (0.0643) 
MaxChairt  0.8083 * 0.8734 * 0.8747 * 0.8576 * 0.8556 * 
  (0.4212) (0.4860) (0.4833) (0.4717) (0.4679) 
BtwCentArt3t -2.1895 ** -2.2101 * -2.2164 ** -2.2152 ** -2.2178 ** 
  (1.0937) (1.1428) (1.1213) (1.1251) (1.1052) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.0337 0.0577 0.0566 0.0532 0.0516  
  (0.1466) (0.1617) (0.1614) (0.1563) (0.1552) 
ArtCit3t 0.8068 ** 0.7866 ** 0.7904 ** 0.7909 ** 0.7941 ** 
  (0.3791) (0.3989) (0.3932) (0.3923) (0.3870) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.5282 * -0.5214 * -0.5206 * -0.5224 * -0.5209 * 
  (0.2748) (0.2827) (0.2811) (0.2807) (0.2788) 
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Table C.1 : Impact of patent–grant pairs on the number of forward citations [NbFCit5t] – Zero-
inflated negative binomial model results (to test model robustness FC (26–30)) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables! FC (26)! FC (27)! FC (28)! FC(29)! FC (30)! !
Constant (Inflate) -3.3830 ** -3.4693 ** -3.4575 ** -3.4409 ** -3.4216 ** 
  (1.4682) (1.6021) (1.5796) (1.5713) (1.5446) 
Lnalpha      
Constant (lnalpha) 0.3244 *** 0.3178 *** 0.3132 *** 0.3151 *** 0.3090 *** 
  (0.0851) (0.0854) (0.0853) (0.0855) (0.0855) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Log Likelihood -1730.3 -1726.91 -1725.43 -1726.7 -1725.07 
Chi Square 105.078 111.849 114.801 112.275 115.532 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Zero obs 543 543 543 543 543 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table C.2 : Impact of patent–grant pairs on the Herfindahl index of forward citations 
[HerfIndexFCit5t] – Regression results (robustness test HFC (12–16)) 
Variable HFC (12)  HFC (13)  HFC(14)  HFC (15)  HFC(16)   
Grant3t -0.2627 -0.2723 * -0.2721 * -0.2737 * -0.2734 * 
  (0.1625) (0.1622) (0.1622) (0.1622) (0.1622) 
Aget -2.1436 *** -1.9837 *** -1.9948 *** -2.0246 *** -2.0640 *** 
  (0.7045) (0.7063) (0.7103) (0.7073) (0.7128) 
[Aget]2 0.0930 *** 0.0849 *** 0.0853 *** 0.0866 *** 0.0881 *** 
  (0.0300) (0.0302) (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0304) 
MaxChairt  0.8024 0.7327 0.7332 0.7237 0.7240 
  (0.9350) (0.9336) (0.9340) (0.9335) (0.9339) 
ArtCit3t 2.6479 * 2.8469 * 2.8568 * 2.7930 * 2.8172 * 
  (1.5149) (1.5140) (1.5161) (1.5148) (1.5163) 
[ArtCit3t]2 -0.5853 -0.6394 * -0.6423 * -0.6139 * -0.6198 * 
  (0.3690) (0.3689) (0.3696) (0.3697) (0.3701) 
BtwCentArt3t 0.5638 0.6028 0.6063 0.7119 0.7364 
  (0.9824) (0.9804) (0.9812) (0.9858) (0.9876) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.5803 -0.6176 -0.6275 -0.6299 -0.6622 
  (0.5709) (0.5700) (0.5739) (0.5701) (0.5746) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.3637 0.4091 0.4129 0.4009 0.4118 
  (0.3791) (0.3788) (0.3798) (0.3789) (0.3798) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
dAcAssigneet 1.2685 0.8951 0.8912 0.8872 0.8739 
  (1.8928) (1.8954) (1.8965) (1.8953) (1.8963) 
dNanoEx -2.7560 -3.1934 -3.2025 -3.2503 -3.2854 
  (2.1569) (2.1603) (2.1621) (2.1609) (2.1630) 
dPGP  9.9647 ** 7.1507 15.0625 ** 6.9757 
   (4.2138) (18.7986) (6.4038) (18.7967) 
dPGP ×    0.6466  2.0011 
CliqnessArt3t! ! ! (4.2092)! ! (4.3727)!
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Table C.2 : Impact of patent–grant pairs on the Herfindahl index of forward citations 
[HerfIndexFCit5t] – Regression results (robustness test HFC (12–16)) (Cont’d and end) 
Variable! HFC(12)! HFC (13)! HFC(14)! HFC (15)! HFC(16)! !
dPGP ×! ! ! ! -4.9829! ! -5.5914!
 BtwCentArt3t    (4.7136) (4.8992) 
Constant 93.2998 *** 92.5549 *** 92.6474 *** 92.7172 *** 93.0234 *** 
  (4.9076) (4.9075) (4.9465) (4.9097) (4.9568) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Log Likelihood -5181.46 -5178.64 -5178.63 -5178.07 -5177.96  
R2 0.0189 0.0238 0.0239 0.0248 0.0250 
R2 Adjusted 0.0081 0.0123 0.0114 0.0124 0.0116 
P value 0.0508 0.0142 0.0218 0.0157 0.0223 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
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APPENDIX D – FIRST STAGE REGRESSION FOR PATENT–PAPER 
PAIRS MODELS 
 
Table D.1 : First stage regression results: [Contract3t]a as an endogenous variable associated with 
the model including the number of claims [NbClaimst] as well as Herfindahl index of forward 
citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] as a dependent variable – Regression results  
Variable Contract (1)  Contract (2)  
[Contract3Ut-2] a 0.2506 *** 0.2690 *** 
  (0.0297) (0.0295) 
[GrantEI3t-1 ] a 0.0673 ** 0.0731 *** 
  (0.0277) (0.0277) 
Loop 0.4603 *** 0.4537 *** 
  (0.0584) (0.0588) 
[Grant3t] a 0.3225 *** 0.2783 *** 
  (0.0367) (0.0349) 
[Aget] a -0.0548 ** -0.0656 *** 
  (0.0251) (0.0250) 
[Aget a]2  -0.0288 -0.0209 
  (0.0179) (0.0179) 
[MaxChairt ] a 0.0234 0.0333 
  (0.0274) (0.0245) 
[ArtCit3t] a 0.1003 *** 0.0963 *** 
  (0.0276) (0.0278) 
[BtwCentArt3t] a 0.0017 -0.0187 
  (0.0308) (0.0284) 
[BtwCentPat3t] a 0.2042 *** 0.1846 *** 
  (0.0408) (0.0391) 
[(BtwCentPat3t)a]2 -0.1737 *** -0.1649 *** 
  (0.0290) (0.0296) 
dAcAssigneet -0.2138 *** -0.2152 *** 
  (0.0699) (0.0629) 
dNanoEx -0.1336 ** -0.1317 ** 
  (0.0643) (0.0649) 
Similarityt a -0.0043 -0.0105 
  (0.0247) (0.0252) 
dAcAssigneet × [(Grant3t) a]  -0.1856 ***  
  (0.0683)  
dAcAssigneet ×  [MaxChairt] a 0.0619  
  (0.0559)  
dAcAssigneet × [(BtwCentArt3t) a ] -0.1265 **  
  (0.0621)  
dAcAssigneet × [(BtwCentPat3t) a ] -0.0832  
  (0.0813)  
Similarityt × [(Grant3t) a]   0.0002 
   (0.0305) 
Similarityt a × [MaxChairt] a  -0.0075 
   (0.0262) 
Similarityt a × [(BtwCentArt3t) a ]  -0.0167 
  (0.0259) 
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Table D.1 : First stage regression results: [Contract3t]a as an endogenous variable associated with 
the model including the number of claims [NbClaimst] as well as Herfindahl index of forward 
citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] as a dependent variable – Regression results (Cont’d and end) 
Variable! Contract (1)! Contract (2)!
Similarityt a × [(BtwCentPat3t) a]   -0.0284 
   (0.0279) 
Constant 0.1669 *** 0.1554 *** 
  (0.0460) (0.0468) 
Nb observations 1083 1083 
R2 0.4556 0.4488 
R2 Adjusted 0.4464 0.4395 
P value 0.0000  0.0000  
Notes: (a) All the variables have been calculated by Z Score (Z) = x – µ / σ, µ=mean and σ = standard deviation  
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APPENDIX E – ENDOGENEITY TEST FOR PATENT–PAPER PAIRS 
 
Table E.1 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with number of forward citations 
[(NbFCit5t)], to test endogeneity (in the model including patent–paper pairs similarity 
[Similarityt]) 
Variables FC (31)  FC (32)   
[Contract3t] a -0.0574 -0.0345 
  (0.0727) (0.0695) 
[Grant3t] a 0.0044 0.0260 
  (0.0468) (0.0425) 
[Aget] a -0.1778 *** -0.1802 *** 
  (0.0221) (0.0221) 
[Aget a]2  -0.0684 *** -0.0673 *** 
  (0.0161) (0.0159) 
[MaxChairt ] a 0.0257 0.0075 
  (0.0238) (0.0212) 
[ArtCit3t] a -0.0353 -0.0410 
  (0.0253) (0.0251) 
[BtwCentArt3t] a 0.0744 *** 0.0497 ** 
  (0.0263) (0.0243) 
[BtwCentPat3t] a -0.0066 0.0167 
  (0.0389) (0.0367) 
[(BtwCentPat3t)a]2 -0.0592 ** -0.0567 * 
  (0.0292) (0.0290) 
dAcAssigneet -0.1177 * -0.1446 *** 
  (0.0620) (0.0550) 
dNanoEx 0.3213 *** 0.3184 *** 
  (0.0576) (0.0577) 
Similarityt a -0.0439 ** -0.0463 ** 
  (0.0218) (0.0221) 
dAcAssigneet × [(Grant3t) a]  0.0952  
  (0.0621)  
dAcAssigneet ×  MaxChairt a -0.0827 *  
  (0.0498)  
dAcAssigneet × [(BtwCentArt3t) a ] -0.1242 **  
  (0.0567)  
dAcAssigneet × [(BtwCentPat3t) a ] 0.1296 *  
  (0.0719)  
Similarityt × [(Grant3t) a]   0.0492 * 
   (0.0268) 
Similarityt a × [MaxChairt] a  -0.0067 
   (0.0231) 
Similarityt a × [(BtwCentArt3t) a ]  -0.0045 
   (0.0229) 
Similarityt a × [(BtwCentPat3t) a]   0.0403 
   (0.0245) 
Constant 0.7229 *** 0.7118 *** 
  (0.0442) (0.0438) 
Nb observations 1083 1083 
144 
Table E.1 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with number of forward citations 
[(NbFCit5t)], to test endogeneity (in the model including patent–paper pairs similarity 
[Similarityt]) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables FC (31)  FC (32)   
Chi Square 147.7570 141.5850 
R2 0.11183 0.111459 
R2 Adjusted 0.0985 0.0981 
Sargan 0.1642 0.1085 
Wu-Hausman 0.1901 0.2994  
Notes: (a) All the variables have been calculated by Z Score (Z) = x – µ / σ, µ=mean and σ 
= standard deviation. Moreover, ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  In order to test endogeneity in our 
model, we used IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with number of forward 
citations [(NbFCit5t)] to validate instrumental variables (through Sargan test) and to 
assess endogeneity (through Wu-Hausman measurement) in the model including patent–
paper pairs similarity [Similarity]. 
 
Table E.2 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with Herfindahl index of backward 
citations [HerfIndexBWCitt], to test endogeneity (in the model including patent–paper pairs 
similarity [Similarityt]) 
Variables  HBC (28)  HBC (29)  
[Contract3t] a 0.0293 0.0356 * 
  (0.0216) (0.0207) 
[Grant3t] a -0.0266 * -0.0238 * 
  (0.0142) (0.0130) 
[Aget] a 0.0183 *** 0.0179 ** 
  (0.0071) (0.0071) 
[Aget a]2  0.0087 * 0.0100 * 
  (0.0052) (0.0052) 
[MaxChairt ] a 0.0057 0.0002 
  (0.0077) (0.0069) 
[ArtCit3t] a 0.0035 0.0024 
  (0.0081) (0.0081) 
[BtwCentArt3t] a 0.0169 ** 0.0075 
  (0.0084) (0.0078) 
[(BtwCentPat3t] a 0.0012 0.0112 
  (0.0123) (0.0117) 
[(BtwCentPat3t)a]2 -0.0075 -0.0129 
  (0.0092) (0.0092) 
dAcAssigneet 0.0101 0.0018 
  (0.0196) (0.0178) 
dNanoEx -0.0037 -0.0039 
  (0.0183) (0.0184) 
Similarityt a -0.0034 -0.0028 
  (0.0071) (0.0072) 
dAcAssigneet × [(Grant3t) a]  0.0189  
  (0.0200)  
dAcAssigneet ×  MaxChairt a -0.0280 *  
  (0.0163)  
dAcAssigneet × [(BtwCentArt3t) a ] -0.0541 ***  
  (0.0186)  
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Table E.2 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with Herfindahl index of backward 
citations [HerfIndexBWCitt], to test endogeneity (in the model including patent–paper pairs 
similarity [Similarityt]) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables ! HBC (28)! HBC (29)!
dAcAssigneet × [(BtwCentPat3t) a ] 0.0495 **  
  (0.0226)  
Similarityt × [(Grant3t) a]   -0.0005 
   (0.0086) 
Similarityt a × [MaxChairt] a  -0.0006 
   (0.0075) 
Similarityt a × [(BtwCentArt3t) a ]  -0.0099 
   (0.0075) 
Similarityt a × [(BtwCentPat3t) a]   0.0208 *** 
   (0.0078) 
Constant 0.7926 *** 0.7948 *** 
  (0.0142) (0.0141) 
Nb observations 986 986 
Chi Square 33.8496 28.5664 
R2 0.0323 0.0259 
R2 Adjusted 0.0163 0.0098 
Sargan 0.8981 0.7587 
Wu-Hausman 0.4965 0.3689 
Notes: (a) All the variables have been calculated by Z Score (Z) = x – µ / σ, µ=mean and 
σ = standard deviation. Moreover, ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  In order to test endogeneity in our 
model, we used IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] to validate instrumental variables (through Sargan 
test) and to assess endogeneity (through Wu-Hausman measurement) in the model 
including patent–paper pairs similarity [Similarity]. 
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APPENDIX F – ENDOGENEITY TEST FOR PUBLIC ASSIGNEES 
Table F.1 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with number of forward citations 
[NbFCit5t], to test endogeneity (in the model related to public assignees) 
Variable FC (33)   
Grant3t -0.0037 
  (0.0063) 
Aget 0.1376 *** 
  (0.0199) 
[Aget]2 -0.0067 *** 
  (0.0008) 
MaxChairt  0.0120 
  (0.0243) 
ArtCit3t -0.0294 * 
  (0.0152) 
BtwCentArt3t 0.0637 ** 
  (0.0275) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.0860 * 
  (0.0453) 
[CliqnessArt3t]2 0.0094 ** 
  (0.0040) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0289 *** 
  (0.0108) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0000 
  (0.0000) 
Loop -0.0460 
  (0.0529) 
dNanoEx 0.3152 *** 
  (0.0549) 
dGovAssigneet 1.9169 * 
  (1.0980) 
dAcAssigneet  0.0486 
  (0.2609) 
dGovAssigneet × Aget -0.3255 * 
  (0.1812) 
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2 0.0123 * 
  (0.0073) 
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t -0.1672 
  (0.1248) 
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t -0.0381 
  (0.1222) 
dAcAssigneet × Aget -0.0226 
  (0.0471) 
dAcAssigneet × [Aget]2 0.0010 
  (0.0020) 
dAcAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t -0.0915 
  (0.0591) 
dAcAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t 0.0364 
  (0.0343)  
Constant 0.1704 
  (0.1448) 
Nb Observations 1110 
Chi Square 154.0940 
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Table F.1 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with number of forward citations 
[NbFCit5t], to test endogeneity (in the model related to public assignees) (Cont’d and end) 
Variable FC (33)   
R2 0.1211 
R2 Adjusted 0.1032 
P value 0.0000 
Sargan 0.3796 
Wu-Hausman 0.3558 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.   
Moreover, in order to test endogeneity in our model, we 
used IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with 
number of forward citations [(NbFCit5t)] to validate 
instrumental variables (through Sargan test) and to assess 
endogeneity (through Wu-Hausman measurement) in the 
model associated with academic assignees [dAcAssigneet] 
and government assignees [dGovAssigneet]. 
 
Table F.2 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with number of claims [NbClaimst], to 
test endogeneity (in the model related to public assignees) 
Variable CL (12)   
Grant3t 0.0024 
  (0.0083) 
Aget 0.0127 * 
  (0.0067) 
MaxChairt  -0.0043 
  (0.0299) 
ArtCit3t -0.0367 ** 
  (0.0185) 
BtwCentArt3t -0.0338 
  (0.0341) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.0352 ** 
  (0.0178) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0191 
  (0.0151) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0001 *** 
  (0.0000) 
(CliqnessPat3t)2 0.0000 *** 
  (0.0000) 
Loop -0.0571 
  (0.0646) 
dNanoEx 0.4003 *** 
  (0.0667) 
dGovAssigneet -0.1608 
  (0.5823) 
dAcAssigneet -0.0898 
  (0.2008) 
dGovAssigneet × Aget 0.0138 
  (0.0417) 
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t -0.1079 
  (0.1526) 
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Table F.2 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with number of claims [NbClaimst], to 
test endogeneity (in the model related to public assignees) (Cont’d and end) 
Variable CL (12)   
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t 0.1446 
  (0.1471) 
dAcAssigneet × Aget -0.0117 
  (0.0158) 
dAcAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t 0.1283 * 
  (0.0729) 
dAcAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t 0.0324 
  (0.0422) 
Constant 2.5107 *** 
  (0.1358) 
Nb Observations 1110 
Chi Square 101.0510 
R2 0.0833 
R2 Adjusted 0.0673 
P value 0.0000 
Sargan 0.3731 
Wu-Hausman 0.7867 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
Furthermore, in order to test endogeneity in our model, we 
used IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with 
number of claims [(NbClaimst)]  to validate instrumental 
variables (through Sargan test) and to assess endogeneity 
(through Wu-Hausman measurement) in the model associated 
with academic assignees [dAcAssigneet] and government 
assignees [dGovAssigneet]. 
 
Table F.3 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) Herfindahl index of backward 
citations [HerfIndexBWCitt], to test endogeneity (in the model related to public assignees) 
Variable HBC (30)  HBC (31)  HBC(32)   
Grant3t 0.1707 -3.6809 *** 0.1841 
  (0.2742) (1.0422) (0.3100) 
Aget -2.8709 *** -1.7022 -2.5304 *** 
  (0.8501) (1.1074) (0.9664) 
[Aget]2 0.1630 *** 0.0969 * 0.1507 *** 
  (0.0362) (0.0570) (0.0490) 
MaxChairt  -1.7194 -1.6943 -1.7051 
  (1.0645) (1.1824) (1.0814) 
ArtCit3t 1.0927 * 1.6471 0.9131 
  (0.6492) (1.1965) (1.0067) 
BtwCentArt3t -18.3000 *** -11.6000 ** -18.7000 *** 
  (4.3606) (4.9068) (4.8490) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 3.6349 *** 2.2096 ** 3.6657 *** 
  (0.8069) (0.8874) (0.8359) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.6236 1.3282 0.4150 
  (0.6298) (1.2792) (1.0572) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.5453 0.1977 0.5597 
  (0.4641) (0.5578) (0.5015) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0008 *** 0.0008 * 0.0009 ** 
  (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
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Table F.3 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) Herfindahl index of backward 
citations [HerfIndexBWCitt], to test endogeneity (in the model related to public assignees) 
(Cont’d and end) 
Variable HBC (30)  HBC (31)  HBC(32)   
Loop 0.9830 2.8861 1.2004 
  (2.2582) (2.5732) (2.3074) 
dNanoEx 1.9904 -5.4342 4.3772 
  (2.3885) (10.9062) (9.0446) 
dGovAssigneet  33.4574 78.3231 25.8963 
  (47.0963) (79.8419) (60.4809) 
dAcAssigneet  -28.8000 *** -16.0000 * -17.0000 ** 
  (11.1477) (9.1867) (8.1395) 
dGovAssigneet × Aget -5.0357 -13.8000 -3.8456 
  (7.8733) (14.5135) (10.2152) 
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2 0.1293 0.4859 0.0859 
  (0.3176) (0.5729) (0.4065) 
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t -1.7334 0.8382 0.0008 
  (34.1091) (42.2198) (35.2573) 
dGovAssigneet ×   -1.4610 -0.7137 -1.9859 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 (7.3649) (9.3236) (7.7374) 
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t 4.3165 -1.7083 5.5917 
  (5.2077) (10.8047) (6.9898) 
dAcAssigneet × Aget 4.0080 ** 1.2922 * 1.1034 * 
  (2.0146) (0.6655) (0.6148) 
dAcAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t 8.7623 -9.6758 * 11.3099 
  (10.3163) (5.5733) (13.7255) 
dAcAssigneet ×   -3.1595  -3.4298 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 (1.9222)  (2.1950) 
NbClaimst 2.7231 *** 23.1035 -3.1045 
  (1.0429) (27.8550) (22.6838) 
dGovAssigneet  × [Grant3t]2  0.2541  
   (0.5255)  
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t  -2.7738  
   (5.9024)  
[Grant3t]2  0.2818 ***  
   (0.0784)  
Constant 62.8097 *** 8.5052 76.3706 
  (6.4620) (75.9231) (62.3383) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 145.2530 114.3930 132.0290 
R2 0.1136  0.0866 
R2 Adjusted 0.0932  0.0664 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan 0.8727 0.9505  
Wu-Hausman 0.0968 0.4073 0.2944 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. In order to test endogeneity in our model, we used IV Regression 
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) for Herfindahl index of backward citations 
[HerfIndexBWCitt] to validate instrumental variables (through Sargan test) and to assess 
endogeneity (through Wu-Hausman measurement) in the model associated with academic 
assignees [dAcAssigneet] and government assignees [dGovAssigneet]. 
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Table F.4 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with Herfindahl index of forward 
citations [HerfIndexFCit5t], to test endogeneity (in the model related to public assignees) 
Variable HFC 17)   
 
Grant3t -0.2326 
  (0.2484) 
Aget -1.9446 ** 
  (0.7759) 
[Aget]2 0.0787 ** 
  (0.0329) 
MaxChairt  0.8567 
  (0.9507) 
ArtCit3t 2.6851 * 
  (1.5249) 
[ArtCit3t]2 -0.5766 
  (0.3694) 
BtwCentArt3t 0.3293 
  (1.0692) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.6935 
  (0.5693) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.2513 
  (0.4223) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0002 
  (0.0002) 
Loop -2.5532 
  (2.0615) 
dNanoEx -2.7444 
  (2.1440) 
dGovAssigneet 20.7692 
  (42.8907) 
dAcAssigneet  -4.7334 
  (10.1798) 
dGovAssigneet × Aget -8.6043 
  (7.0807) 
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2 0.4065 
  (0.2839) 
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t 7.4070 
  (4.8816) 
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t 7.6975 
  (4.7473) 
dAcAssigneet × Aget 0.3158 
  (1.8395) 
dAcAssigneet × [Aget]2 0.0130 
  (0.0799) 
dAcAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t -0.4546 
  (1.3422) 
Constant 94.8889 *** 
  (5.2831) 
Nb Observations 1110 
Chi Square 33.7925 
R2 0.0306 
R2 Adjusted 0.0110 
P value 0.0516 
Sargan 0.2939 
151 
Table F.4 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with Herfindahl index of forward 
citations [HerfIndexFCit5t], to test endogeneity (in the model related to public assignees) (Cont’d 
and end) 
Variable HFC 17)   
 
Wu-Hausman 0.9445 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. In order 
to test endogeneity in our model, we used IV Regression 
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with Herfindahl index of 
forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] to validate instrumental 
variables (through Sargan test) and to assess endogeneity 
(through Wu-Hausman measurement) in the model associated 
with academic assignees [dAcAssigneet] and government 
assignees [dGovAssigneet]. 
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APPENDIX G –ENDOGENEITY TEST FOR PATENT–GRANT PAIRS 
 
Table G.1 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) used with number of forward citations 
[NbFCit5t], to test endogeneity (in the model linking to patent–grant pairs [dPGPt]) 
Variable FC (34)   
Grant3t -0.0008 
  (0.0061) 
Aget 0.1190 *** 
  (0.0183) 
[Aget]2 -0.0059 *** 
  (0.0008) 
MaxChairt  0.0165 
  (0.0243) 
ArtCit3t -0.0321 ** 
  (0.0151) 
BtwCentArt3t 0.0498 * 
  (0.0257) 
CliqnessArt3t × 10 3 -0.0812 * 
  (0.0448) 
[CliqnessArt3t × 10 3]2 0.0085 ** 
  (0.0039) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0221 ** 
  (0.0103) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0000 
  (0.0000) 
dAcAssigneet -0.1273 *** 
  (0.0485) 
dNanoEx 0.3243 *** 
  (0.0549) 
dPGPt -0.5512 
  (0.4930) 
dPGPt × CliqnessArt3t  0.0946 
  (0.1310) 
dPGPt × [CliqnessArt3t ]2 -0.0004 
  (0.0007) 
dPGPt × BtwCentArt3t -0.0376 
  (0.1267) 
Constant 0.2685 ** 
  (0.1365) 
Nb observations 1110 
Chi Square 149.8400 
R2 0.1189 
R2 Adjusted   0.1060 
Sargan 0.3622 
Wu-Hausman 0.6416  
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Furthermore, in order to test endogeneity in our model, we used 
IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with number of 
forward citations [(NbFCit5t)] to validate instrumental variables 
(through Sargan test) and to assess endogeneity (through Wu-
Hausman measurement) in our analysis model that is associated 
with patent–grant pairs [dPGP]. 
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Table G.2 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) used with number of claims 
[NbClaimst], to test endogeneity (in the model linking to patent–grant pairs [dPGPt]) 
Variable CL (13)   
Grant3t 0.0013 
  (0.0077) 
Aget 0.0131 ** 
  (0.0060) 
MaxChairt  -0.0055 
  (0.0299) 
ArtCit3t -0.0397 ** 
  (0.0185) 
BtwCentArt3t -0.0204 
  (0.0318) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.0354 ** 
  (0.0178) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0161 
  (0.0146) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0001 *** 
  (0.0000) 
[CliqnessPat3t]2 0.0000 *** 
  (0.0000) 
dAcAssigneet -0.0229 
  (0.0591) 
dNanoEx 0.4020 *** 
  (0.0671) 
dPGPt -0.2377 
  (0.5821) 
dPGPt × CliqnessArt3t  0.0357 
  (0.1355) 
dPGPt × BtwCentArt3t 0.1115 
  (0.1521) 
Constant 2.4737 *** 
  (0.1305) 
Nb observations 1110 
Chi Square 92.0642 
R2 0.0765 
R2 Adjusted 0.0647 
Sargan 0.3576 
Wu-Hausman 0.8078 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
Furthermore, in order to test endogeneity in our model, we 
used IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with 
number of claims [(NbClaimst)] to validate instrumental 
variables (through Sargan test) and to assess endogeneity 
(through Wu-Hausman measurement) in our analysis that is 
linked to patent–grant pairs [dPGP]. 
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Table G.3 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with Herfindahl index of backward 
citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] (including patent–grant pairs [dPGPt] variable) 
Variable HBC (33)   HBC (34)   HBC (35)   
Grant3t 0.3428 -4.1803 *** 0.3550 
  (0.2630) (1.2270) (0.3040) 
Aget -2.3779 *** -1.4098 -2.4245 ** 
  (0.7947) (1.2771) (0.9829) 
[Aget]2 0.1473 *** 0.0839 0.1505 *** 
  (0.0338) (0.0690) (0.0517) 
MaxChairt  -1.6251 -1.3833 -1.6257 
  (1.0695) (1.3425) (1.0712) 
ArtCit3t 1.1204 * 1.9400 1.0574 
  (0.6566) (1.3255) (1.0205) 
BtwCentArt3t -18.3000 *** -12.3000 ** -18.5000 *** 
  (4.0085) (5.9993) (4.3480) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 3.4082 *** 2.0658 * 3.4208 *** 
  (0.7321) (1.0667) (0.7497) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.3951 1.3940 0.3235 
  (0.6414) (1.4439) (1.0949) 
BtwCentPat3t 1.1129 ** 0.5973 1.1389 ** 
  (0.4512) (0.6721) (0.5553) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0008 *** 0.0007 0.0008 ** 
  (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
dAcAssigneet -3.4481 -2.0706 -3.4910 
  (2.1050) (2.8175) (2.1742) 
dNanoEx 2.0596 -8.8536 2.7983 
  (2.4291) (12.7737) (9.4649) 
dPGPt 8.0108 16.8291 7.1501 
  (20.8142) (30.1423) (23.4128) 
dPGPt × CliqnessArt3t  -1.9978 -3.8345 -1.8476 
  (4.8351) (6.6901) (5.1875) 
dPGPt × BtwCentArt3t 5.6570 1.6362 6.0017 
  (8.9663) (12.6479) (9.9429) 
dPGPt × [BtwCentArt3t]2 -0.0784 -0.0193 -0.0810 
  (0.1496) (0.1948) (0.1531) 
NbClaimst 2.7497 *** 31.9741 0.8443 
  (1.0565) (32.2286) (23.6151) 
[Grant3t]2  0.3333 ***  
   (0.0930)  
Constant 58.4500 *** -15.9000 63.5665 
  (6.1912) (86.4824) (63.6504) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 102.4500 69.9641 95.2508 
R2 0.0802  0.0772 
R2 Adjusted 0.0658  0.0629 
Sargan 0.9355 0.8741  
Wu-Hausman 0.0583 0.2441  0.1661 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented 
in parentheses.  Moreover, in order to test endogeneity in our model, we used IV Regression Two-
stage least squares (2SLS) for Herfindahl index of backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] to 
validate instrumental variables (through Sargan test) and to assess endogeneity (through Wu-
Hausman measurement) in our analysis including patent–grant pairs [dPGP]. 
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Table G.4 : IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) used with Herfindahl index of forward 
citations [HerfIndexFCit5t], to test endogeneity (including patent–grant pairs [dPGPt] variable) 
Variable HFC (18)   
Grant3t -0.3114 
  (0.2324) 
Aget -2.0438 *** 
  (0.7132) 
[Aget]2 0.0873 *** 
  (0.0303) 
MaxChairt  0.7724 
  (0.9515) 
ArtCit3t 2.8438 * 
  (1.5099) 
[ArtCit3t]2 -0.6242 * 
  (0.3679) 
BtwCentArt3t 0.7837 
  (1.0025) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.6586 
  (0.5707) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.3802 
  (0.4019) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0002 
  (0.0002) 
dAcAssigneet 0.8912 
  (1.8841) 
dNanoEx -3.3055 
  (2.1493) 
dPGPt 7.0275 
  (18.6626) 
dPGPt × CliqnessArt3t  1.9966 
  (4.3413) 
dPGPt × BtwCentArt3t -5.5991 
  (4.8640) 
Constant 93.1212 *** 
  (4.9400)  
Nb observations 1110 
Chi Square 27.3899 
R2 0.0250 
R2 Adjusted 0.0116 
Sargan 0.1726 
Wu-Hausman 0.8220 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
Furthermore, in order to test endogeneity in our model, we 
used IV Regression Two-stage least squares (2SLS) with 
Herfindahl index of forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] to 
validate instrumental variables (through Sargan test) and to 
assess endogeneity (through Wu-Hausman measurement) in 
our analysis that is linked to patent–grant pairs [dPGP]. 
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APPENDIX H – EXTRA FINAL MODELS 
 
Table H.1 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of forward 
citations [NbFCit5t] – Tobit results FC (35–38) 
Variables FC (35) FC (36) FC (37) FC (38) 
Grant3t 0.0053 0.0043 0.0021 0.0042 
  (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0080) 
Aget 0.2787 *** 0.2845 *** 0.2780 *** 0.2887 *** 
  (0.0389) (0.0392) (0.0389) (0.0425) 
[Aget]2 -0.0137 *** -0.0139 *** -0.0137 *** -0.0141 *** 
  (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0018) 
MaxChairt  0.0209 0.0187 0.0202 0.0212 
  (0.0447) (0.0447) (0.0448) (0.0447) 
ArtCit3t -0.0661 ** -0.0639 ** -0.0653 ** -0.0650 ** 
  (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0288) 
BtwCentArt3t 0.0747 0.0795 * 0.0790 * 0.0788 * 
  (0.0474) (0.0476) (0.0474) (0.0476) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.1451 * -0.1527 * -0.1493 * -0.1520 * 
  (0.0830) (0.0838) (0.0829) (0.0830)  
[CliqnessArt3t]2 0.0156 ** 0.0166 ** 0.0161 ** 0.0163 ** 
  (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0073) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0308 * -0.0330 * -0.0346 * -0.0329 * 
  (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0185) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Loop -0.0618 -0.0589 -0.0586 -0.0573 
  (0.0977) (0.0976) (0.0976) (0.0982) 
dNanoEx 0.5378 *** 0.5510 *** 0.5407 *** 0.5396 *** 
  (0.1018) (0.1020) (0.1018) (0.1019) 
dGovAssigneet -0.3129 3.1564 -0.4532 ** -0.4521 ** 
  (0.2511) (2.1022) (0.2247) (0.2248) 
dAcAssigneet  -0.2142 * -0.2107 * -0.4068 0.0800 
  (0.1110) (0.1108) (0.2544) (0.5586) 
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t  0.0169   
   (0.0442)   
dGovAssigneet × Aget  -0.5216   
   (0.3662)   
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2  0.0191   
   (0.0153)   
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t  -0.2936   
   (0.2464)   
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t -0.3543 -0.3667   
  (0.3139) (0.3373)   
dAcAssigneet  × Grant3t   0.0200  
    (0.0238)  
dAcAssigneet × Aget    -0.0505 
     (0.0998) 
dAcAssigneet × [Aget]2    0.0019 
     (0.0043) 
Constant -0.7516 *** -0.7842 *** -0.7190 *** -0.7997 *** 
  (0.2751) (0.2764) (0.2760) (0.2954) 
Constant (Sigma) 1.1260 *** 0.1231 *** 1.1257 *** 1.1263 *** 
 (0.0377) (0.0376) (0.0377) (0.0377) 
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Table H.1 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of forward 
citations [NbFCit5t] – Tobit results FC (35–38) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables FC (35) FC (36) FC (37) FC (38) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 144.60 148.63 143.78 143.36 
Pseudo R2 0.0548 0.0563 0.0545 0.0543 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table H.2 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of forward 
citations [NbFCit5t] – Tobit results FC (39–42)  
Variables FC (39) FC (40) FC (41) FC (42) 
Grant3t 0.0034 0.0037 -0.0003 -0.0008 
  (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0086) (0.0088) 
Aget 0.2824 *** 0.2804 *** 0.2910 *** 0.2971 *** 
  (0.0390) (0.0389) (0.0425) (0.0429) 
[Aget]2 -0.0138 *** -0.0138 *** -0.0142 *** -0.0143 *** 
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
MaxChairt  0.0205 0.0210 0.0178 0.0148 
  (0.0447) (0.0447) (0.0447) (0.0446) 
ArtCit3t -0.0631 ** -0.0665 ** -0.0631 ** -0.0608 ** 
  (0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0288) 
BtwCentArt3t 0.0940 * 0.0792 * 0.0999 ** 0.1043 ** 
  (0.0494) (0.0475) (0.0496) (0.0499) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.1531 * -0.1495 * -0.1501 * -0.1539 * 
  (0.0828) (0.0829) (0.0829) (0.0838) 
[CliqnessArt3t]2 0.0165 ** 0.0162 ** 0.0165 ** 0.0171 ** 
  (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0074) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0343 * -0.0348 * -0.0402 ** -0.0413 ** 
  (0.0186) (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0195) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Loop -0.0629 -0.0532 -0.0551 -0.0553 
  (0.0976) (0.0981) (0.0985) (0.0984) 
dNanoEx 0.5361 *** 0.5371 *** 0.5370 *** 0.5498 *** 
  (0.1018) (0.1019) (0.1019) (0.1020) 
dGovAssigneet -0.4542 ** -0.4543 ** -0.4653 ** 3.2200 
  (0.2245) (0.2249) (0.2247) (2.1008) 
dAcAssigneet -0.0836 -0.2428 ** -0.0218 0.0339 
  (0.1574) (0.1234) (0.5645) (0.5643) 
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t    0.0226 
     (0.0442) 
dGovAssigneet × Aget    -0.5345 
     (0.3659) 
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2    0.0195 
     (0.0153) 
dGovAssigneet ×     -0.3247 
BtwCentArt3t    (0.2465) 
dGovAssigneet ×     -0.3561 
BtwCentPat3t    (0.3364) 
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Table H.2 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of forward 
citations [NbFCit5t] – Tobit results FC (39–42) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables FC (39) FC (40) FC (41) FC (42) 
dAcAssigneet  × Grant3t   0.0284 0.0291 
    (0.0247) (0.0248) 
dAcAssigneet × Aget   -0.0654 -0.0717 
    (0.1034) (0.1033) 
dAcAssigneet × [Aget]2   0.0027 0.0028 
    (0.0044) (0.0044) 
dAcAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t -0.1313  -0.1422 -0.1508 
  (0.1117)  (0.1157) (0.1157) 
dAcAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t  0.0335 0.0387 0.0388 
   (0.0663) (0.0678) (0.0677) 
Constant -0.7815 *** -0.7426 *** -0.8148 *** -0.8664 *** 
  (0.2773) (0.2751) (0.2952) (0.2971) 
Constant (Sigma) 1.1252 *** 1.1260 *** 1.1238 *** 1.1204 *** 
 (0.0376) (0.0377) (0.0376) (0.0375) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 144.46 143.33 146.22 152.11 
Pseudo R2 0.0548 0.0543 0.0554 0.0577 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table H.3 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of claims 
[NbClaimst] – Regression results CL (14–18) 
Variables CL (14)  CL(15)  CL(16)  CL(17)  CL(18)   
Grant3t 0.0009 0.0012 0.0012 0.0009 0.0008 
  (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
Aget 0.0140 ** 0.0132 ** 0.0132 ** 0.0123 ** 0.0131 ** 
  (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0060) 
MaxChairt  -0.0037 -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0026 -0.0046 
  (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0292) 
ArtCit3t -0.0368 ** -0.0355 * -0.0355 * -0.0356 * -0.0347 * 
  (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) 
BtwCentArt3t  -0.0199 -0.0206 -0.0206 -0.0188 -0.0167 
  (0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0311) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.0355 ** -0.0361 ** -0.0362 ** -0.0361 ** -0.0349 ** 
  (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0178) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0195 -0.0206 -0.0206 -0.0205 -0.0212 
  (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0135) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
[CliqnessPat3t]2 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Loop -0.0795 -0.0674 -0.0675 -0.0649 -0.0655 
  (0.0617) (0.0634) (0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0634) 
dNanoEx 0.3994 *** 0.3980 *** 0.3980 *** 0.3945 *** 0.3994 *** 
  (0.0670) (0.0670) (0.0671) (0.0671) (0.0670) 
dGovAssigneet   -0.0134 -0.0114 -0.4977 0.1591 
   (0.1416) (0.2474) (0.5049) (0.2117) 
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Table H.3 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of claims 
[NbClaimst] – Regression results CL (14–18) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables CL (14)  CL(15)  CL(16)  CL(17)  CL(18)   
dAcAssigneet   -0.0665 -0.0665 -0.0685 -0.0670 
   (0.0711) (0.0711) (0.0711) (0.0711) 
dGovAssigneet  × Grant3t   -0.0003   
    (0.0259)   
dGovAssigneet × Aget    0.0377  
     (0.0378)  
dGovAssigneet ×      -0.1631 
BtwCentArt3t     (0.1488) 
Constant 2.4729 *** 2.4934 *** 2.4933 *** 2.5035 *** 2.4879 *** 
  (0.1263) (0.1283) (0.1285) (0.1287) (0.1284) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Log Likelihood -1335.09 -1334.64 -1334.64 -1334.14 -1334.03 
R2 0.0772 0.0779 0.0779 0.0788 0.0789 
R2 Adjusted 0.0679 0.0670 0.0661 0.0670 0.0672 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table H.4 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of claims 
[NbClaimst] – Regression results CL (19–22) 
Variables CL (19)  CL(20)  CL (21)  CL (22)  
Grant3t 0.0005 0.0009 0.0031 0.0011 
  (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0052) 
Aget 0.0128 ** 0.0124 ** 0.0131 ** 0.0141 ** 
  (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0066) 
MaxChairt  -0.0032 -0.0038 -0.0023 -0.0036 
  (0.0292) (0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0292) 
ArtCit3t -0.0349 * -0.0346 * -0.0357 * -0.0353 * 
  (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) 
BtwCentArt3t  -0.0191 -0.0162 -0.0218 -0.0197 
  (0.0309) (0.0312) (0.0309) (0.0310) 
CliqnessArt3t  -0.0358 ** -0.0353 ** -0.0366 ** -0.0360 ** 
  (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0177) 
BtwCentPat3t -0.0213 -0.0208 -0.0191 -0.0208 
  (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0135) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
[CliqnessPat3t]2 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Loop -0.0644 -0.0639 -0.0664 -0.0688 
  (0.0634) (0.0636) (0.0634) (0.0636) 
dNanoEx 0.3992 *** 0.3980 *** 0.3964 *** 0.3975 *** 
  (0.0670) (0.0672) (0.0670) (0.0671) 
dGovAssigneet  -0.1177 -0.0712 -0.0117 -0.0135 
  (0.1615) (0.5980) (0.1416) (0.1417) 
dAcAssigneet  -0.0687 -0.0700 0.0830 -0.0057 
  (0.0711) (0.0712) (0.1539) (0.1974) 
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Table H.4 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the number of claims 
[NbClaimst] – Regression results CL (19–22) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables CL (19)  CL(20)  CL (21)  CL (22)  
dGovAssigneet  × Grant3t  -0.0175   
   (0.0282)   
dGovAssigneet × Aget  0.0178   
   (0.0424)   
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t  -0.1267   
   (0.1533)   
dGovAssignee × BtwCentPat3t 0.1817 0.1732   
  (0.1352) (0.1549)   
dAcAssigneet  × Grant3t   -0.0160  
    (0.0146)  
dAcAssigneet × Aget    -0.0051 
     (0.0153) 
Constant 2.5023 *** 2.4980 *** 2.4821 *** 2.4806 *** 
  (0.1284) (0.1291) (0.1287) (0.1341) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Log Likelihood  -1333.73 -1333.05 -1334.03 -1334.59 
R2 0.0794 0.0806 0.0789 0.0780 
R2 Adjusted 0.0677 0.0662 0.0672 0.0662 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table H.5 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt]– Tobit results HBC (36–40) 
Variables HBC (36) HBC (37) HBC (38) HBC (39) HBC (40) 
Grant3t -4.0048 *** -3.9735 *** -3.9252 *** -3.8236 *** -3.7596 *** 
  (0.8859) (0.8811) (0.8806 ) (0.8722) (0.8713 ) 
[Grant3t]2 0.3270 *** 0.3264 *** 0.3214 *** 0.3154 *** 0.3089 *** 
  (0.0714) (0.0710) (0.0710) (0.0702) (0.0702) 
NbClaimst 3.3849 *** 3.3119 *** 3.0255 ** 0.5512 0.1171 
  (1.1891) (1.1832) (1.1947) (1.2972) (1.3126) 
Aget -2.5498 *** -2.3791 *** -2.4100 *** -2.5039 *** -2.5454 *** 
  (0.8749) (0.8718) (0.8711) (0.8629) (0.8617) 
[Aget]2 0.1578 *** 0.1479 *** 0.1487 *** 0.1546 *** 0.1558 *** 
  (0.0373) (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0369) (0.0368) 
MaxChairt  -1.5007 -1.6468 -1.6381 -1.5881 -1.5756 
  (1.1716) (1.1663) (1.1650) (1.1538) (1.1518) 
ArtCit3t 1.1048 1.2052 1.2308 * 1.0588 1.0856 
  (0.7383) (0.7356) (0.7350) (0.7283) (0.7271) 
BtwCentArt3t  -17.6000 *** -16.1000 *** -16.1000 *** -16.8000 *** -16.8000 *** 
  (4.5861) (4.5807) (4.5757) (4.5358) (4.5280) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.8890 *** 2.5973 *** 2.6075 *** 2.7019 *** 2.7176 *** 
  (0.8652) (0.8647) (0.8637) (0.8562) (0.8547) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.5308 0.4734 0.5659 0.4999 0.6142 
  (0.7151) (0.7125) (0.7142) (0.7051) (0.7064)  
BtwCentPat3t 1.2289 *** 0.9080 * 0.8764 * 0.8791 * 0.8393 * 
  (0.4726) (0.4789) (0.4788) (0.4737) (0.4733) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Loop 1.9606 2.2170 2.2637 3.3603 3.4518 
  (2.4573) (2.5023) (2.4996) (2.4868) (2.4829) 
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Table H.5 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt]– Tobit results HBC (36–40) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HBC (36) HBC (37) HBC (38) HBC (39) HBC (40) 
dNanoEx 3.1025 3.0217 3.1236 2.9644 3.0877 
  (2.7131) (2.6985) (2.6966) (2.6693) (2.6658)  
dGovAssigneet  -16.1000 *** -48.6000 ** -15.9000 *** -55.6000 *** 
   (5.6640) (20.7079) (5.6001) (20.5159) 
dAcAssigneet   -6.3483 ** -6.4085 ** -44.0000 *** -45.2000 *** 
   (2.8181) (2.8150) (8.1643) (8.1718) 
dGovAssigneet ×   12.3585  15.1263 ** 
NbClaimst   (7.5681)  (7.5011) 
dAcAssigneet ×     14.6161 *** 15.0532 *** 
NbClaimst    (2.9752) (2.9780) 
Constant 57.2654 *** 59.2069 *** 59.7010 *** 66.7906 *** 67.6249 *** 
  (6.8629) (6.8740) (6.8730) (6.9714) (6.9717) 
Constant (Sigma) 31.9057 *** 31.7270 *** 31.6915 *** 31.3837 *** 31.3289 *** 
  (0.7571) (0.7527) (0.7518) (0.7444) (0.7430) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 115.56 127.72 130.39 151.79 155.86 
Pseudo R2 0.0115 0.0128 0.0130 0.0152 0.0156 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table H.6 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (41 – 45) 
Variables HBC (41) HBC (42) HBC (43) HBC (44) HBC (45) 
Grant3t -3.8996 *** -3.8653 *** -4.0043 *** -3.9461 *** -3.8917 *** 
  (0.8995) (0.8987) (0.8810) (0.8796) (0.8868) 
[Grant3t]2 0.3219 *** 0.3184 *** 0.3298 *** 0.3246 *** 0.3182 *** 
  (0.0726) (0.0725) (0.0710) (0.0709) (0.0715) 
NbClaimst 3.3094 *** 3.0208 ** 3.3750 *** 3.0043 ** 3.2635 *** 
  (1.1831) (1.1945) (1.1836) (1.1930) (1.1837) 
Aget -2.3923 *** -2.4237 *** -2.2929 *** -2.3160 *** -2.3635 *** 
  (0.8720) (0.8712) (0.8761) (0.8743) (0.8719) 
[Aget]2 0.1486 *** 0.1494 *** 0.1452 *** 0.1466 *** 0.1470 *** 
  (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0375) (0.0374) (0.0372) 
MaxChairt  -1.6591 -1.6508 -1.6636 -1.6741 -1.6675 
  (1.1664) (1.1651) (1.1661) (1.1638) (1.1677) 
ArtCit3t 1.2076 1.2286 * 1.2160 * 1.2589 * 1.2193 * 
  (0.7365) (0.7358) (0.7352) (0.7340) (0.7370) 
BtwCentArt3t  -16.0000 *** -16.0000 *** -16.2000 *** -16.2000 *** -15.9000 *** 
  (4.5824) (4.5772) (4.5787) (4.5695) (4.6044) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.5852 *** 2.5912 *** 2.5956 *** 2.6089 *** 2.5988 *** 
  (0.8654) (0.8644) (0.8642) (0.8624) (0.8681)  
CliqnessArt3t  0.4584 0.5496 0.4792 0.6133 0.5012 
 (0.7130) (0.7145) (0.7122) (0.7137) (0.7140)  
BtwCentPat3t 0.9220 * 0.8970 * 0.9050 * 0.8647 * 0.8771 * 
  (0.4823) (0.4820) (0.4788) (0.4782) (0.4800) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0012 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Loop 2.1493 2.1898 2.1594 2.1701 2.2564 
  (2.5049) (2.5021) (2.5015) (2.4963) (2.5021) 
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Table H.6 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (41 – 45) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HBC (41) HBC (42) HBC (43) HBC (44) HBC (45) 
dNanoEx 2.9745 3.0818 3.1963 3.4547 3.0201 
  (2.6996) (2.6975) (2.7006) (2.6982) (2.7017) 
dGovAssigneet -11.7000 -44.0000 ** 49.3545 35.2546 -9.5928 
  (9.9853) (22.0235) (52.8270) (53.1508) (8.6442) 
dAcAssigneet  -6.3626 ** -6.4217 ** -6.3081 ** -6.3402 ** -6.3746 ** 
  (2.8179) (2.8148) (2.8173) (2.8114) (2.8172) 
dGovAssigneet ×   12.4865  17.8992 **  
NbClaimst  (7.5931)  (8.1500)  
dGovAssigneet ×  -2.1370 -1.8106    
Grant3t (4.7922) (4.7945)    
dGovAssigneet  ×  0.1352 0.1008    
[Grant3t]2 (0.3829) (0.3832)    
dGovAssigneet ×    -10.2000 -14.5000  
Aget   (8.7877) (8.9988)  
dGovAssigneet ×    0.3672 0.4915  
[Aget]2   (0.3482) (0.3526)  
dGovAssigneet ×      8.6342 
BtwCentArt3t     (37.7633) 
dGovAssigneet ×       -3.0996 
[BtwCentArt3t]2     (8.0870) 
Constant 59.1633 *** 59.6462 *** 58.4996 *** 58.8448 *** 59.0602 *** 
  (6.8745) (6.8729) (6.8925) (6.8802) (6.8762) 
Constant (Sigma) 31.7232 *** 31.6869 *** 31.7062 *** 31.6415 *** 31.7157 *** 
  (0.7526) (0.7517) (0.7522) (0.7506) (0.7524) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 128.06 130.77 129.35 134.19 128.73 
Pseudo R2 0.0128 0.0131 0.0129 0.0134 0.0129 
P value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table H.7 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (46 – 50) 
Variables HBC (46) HBC (47) HBC (48)  HBC (49) HBC (50) 
rant3t -3.8911 *** -3.9608 *** -3.9266 *** -3.8097 *** -4.3267 *** 
  (0.8861) (0.8814) (0.8808) (0.8991) (0.9069) 
[Grant3t]2 0.3180 *** 0.3245 *** 0.3217 *** 0.3131 *** 0.3527 *** 
  (0.0715) (0.0711) (0.0710) (0.0726) (0.0729) 
NbClaimst 3.0326 ** 3.2847 *** 3.0256 ** 3.0086 ** 3.4105 *** 
  (1.1947) (1.1845) (1.1947) (1.1929) (1.1834) 
Aget -2.3991 *** -2.3613 *** -2.4133 *** -2.3176 *** -2.3945 *** 
  (0.8715) (0.8726) (0.8723) (0.8747) (0.8713) 
[Aget]2 0.1482 *** 0.1470 *** 0.1489 *** 0.1469 *** 0.1504 *** 
  (0.0372) (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0374) (0.0372) 
MaxChairt  -1.6491 -1.6445 -1.6383 -1.6848 -1.5403 
! (1.1669)! (1.1662)! (1.1650)! (1.1656)! (1.1673)!
ArtCit3t 1.2349 * 1.2120 * 1.2301 * 1.2750 * 1.2457 * 
  (0.7364) (0.7357) (0.7351) (0.7366) (0.7352) 
BtwCentArt3t  -16.0000 *** -16.1000 *** -16.1000 *** -16.2000 *** -16.2000 *** 
  (4.6011) (4.5803) (4.5757) (4.5975) (4.5937) 
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Table H.7 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (46 – 50) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HBC (41) HBC (42) HBC (43) HBC (44) HBC (45) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.6072 *** 2.6034 *** 2.6066 *** 2.6269 *** 2.5907 *** 
  (0.8674) (0.8647) (0.8638) (0.8673) (0.8686) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.5697 0.4775 0.5666 0.6073 0.4779 
  (0.7155) (0.7125) (0.7142) (0.7168) (0.7124) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.8648 * 0.8859 * 0.8794 * 0.8476 * 0.8722 * 
  (0.4797) (0.4812) (0.4807) (0.4830) (0.4804) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Loop 2.2777 2.2345 2.2615 2.1421 1.8286 
  (2.5001) (2.5023) (2.4998) (2.4985) (2.5111) 
dNanoEx 3.1127 3.0566 3.1195 3.3798 3.0424 
  (2.7007) (2.6993) (2.6972) (2.7086) (2.6954) 
dGovAssigneet -42.0000 * -17.6000 *** -48.9000 ** 45.3974 -16.2000 *** 
  (25.3144) (6.4748) (20.9997) (55.5026) (5.6570) 
dAcAssigneet  -6.4146 ** -6.3744 ** -6.4052 ** -6.3506 ** -10.2000 
  (2.8150) (2.8183) (2.8154) (2.8115) (6.2358) 
dGovAssigneet ×  11.0529  12.5420 17.2524 *  
NbClaimst (8.1005)  (7.9992) (9.2732)  
dGovAssigneet ×     -3.3542  
Grant3t    (5.4257)  
dGovAssigneet  ×     0.2670  
[Grant3t]2    (0.4469)  
dGovAssigneet ×     -15.1000  
Aget    (10.1526)  
dGovAssigneet ×     0.5080  
[Aget]2    (0.4033)  
dGovAssigneet ×  4.1476   8.6853  
BtwCentArt3t (37.8998)   (41.8561)   
dGovAssigneet ×  ! -1.4901 ! ! ! -2.1903! !
[BtwCentArt3t]2 (8.1704)   (9.0495)  
dGovAssigneet ×   2.4750 -0.3993 -0.3069  
BtwCentPat3t  (5.3365) (5.6385) (6.8812)  
dAcAssigneet  ×      4.4804 
Grant3t     (2.7747) 
dAcAssigneet ×      -0.3483 
[Grant3t]2     (0.2204) 
Constant 59.5763 *** 59.2616 *** 59.6996 *** 58.7647 *** 59.1942 *** 
  (6.8809) (6.8743) (6.8730) (6.8871) (6.8739) 
Constant 
(Sigma) 
31.6898 *** 31.7237 *** 31.6915 *** 31.6368 *** 31.6861 *** 
  (0.7518) (0.7526) (0.7518) (0.7505) (0.7517) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 130.59 127.93 130.39 134.75 130.32 
Pseudo R2 0.0131 0.0128 0.0130 0.0135 0.0130 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table H.8 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (51 – 55) 
Variables HBC(51)  HBC (52)  HBC (53)  HBC(54)  HBC (55)   
Grant3t -4.2386 *** -3.9551 *** -3.8074 *** -3.7914 *** -3.6258 *** 
  (0.8969 ) (0.8783 ) (0.8694 ) (0.8867) (0.8776) 
[Grant3t]2 0.3449 *** 0.3266 *** 0.3157 *** 0.3091 *** 0.2966 *** 
  (0.0721) (0.0707) (0.0700) (0.0716) (0.0709) 
NbClaimst 0.6004 3.2957 *** 0.5277 3.4367 *** 0.6583 
  (1.2951) (1.1796) (1.2931) (1.1840) (1.2965) 
Aget -2.5327 *** -3.1751 *** -3.3401 *** -2.3124 *** -2.4330 *** 
  (0.8620) (0.9480) (0.9383) (0.8716) (0.8624) 
[Aget]2 0.1580 *** 0.1720 *** 0.1807 *** 0.1474 *** 0.1541 *** 
  (0.0369) (0.0404) (0.0400) (0.0372) (0.0368) 
MaxChairt  -1.4716 -1.6118 -1.5501 -1.6982 -1.6438 
  (1.1541) (1.1626) (1.1500) (1.1653) (1.1525) 
ArtCit3t 1.1047 1.1148 0.9692 1.2919 * 1.1507 
  (0.7273) (0.7338) (0.7264) (0.7366) (0.7289) 
BtwCentArt3t  -16.9000 *** -16.5000 *** -17.2000 *** -15.7000 *** -16.3000 *** 
  (4.5472) (4.5678) (4.5230) (4.5848) (4.5395) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.7200 *** 2.6245 *** 2.7309 *** 2.6525 *** 2.7609 *** 
  (0.8598) (0.8620) (0.8535) (0.8647) (0.8561) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.5145 0.4511 0.4787 0.5102 0.5392 
  (0.7046) (0.7101) (0.7027) (0.7119) (0.7043) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.8259 * 0.9404 ** 0.9125 * 0.8522 * 0.8184 * 
  (0.4750) (0.4774) (0.4723) (0.4794) (0.4741) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Loop 2.9446 2.3415 3.4601 2.0116 3.1531 
  (2.4932) (2.5044) (2.4884) (2.5022) (2.4858) 
dNanoEx 3.0009 3.0058 2.9315 2.8173 2.7432 
  (2.6647) (2.6921) (2.6629) (2.6978) (2.6679) 
dGovAssigneet -15.9000 *** -15.9000 *** -15.7000 *** -16.2000 *** -16.0000 *** 
  (5.5900) (5.6453) (5.5814) (5.6562) (5.5909) 
dAcAssigneet  -50.8000 *** -37.8000 *** -76.6000 *** -1.5398 -39.1000 *** 
  (10.1658) (12.7342) (14.9044) (4.0368) (8.5707) 
dAcAssigneet ×  14.9836 ***  14.6826 ***  14.7581 *** 
NbClaimst (2.9760)  (2.9714)  (2.9712) 
dAcAssigneet  ×  5.3238 *     
Grant3t (2.7534)     
dAcAssigneet ×  -0.4020 *     
[Grant3t]2 (0.2185)     
dAcAssigneet × Aget  4.4093 * 4.6839 **   
   (2.2814) (2.2603)   
dAcAssigneet ×   -0.1311 -0.1447   
[Aget]2  (0.0994) (0.0985)   
dAcAssigneet ×     -4.7374 * -5.1288 * 
BtwCentArt3t    (2.8549) (2.8314) 
Constant 67.0652 *** 65.6480 *** 73.4070 *** 57.3383 *** 64.8543 *** 
  (6.9721) (7.2833) (7.3708) (6.9567) (7.0421) 
Constant (Sigma) 31.3256 *** 31.6192 *** 31.2749 *** 31.6861 *** 31.3353 *** 
  (0.7430) (0.7500) (0.7417) (0.7517) (0.7432) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 155.58 135.68 160.05 130.47 155.07 
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Table H.8 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (51 – 55) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HBC(51)  HBC (52)  HBC (53)  HBC(54)  HBC (55)   
Pseudo R2 0.0155 0.0136 0.0160 0.0130 0.0155 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table H.9 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (56 – 59) 
Variables HBC (56)  HBC (57)  HBC (58)  HBC (59)  
Grant3t -4.0946 *** -3.9388 *** -4.0898 *** -3.8686 *** 
  (0.8784 ) (0.8703) (0.9069) (0.9286) 
[Grant3t]2 0.3323 *** 0.3211 *** 0.3281 *** 0.3085 *** 
  (0.0707) (0.0700) (0.0734) (0.0754) 
NbClaimst 3.1936 *** 0.5383 0.7067 0.2428 
  (1.1790) (1.2927) (1.2855) (1.2985) 
Aget -2.3128 *** -2.4395 *** -3.2094 *** -3.1365 *** 
  (0.8685) (0.8603) (0.9340) (0.9377) 
[Aget]2 0.1432 *** 0.1501 *** 0.1771 *** 0.1757 *** 
  (0.0371) (0.0368) (0.0398) (0.0400) 
MaxChairt  -1.7352 -1.6696 -1.5766 -1.6243 
  (1.1619) (1.1503) (1.1465) (1.1453) 
ArtCit3t 1.0412 0.9159 0.9918 1.0741 
  (0.7346) (0.7277) (0.7244) (0.7250) 
BtwCentArt3t  -14.9000 *** -15.7000 *** -15.7000 *** -15.7000 *** 
  (4.5802) (4.5396) (4.5393) (4.5549) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.3807 *** 2.5018 *** 2.6370 *** 2.6822 *** 
  (0.8642) (0.8564) (0.8582) (0.8605) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.6146 0.6269 0.6520 0.8250 
  (0.7111) (0.7042) (0.7012) (0.7056) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.5634 0.5688 0.5085 0.4147 
  (0.4906) (0.4857) (0.4881) (0.4936) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Loop 2.8418 3.8875 3.3375 3.3425 
  (2.5007) (2.4860) (2.4846) (2.4797) 
dNanoEx 2.8445 2.8058 2.6014 2.9614 
  (2.6879) (2.6607) (2.6484) (2.6560) 
dGovAssigneet -16.7000 *** -16.4000 *** -16.3000 *** 31.3499 
  (5.6432) (5.5839) (5.5448) (54.3388) 
dAcAssigneet -10.6000 *** -46.6000 *** -81.0000 *** -81.3000 *** 
  (3.1480) (8.1987) (15.4894) (15.4607) 
dGovAssigneet ×     20.0903 ** 
NbClaimst    (9.0790) 
dAcAssigneet ×   14.1339 *** 14.7948 *** 15.2454 *** 
NbClaimst  (2.9714) (2.9631) (2.9605) 
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t    -3.2276 
     (5.3123) 
dGovAssigneet  ×     0.2669 
[Grant3t]2    (0.4376) 
dGovAssigneet × Aget    -14.2000 
     (9.9306) 
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Table H.9 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (56 – 59) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HBC (56)  HBC (57)  HBC (58)  HBC (59)  
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2    0.4777 
     (0.3945) 
dGovAssigneet ×     8.1352 
BtwCentArt3t    (40.9264) 
dGovAssigneet ×      -2.2146 
[BtwCentArt3t]2    (8.8466) 
dGovAssigneet ×     0.0089 
BtwCentPat3t    (6.7304) 
dAcAssigneet  × Grant3t   5.4869 * 5.2856 * 
    (2.9158) (2.9123) 
dAcAssigneet ×    -0.4137 * -0.3950 * 
[Grant3t]2   (0.2334) (0.2333) 
dAcAssigneet × Aget   4.5052 * 4.4055 * 
    (2.3014) (2.2964) 
dAcAssigneet × [Aget]2   -0.1259 -0.1233 
    (0.1001) (0.0999) 
dAcAssigneet ×    -6.2813 ** -6.6850 ** 
BtwCentArt3t   (3.0206) (3.0316) 
dAcAssigneet ×  4.8062 *** 4.3437 *** 3.8620 ** 3.9386 ** 
BtwCentPat3t (1.6141) (1.6010) (1.6289) (1.6251) 
Constant 60.0498 *** 67.2892 *** 72.0060 *** 71.6971 *** 
  (6.8519) (6.9503) (7.3607) (7.3824) 
Constant (Sigma) 31.5948 *** 31.2752 *** 31.0518 *** 30.9396 *** 
  (0.7495) (0.7418) (0.7363) (0.7336) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 136.55 159.13 175.35 184.08 
Pseudo R2 0.0136 0.0159 0.0175 0.0184 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table H.10 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (60 – 64) 
Variables HBC (60)  HBC (61)  HBC (62)  HBC (63)  HBC (64)  
Grant3t -3.9237 *** -3.8936 *** -3.8166 *** -3.9207 *** -3.8036 *** 
  (0.8887) (0.8837) (0.9022) (0.8837) (0.8893) 
[Grant3t]2 0.3218 *** 0.3214 *** 0.3166 *** 0.3244 *** 0.3123 *** 
  (0.0716) (0.0712) (0.0728) (0.0712) (0.0718) 
Aget -2.6292 *** -2.4565 *** -2.4699 *** -2.3773 *** -2.4380 *** 
  (0.8776) (0.8745) (0.8747) (0.8788) (0.8744) 
[Aget]2 0.1635 *** 0.1533 *** 0.1540 *** 0.1507 *** 0.1522 *** 
  (0.0374) (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0376) (0.0373) 
MaxChairt  -1.4991 -1.6456 -1.6580 -1.6597 -1.6688 
  (1.1760) (1.1705) (1.1706) (1.1704) (1.1718) 
ArtCit3t 1.0040 1.1105 1.1135 1.1187 1.1279 
  (0.7401) (0.7374) (0.7383) (0.7371) (0.7387) 
BtwCentArt3t  -17.9000 *** -16.4000 *** -16.3000 *** -16.5000 *** -16.2000 *** 
  (4.6017) (4.5959) (4.5976) (4.5944) (4.6194) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.9291 *** 2.6312 *** 2.6193 *** 2.6303 *** 2.6318 *** 
  (0.8682) (0.8676) (0.8684) (0.8672) (0.8710) 
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Table H.10 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (60 – 64) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HBC (60)  HBC (61)  HBC (62)  HBC (63)  HBC (64)  
CliqnessArt3t  0.4086 0.3507 0.3357 0.3541 0.3838 
  (0.7164) (0.7136) (0.7141) (0.7133) (0.7151)  
BtwCentPat3t 1.2660 *** 0.9387 * 0.9523 ** 0.9360 * 0.9038 * 
  (0.4741) (0.4805) (0.4839) (0.4805) (0.4816) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Loop 1.8361 2.1374 2.0690 2.0855 2.1823 
  (2.4658) (2.5109) (2.5135) (2.5104) (2.5105) 
dNanoEx 4.4030 4.2896 4.2397 4.4691 * 4.2677 
  (2.6845) (2.6700) (2.6711) (2.6735) (2.6730) 
dGovAssigneet  -16.1000 *** -11.7000 43.7205 -8.8515 
   (5.6825) (10.0170) (52.9790) (8.6678) 
dAcAssigneet  -6.5898 ** -6.6045 ** -6.5599 ** -6.6154 ** 
   (2.8263) (2.8261) (2.8258) (2.8252) 
dGovAssigneet ×    -2.2185   
Grant3t   (4.8088)   
dGovAssigneet ×    0.1418   
[Grant3t]2   (0.3842)   
dGovAssigneet ×     -9.3993  
Aget    (8.8144)  
dGovAssigneet ×     0.3402  
[Aget]2    (0.3493)  
dGovAssigneet ×      9.3953 
BtwCentArt3t     (37.8921) 
dGovAssigneet ×       -3.4049 
BtwCentArt3t]2     (8.1145) 
Constant 66.2845 *** 68.0948 *** 68.0450 *** 67.6018 *** 67.7868 *** 
  (6.1057) (6.1145) (6.1150) (6.1272) (6.1215) 
Constant (Sigma) 32.0237 *** 31.8401 *** 31.8362 *** 31.8233 *** 31.8258 *** 
  (0.7599) (0.7555) (0.7554) (0.7550) (0.7551) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 107.47 119.90 120.26 121.24 121.15 
Pseudo R2 0.0107 0.0120 0.0120 0.0121 0.0121 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table H.11 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (65 – 68)  
Variables HBC (65)  HBC (66)  HBC (67)  HBC (68)   
Grant3t -3.8780 *** -3.7441 *** -4.2118 *** -3.8759 *** 
  (0.8839) (0.9028) (0.9094) (0.8809) 
[Grant3t]2 0.3189 *** 0.3093 *** 0.3454 *** 0.3216 *** 
  (0.0713) (0.0729) (0.0732) (0.0710) 
Aget -2.4326 *** -2.3729 *** -2.4707 *** -3.2657 *** 
  (0.8752) (0.8784) (0.8742) (0.9508) 
[Aget]2 0.1520 *** 0.1508 *** 0.1556 *** 0.1779 *** 
  (0.0374) (0.0376) (0.0373) (0.0405) 
MaxChairt  -1.6426 -1.7066 -1.5463 -1.6098 
  (1.1703) (1.1712) (1.1718) (1.1667) 
ArtCit3t 1.1203 1.1393 1.1443 1.0201 
  (0.7375) (0.7390) (0.7371) (0.7356) 
BtwCentArt3t  -16.4000 *** -16.2000 *** -16.4000 *** -16.8000 *** 
  (4.5951) (4.6174) (4.6100) (4.5827) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.6387 *** 2.6321 *** 2.6205 *** 2.6589 *** 
  (0.8676) (0.8713) (0.8717) (0.8649) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.3574 0.3720 0.3495 0.3288 
  (0.7136) (0.7158) (0.7136) (0.7112) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.9097 * 0.8932 * 0.9095 * 0.9713 ** 
  (0.4828) (0.4852) (0.4821) (0.4790) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0011 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Loop 2.1610 2.0591 1.7792 2.2543 
  (2.5107) (2.5104) (2.5205) (2.5130) 
dNanoEx 4.3212 4.4552 * 4.3391 4.2627 
  (2.6700) (2.6821) (2.6679) (2.6639) 
dGovAssigneet -18.0000 *** 47.8149 -16.2000 *** -15.9000 *** 
  (6.4932) (55.4965) (5.6767) (5.6636) 
dAcAssigneet -6.6211 ** -6.6002 ** -9.7915 -38.4000 *** 
  (2.8263) (2.8234) (6.2558) (12.7722) 
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t  -1.6595    
   (5.3803)   
dGovAssigneet × [Grant3t]2  0.0772   
   (0.4394)   
dGovAssigneet × Aget  -7.0349   
   (9.4843)   
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2  0.2104   
   (0.3811)   
dGovAssigneet ×   15.8289   
BtwCentArt3t  (41.8044)   
dGovAssigneet ×    -4.9212   
[BtwCentArt3t]2  (8.9784)   
dGovAssigneet ×  3.2064 5.0386   
BtwCentPat3t (5.3479) (6.4935)   
dAcAssigneet  × Grant3t   4.0620  
    (2.7805)  
dAcAssigneet  × [Grant3t]2   -0.3186  
    (0.2209)  
dAcAssigneet × Aget    4.4918 ** 
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Table H.11 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
backward citations [HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (65 – 68) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HBC (65)  HBC (66)  HBC (67)  HBC (68)   
     (2.2888) 
dAcAssigneet × [Aget]2    -0.1349 
     (0.0998) 
Constant 68.0711 *** 67.2377 *** 68.2986 *** 74.5623 *** 
  (6.1136) (6.1325) (6.1241) (6.5683) 
Constant (Sigma) 31.8345 *** 31.7918 *** 31.8062 *** 31.7309 *** 
  (0.7553) (0.7543) (0.7547) (0.7528) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 120.26 123.63 122.04 127.89 
Pseudo R2 0.0120 0.0124 0.0122 0.0128 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table H.12 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] – Tobit results HFC (19 – 23) 
Variables HFC (19)  HFC (20)  HFC (21)  HFC (22)  HFC (23)  
Grant3t -0.2675 -0.2787 -0.3451 -0.3180 -0.2631 
  (0.2524) (0.2526) (0.2584) (0.2527) (0.2532) 
Aget -6.9610 *** -6.9142 *** -6.8790 *** -6.7160 *** -6.9094 *** 
  (1.2161) (1.2167) (1.2160) (1.2191) (1.2157) 
[Aget]2 0.3348 *** 0.3344 *** 0.3325 *** 0.3223 *** 0.3344 *** 
  (0.0515) (0.0515) (0.0515) (0.0517) (0.0515) 
MaxChairt  0.6491 0.6359 0.6517 0.7172 0.6737 
  (1.4042) (1.4046) (1.4035) (1.4013) (1.4049) 
ArtCit3t 5.9785 ** 5.9387 ** 5.9346 ** 5.7786 ** 5.8239 ** 
  (2.3217) (2.3225) (2.3210) (2.3188) (2.3253) 
[ArtCit3t]2 -1.1393 ** -1.1414 ** -1.1342 ** -1.1041 * -1.1185 ** 
  (0.5653) (0.5652) (0.5648) (0.5641) (0.5656) 
BtwCentArt3t  -0.4260 -0.4024 -0.3281 -0.2372 -0.5590 
  (1.4866) (1.4864) (1.4865) (1.4847) (1.4968) 
CliqnessArt3t  -1.1849 -1.1496 -1.1030 -1.1864 -1.1915 
  (0.8473) (0.8477) (0.8473) (0.8469) (0.8487) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.7028 0.7235 0.6448 0.6710 0.7515 
  (0.5729) (0.5831) (0.5862) (0.5818) (0.5837) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Loop -3.6996 -4.2953 -4.1195 -4.1290 -4.3467 
  (2.9738) (3.0501) (3.0508) (3.0412) (3.0495) 
dNanoEx -7.0340 ** -6.9694 ** -6.9305 ** -7.2687 ** -7.0393 ** 
  (3.2439) (3.2436) (3.2406) (3.2443) (3.2431) 
dGovAssigneet  -2.9325 -14.3000 56.2439 -9.4379 
   (6.8522) (11.6292) (69.0434) (10.1569) 
dAcAssigneet  2.5117 2.5098 2.3280 2.5272 
   (3.4496) (3.4467) (3.4391) (3.4482) 
dGovAssigneet ×    1.5028   
Grant3t   (1.2434)   
dGovAssigneet × Aget    -15.1000  
     (12.2114)  
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Table H.12 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] – Tobit results HFC (19 – 23) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HFC (19)  HFC (20)  HFC (21)  HFC (22)  HFC (23)  
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2    0.7724  
     (0.5171)  
dGovAssigneet ×      6.1288 
BtwCentArt3t     (7.1054) 
Constant 123.0000 *** 122.0000 *** 123.0000 *** 122.0000 *** 123.0000 *** 
  (8.0555) (8.0974) (8.0923) (8.1083) (8.0956) 
Constant (Sigma) 36.4504 *** 36.4351 *** 36.4065 *** 36.3276 *** 36.4194 *** 
  (1.0457) (1.0454) (1.0445) (1.0421) (1.0449) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 
       
Chi Square 76.5717 77.3430 78.8039 82.5109 78.0882 
Pseudo R2 0.0100 0.0101 0.0103 0.0108 0.0102 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table H.13 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] – Tobit results HFC (24 – 27) 
Variables HFC (24)  HFC (25)  HFC (26)  HFC (27)  
Grant3t -0.3598 -0.3523 -0.3169 -0.2721 
  (0.2534 ) (0.2572) (0.2656) (0.2526) 
Aget -6.7849 *** -6.6194 *** -6.9522 *** -7.4654 *** 
  (1.2134) (1.2134) (1.2208) (1.3482) 
[Aget]2 0.3266 *** 0.3179 *** 0.3361 *** 0.3506 *** 
  (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0517) (0.0566) 
MaxChairt  0.6912 0.8058 0.6194 0.6770 
  (1.3995) (1.3967) (1.4051) (1.4046) 
ArtCit3t 5.8664 ** 5.5605 ** 5.9062 ** 5.8207 ** 
  (2.3159) (2.3142) (2.3233) (2.3246) 
[ArtCit3t]2 -1.1135 ** -1.0478 * -1.1325 ** -1.1235 ** 
  (0.5633) (0.5627) (0.5654) (0.5654) 
BtwCentArt3t  -0.2124 -0.4060 -0.3786 -0.5409 
  (1.4820) (1.4882) (1.4870) (1.4904) 
CliqnessArt3t  -1.1128 -1.2085 -1.1346 -1.1632 
  (0.8440) (0.8454) (0.8482) (0.8474) 
BtwCentPat3t 0.5816 0.6037 0.6905 0.7502 
  (0.5830) (0.5840) (0.5872) (0.5830) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Loop -4.0799 -4.0863 -4.2955 -4.1032 
  (3.0383) (3.0317) (3.0496) (3.0696) 
dNanoEx -6.8987 ** -7.2449 ** -6.9448 ** -6.9400 ** 
  (3.2317) (3.2357) (3.2436) (3.2441) 
dGovAssigneet -13.4000 * 47.8610 -2.9748 -2.8286 
  (7.7535) (71.0240) (6.8511) (6.8462) 
dAcAssigneet 2.3178 2.2525 -0.6713 -16.9000 
  (3.4359) (3.4252) (7.6453) (16.7846) 
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Table H.13 : Impact of academic assignees and government assignees on the Herfindahl index of 
forward citations [HerfIndexFCit5t] – Tobit results HFC (24 – 27) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HFC (24)  HFC (25)  HFC (26)  HFC (27)  
dGovAssigneet × Grant3t  0.0303   
   (1.3799)   
dGovAssigneet × Aget  -16.3000   
   (12.6826)   
dGovAssigneet × [Aget]2  0.7829   
   (0.5418)   
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentArt3t  11.7759   
   (7.4203)   
dGovAssigneet × BtwCentPat3t 28.4374 ** 26.3826 **   
  (11.9891) (12.5547)   
dAcAssigneet  × Grant3t   0.3364  
    (0.7220)  
dAcAssigneet × Aget    2.6324 
     (3.0245) 
dAcAssigneet × [Aget]2    -0.0739 
     (0.1324) 
Constant 122.0000 *** 122.0000 *** 123.0000 *** 127.0000 *** 
  (8.0669) (8.0723) (8.1652) (8.9103) 
Constant (Sigma) 36.2965 *** 36.1841 *** 36.4300 *** 36.4111 *** 
  (1.0408) (1.0376) (1.0453) (1.0446) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 86.0052 90.6246 77.5596 79.2735 
Pseudo R2 0.0112 0.0118 0.0101 0.0104 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table H.14 : Impact of patent–grant pairs on the Herfindahl index of backward citations 
[HerfIndexBWCitt]– Tobit results HBC (69 – 71) 
Variables HBC (69) HBC (70) HBC (71) 
Grant3t -3.8546 *** -3.8523 *** -3.8469 *** 
  (0.8820) (0.8820 ) (0.8828) 
[Grant3t]2 0.3186 *** 0.3182 *** 0.3177 *** 
  (0.0713) (0.0713) (0.0713) 
(NbClaimst) 3.3550 *** 3.3541 *** 3.3579 *** 
  (1.1886) (1.1886) (1.1888) 
Aget -2.4556 *** -2.4243 *** -2.4115 *** 
  (0.8718) (0.8758) (0.8804) 
[Aget]2 0.1531 *** 0.1515 *** 0.1510 *** 
  (0.0373) (0.0375) (0.0376) 
MaxChairt  -1.5212 -1.5325 -1.5329 
  (1.1711) (1.1714) (1.1714) 
ArtCit3t 1.2478 * 1.2473 * 1.2488 * 
  (0.7365) (0.7364) (0.7365) 
BtwCentArt3t -16.8000 *** -16.8000 *** -16.8000 *** 
  (4.5891) (4.5913) (4.5912) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.7211 *** 2.7329 *** 2.7329 *** 
  (0.8636) (0.8641) (0.8641) 
CliqnessArt3t 0.3912 0.3855 0.3970 
  (0.7152) (0.7153) (0.7199) 
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Table H.14 : Impact of patent–grant pairs on the Herfindahl index of backward citations 
[HerfIndexBWCitt]– Tobit results HBC (69 – 71) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HBC (69) HBC (70) HBC (71) 
BtwCentPat3t 1.0899 ** 1.1000 ** 1.0950 ** 
  (0.4780) (0.4787) (0.4800) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
dAcAssigneet -3.3386 -3.4080 -3.4053 
  (2.3656) (2.3728) (2.3729) 
dNanoEx 2.9421 2.8557 2.8642 
  (2.7100) (2.7197) (2.7203) 
dPGPt  1.9509 5.1673 
   (5.2071) (23.1908) 
dPGPt × CliqnessArt3t    -0.7388 
    (5.1905) 
Constant 58.6359 *** 58.4885 *** 58.3656 *** 
  (6.9144 ) (6.9254) (6.9791) 
Constant (Sigma) 31.8911 *** 31.8899 *** 31.8895 *** 
  (0.7567) (0.7567) (0.7566) 
Statistics    
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 116.91 117.051 117.071 
Pseudo R2 0.0117 0.0117 0.0117 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table H.15 : Impact of patent–grant pairs on the Herfindahl index of backward citations 
[HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (72 – 74) 
Variables HBC (72) HBC (73) HBC (74) 
Grant3t -3.8361 *** -3.8807 *** -3.8748 *** 
  (0.8829) (0.8861) (0.8863) 
[Grant3t]2 0.3169 *** 0.3213 *** 0.3207 *** 
  (0.0713) (0.0716) (0.0717) 
NbClaimst 3.2788 *** 3.2655 *** 3.2699 *** 
  (1.2047) (1.2046) (1.2046) 
Aget -2.4215 *** -2.4025 *** -2.3676 *** 
  (0.8757) (0.8774) (0.8842) 
[Aget]2 0.1514 *** 0.1504 *** 0.1491 *** 
  (0.0375) (0.0376) (0.0378) 
MaxChairt  -1.5288 -1.5092 -1.5098 
  (1.1713) (1.1717) (1.1717) 
ArtCit3t 1.2544 * 1.2202 * 1.2191 * 
  (0.7366) (0.7384) (0.7384) 
BtwCentArt3t -16.8000 *** -17.1000 *** -17.1000 *** 
  (4.5916) (4.6010) (4.6013) 
[BtwCentArt3t]2 2.7412 *** 2.7556 *** 2.7570 *** 
  (0.8643) (0.8644) (0.8644) 
CliqnessArt3t  0.3798 0.3913 0.4194 
  (0.7154) (0.7154) (0.7208) 
BtwCentPat3t 1.0997 ** 1.1174 ** 1.1067 ** 
  (0.4787) (0.4795) (0.4806) 
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Table H.15 : Impact of patent–grant pairs on the Herfindahl index of backward citations 
[HerfIndexBWCitt] – Tobit results HBC (72 – 74) (Cont’d and end) 
Variables HBC (72) HBC (73) HBC (74) 
CliqnessPat3t 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
dAcAssigneet -3.5178 -3.4815 -3.4748 
  (2.3901) (2.3901) (2.3901) 
dNanoEx 2.7683 2.8721 2.8954 
  (2.7291) (2.7337) (2.7345) 
dPGPt -5.3643 -8.3549 -1.5733 
  (19.9155) (20.5129) (29.5809) 
dPGPt × CliqnessArt3t    -1.7204 
    (5.4069) 
dPGPt ×  NbClaimst  2.6957 2.3746 2.4420 
  (7.0838) (7.0980) (7.1008) 
dPGPt × BtwCentArt3t  5.9256 6.2607 
   (9.9508) (10.0059) 
dPGPt × [BtwCentArt3t]2  -0.0471 -0.0433 
   (0.1655) (0.1659) 
Constant 58.6333 *** 58.6444 *** 58.3535 *** 
  (6.9351) (6.9360) (6.9958) 
Constant (Sigma) 31.8868 *** 31.8795 *** 31.8777 *** 
  (0.7566) (0.7564) (0.7564) 
Nb observations 1110 1110 1110 
Chi Square 117.196 117.662 117.763 
Pseudo R2 0.0117 0.0118 0.0118 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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APPENDIX I – T-TEST AND TEST OF VARIANCE 
 
Table I.1 : Mean comparison between patent–paper pairs / non-patent–paper pairs groups for 
forward citation 
Over Nb Observations Mean Std.Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
(NbFCit5t)]      
No patent–paper pairs 940 0.6073 0.0233 0.5615 0.6530 
Patent–paper pairs 170 0.5471 0.0465 0.4558 0.6383 
 
Table I.2 : Test of variances for patent–paper pairs / non-patent–paper pairs 
Group Obs Mean Std.Err. Std.Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
No patent–paper pairs 940 0.6073 0.0233 0.7151 0.5615 0.6530 
Patent–paper pairs 170 0.5471 0.0465 0.6063 0.4553 0.6389 
Combined 1110 0.5980 0.0210 0.6996 0.5568 0.6392 
ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                                   f =   1.3914 
Ho: ratio = 1                                                             degrees of freedom = 939, 169 
Ha: ratio < 1                  Ha: ratio!= 1                      Ha: ratio > 1 
Pr(F < f) = 0.9961         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.0078           Pr(F > f) = 0.0039 
 
Table I.3 : Two-sample t-test with equal variances patent–paper pairs / non-patent–paper pairs 
Group Obs Mean Std.Err. Std.Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
No patent–paper pairs 940 0.6073 0.0233 0.7151 0.5615 0.6530 
Patent–paper pairs 170 0.5471 0.0465 0.6063 0.4553 0.6389 
Combined 1110 0.5980 0.0210 0.6996 0.5568 0.6392 
Diff  0.0602 0.0583  -0.0542 0.1746 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                       t =   1.0321 
Ho: diff = 0                                                             degrees of freedom = 1108 
Ha: diff < 0                   Ha: diff != 0                      Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.8489         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3022          Pr(T > t) = 0.1511 
 
Table I.4 : Mean comparison between exclusive academic assignees / non-academic assignees 
groups for forward citation  
 Group Obs Mean Std.Err. Std.Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
(NbFCit5t)]       
Not Academic Assignees 1075 0.6019 0.0214 0.7029 0.5598 0.6439 
Academic Assignees 35 0.4802 0.0991 0.5863 0.2788 0.6816 
Combined 1110 0.5980 0.0210 0.6996 0.5568 0.6392 
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Table I.5 : Test of variance for exclusive academic assignees / non-academic assignees 
 Group Obs Mean Std.Err. Std.Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Not Academic Assignees 1075 0.6019 0.0214 0.7029 0.5598 0.6439 
Academic Assignees 35 0.4802 0.0991 0.5863 0.2788 0.6816 
Combined 1110 0.5980 0.0210 0.6996 0.5568 0.6392 
ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                                     f =   1.4374 
Ho: ratio = 1                                                               degrees of freedom = 1074, 34 
Ha: ratio < 1                   Ha: ratio!= 1                        Ha: ratio > 1 
Pr(F < f) = 0.9055         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.1890             Pr(F > f) = 0.0945 
 
Table I.6 : t-test with equal variances for exclusive academic assignees / non-academic assignees 
Group Obs Mean Std.Err. Std.Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Not Academic Assignees 1075 0.6019 0.0214 0.7029 0.5598 0.6439 
Academic Assignees 35 0.4802 0.0991 0.5863 0.2788 0.6816 
Combined 1110 0.5980 0.0210 0.6996 0.5568 0.6392 
Diff  0.1217 0.1202  -0.1141 0.3575 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                        t =   1.0127 
Ho: diff = 0                                                             degrees of freedom = 1108 
Ha: diff < 0                     Ha: diff != 0                    Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.8443         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3114          Pr(T > t) = 0.1557 
 
Table I.7 : Mean comparison between exclusive government assignee / non-government assignee 
groups for forward citations 
Over Nb Observations Mean Std.Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
(NbFCit5t)]       
Not Government Assignees 932 0.6127 0.0233 0.5670 0.6584 
Government Assignees 178 0.5212 0.0476 0.4277 0.6146 
 
Table I.8 : Test of variances for exclusive government assignees / non-government assignees 
Group Obs Mean Std.Err. Std.Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Not Government Assignees 932 0.6127 0.0233 0.7106 0.5670 0.6584 
Government Assignees 178 0.5212 0.0476 0.6354 0.4272 0.6152 
Combined 1110 0.5980 0.0210 0.6996 0.5568 0.6392 
ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                                  f =   1.2507 
Ho: ratio = 1                                                            degrees of freedom = 931, 177 
Ha: ratio < 1                   Ha: ratio!= 1                     Ha: ratio > 1 
Pr(F < f) = 0.9680         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.0639          Pr(F > f) = 0.0320 
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Table I.9 : t-test with unequal variances for exclusive government assignees / non-government 
assignees 
Group Obs Mean Std.Err. Std.Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Not Government Assignees 932 0.6127 0.0233 0.7106 0.5670 0.6584 
Government Assignees 178 0.5212 0.0476 0.6354 0.4272 0.6152 
Combined 1110 0.5980 0.0210 0.6996 0.5568 0.6392 
Diff  0.0915 0.0530  -0.0128 0.1959 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                        t =   1.7267 
Ho: diff = 0                                                             Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 268.74 
Ha: diff < 0                    Ha: diff!= 0                      Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9573         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0854          Pr(T > t) = 0.0427 
 
Table I.10 : Mean estimation for patent–grant pairs / non-patent–grant pairs groups for forward 
citation 
Over Nb Observations Mean Std.Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
(NbFCit5t)]      
No patent–grant pairs 1069  0.6110 0.0214 0.5689 0.6531 
Patent–grant pairs 41 0.2597 0.0879 0.0872 0.4322 
 
Table I.11 : Test of variance for patent–grant pairs / non-patent–grant pairs 
Group Obs Mean Std.Err. Std.Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
No patent–grant pairs 1069 0.6110 0.0214 0.7013 0.5689 0.6531 
Patent–grant pairs 41 0.2597 0.0879 0.5629 0.0821 0.4374 
Combined 1110 0.5980 0.0210 0.6996 0.5568 0.6392 
ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                                   f =   1.5524 
Ho: ratio = 1                                                             degrees of freedom = 1068, 40 
Ha: ratio < 1                  Ha: ratio!= 1                      Ha: ratio > 1 
Pr(F < f) = 0.9585         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.0829           Pr(F > f) = 0.0415 
 
Table I.12 : Test of means if unequal variance between groups for patent–grant pairs / non-
patent–grant pairs 
Group Obs Mean Std.Err. Std.Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
No patent–grant pairs 1069 0.6110 0.0214 0.7013 0.5689 0.6531 
Patent–grant pairs 41 0.2597 0.0879 0.5629 0.0821 0.4374 
Combined 1110 0.5980 0.0210 0.6996 0.5568 0.6392 
Diff  0.3513 0.0905  0.1690 0.5336 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                        t =   3.8824 
Ho: diff = 0                                                             Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 44.8991 
Ha: diff < 0                    Ha: diff != 0                     Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9998         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0003          Pr(T > t) = 0.0002  
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APPENDIX J – STANDARD TERMS, APA FORMAT 
Table J.1 : Guide to usage of en dash (–) and hyphen (-) in key phrases in this research 
University–industry 
linkages 
en dash (–) Refers to the links between university and industry 
Authors-inventors hyphen (-) Refers to authors who are also inventors (same person) 
 Author–inventor en dash (–) Refers to an author who is paired with an inventor 
(different people) 
Patent–paper pair en dash (–) Indicates a pair consisting of a patent and a paper 
Patent–grant pair en dash (–) Indicates a pair consisting of a patent and grant 
Co-authorship hyphen (-) Collaborative network of authors 
Co-invention hyphen (-) Collaborative network of inventors 
Co-assignees hyphen (-) Collaborative network of assignees 
Bayh–Dole Act en dash (–) US legislation allowing public patentees (including 
universities) with government funding to claim private 
patent ownership 
Reference: (Publication manual of the American Psychological Association  2010, p. 97) 
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APPENDIX K – CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
Table K.1 : Correlation matrix of the model linked to patent–paper pairs similarity [Similarityt] 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
[Grant3t] a 1 1        
[Contract3t] a 2 0.5590* 1       
[Contract3Ut-2] a 3 0.6009* 0.5243* 1      
[GrantEI3t-1] a 4 0.4830* 0.3333* 0.3325* 1     
[Aget] a 5 0.0478 0.0302 0.0586 0.1199* 1    
[MaxChairt ] a 6 0.2571* 0.2187* 0.1950* 0.3312* 0.0872* 1   
[ArtCit3t] a 7 0.1705* 0.1824* 0.0949* 0.1194* 0.1932* 0.0890* 1  
[BtwCentArt3t] a 8 0.2231* 0.1762* 0.2408* 0.1738* -0.0104 0.0483 0.4939* 1 
CliqnessArt3t  9 0.0111 0.0743* 0.0433 0.0458 -0.2250* -0.033 0.1018* 0.3290* 
[CliqnessPat3t] a 10 0.1428* -0.015 0.0590* 0.0825* 0.0983* 0.0431 -0.1390* -0.2850* 
[BtwCentPat3t] a 11 -0.3587* -0.1526* -0.2229* -0.0822* 0.0646* -0.0673* 0.1209* 0.1285* 
Loop 12 0.2393* 0.3103* 0.1390* 0.1410* 0.0727* 0.0818* 0.0864* -0.0610* 
dAcAssigneet 13 0.1216* -0.0097 -0.025 0.0636* -0.1127* 0.0391 0.0577 -0.012 
dNanoEx 14 -0.0071 -0.0649* -0.0036 0.0799* 0.0935* -0.0251 -0.0429 0.0108 
Similarityt a 15 0.0856* 0.0177 -0.0223 0.0041 -0.1585* -0.0113 0.1253* 0.1381* 
 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
CliqnessArt3t  9 1       
[CliqnessPat3t] a 10 -0.2286* 1      
[BtwCentPat3t] a 11 0.2561* -0.4697* 1     
Loop 12 -0.1775* 0.0990* -0.1417* 1    
dAcAssigneet 13 -0.1416* 0.1299* -0.2380* 0.2458* 1   
dNanoEx 14 -0.1183* 0.1229* -0.1135* -0.0349 0.0077 1  
Similarityt a 15 0.1314* -0.1021* 0.0334 0.1054* 0.2618* -0.1275* 1 
Note: (a) All the variables have been calculated by Z Score (Z) = x – µ / σ, µ=mean and σ = standard 
deviation. Furthermore, * corresponds to a 1% significance level. 
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Table K.2 : Correlation matrix of the model related to academic [dAcAssigneet] and government assignees [dGovAssigneet] 
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
NbFCit5t 1 1        
NbClaimst 2 0.1166* 1       
HerfIndexFCit5t  3 -0.1213* 0.0288 1      
HerfIndexBWCitt  4 -0.0146 0.1068* 0.0642* 1     
Grant3t 5 0.0359 0.0047 -0.0539 -0.0021 1    
Aget 6 -0.1205* 0.0749* 0.0016 0.1566* 0.0639* 1   
MaxChairt  7 0.0089 0.0041 0.011 -0.0375 0.2571* 0.1194* 1  
ArtCit3t 8 -0.0783* -0.0844* 0.0205 0.0545 0.1705* 0.1773* 0.0890* 1 
BtwCentArt3t 9 0.0468 -0.0993* -0.0071 -0.0095 0.2231* -0.0181 0.0483 0.4939* 
CliqnessArt3t  10 0.0633* -0.1281* -0.0397 -0.0382 0.024 -0.0811* -0.0392 0.1715* 
BtwCentPat3t 11 -0.0493 -0.0446 0.0235 0.0118 -0.3587* 0.1032* -0.0673* 0.1209* 
CliqnessPat3t 12 0.0042 0.0986* 0.0129 0.0860* 0.1428* 0.0695* 0.0431 -0.1390* 
Loop 13 -0.0545 -0.0078 -0.0399 0.0081 0.2393* 0.1028* 0.0818* 0.0864* 
dNanoEx 14 0.1387* 0.1890* -0.025 0.0526 -0.0071 0.0082 -0.0251 -0.0429 
dGovAssigneet 15 -0.0304 0.0025 -0.0367 -0.0920* 0.0109 0.0033 -0.0301 -0.0182 
dAcAssigneet  16 -0.048 -0.0382 -0.002 -0.0814* 0.1629* -0.1085* 0.0427 0.0422 
 
Variables  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
BtwCentArt3t 9 1        
CliqnessArt3t  10 0.3822* 1       
BtwCentPat3t 11 0.1285* 0.2478* 1      
CliqnessPat3t 12 -0.2850* -0.2405* -0.4697* 1     
Loop 13 -0.0610* -0.1069* -0.1417* 0.0990* 1    
dNanoEx 14 0.0108 -0.1055* -0.1135* 0.1229* -0.0349 1   
dGovAssigneet 15 0.0019 0.0151 -0.1060* 0.0306 -0.0973* 0.0176 1  
dAcAssigneet  16 -0.0257 -0.0876* -0.2281* 0.1272* 0.2463* -0.0079 -0.0789* 1 
Note: * corresponds to a 1% significance level. 
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Table K.3 : Correlation matrix of the model including patent–grant pairs [dPGPt] 
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
NbFCit5t 1 1        
NbClaimst 2 0.1166* 1       
HerfIndexFCit5t  3 -0.1213* 0.0288 1      
HerfIndexBWCitt  4 -0.0146 0.1068* 0.0642* 1     
Grant3t 5 0.0359 0.0047 -0.0539 -0.0021 1    
Aget 6 -0.1205* 0.0749* 0.0016 0.1566* 0.0639* 1   
MaxChairt  7 0.0089 0.0041 0.011 -0.0375 0.2571* 0.1194* 1  
ArtCit3t 8 -0.0783* -0.0844* 0.0205 0.0545 0.1705* 0.1773* 0.0890* 1 
BtwCentArt3t 9 0.0468 -0.0993* -0.0071 -0.0095 0.2231* -0.0181 0.0483 0.4939* 
CliqnessArt3t  10 0.0633* -0.1281* -0.0397 -0.0382 0.024 -0.0811* -0.0392 0.1715* 
BtwCentPat3t 11 -0.0493 -0.0446 0.0235 0.0118 -0.3587* 0.1032* -0.0673* 0.1209* 
CliqnessPat3t 12 0.0042 0.0986* 0.0129 0.0860* 0.1428* 0.0695* 0.0431 -0.1390* 
Loop 13 -0.0545 -0.0078 -0.0399 0.0081 0.2393* 0.1028* 0.0818* 0.0864* 
dAcAssignee t  14 -0.0673* -0.0135 0.0144 -0.0712* 0.1325* -0.0716* 0.0383 0.0608* 
dNanoEx 15 0.1387* 0.1890* -0.025 0.0526 -0.0071 0.0082 -0.0251 -0.0429 
dPGPt 16 -0.0947* 0.0317 0.0725* 0.0239 0.0577 0.045 0.0431 0.013 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * corresponds to a 1% significance level. 
Variables  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
BtwCentArt3t 9 1        
CliqnessArt3t  10 0.3822* 1       
BtwCentPat3t 11 0.1285* 0.2478* 1      
CliqnessPat3t 12 -0.2850* -0.2405* -0.4697* 1     
Loop 13 -0.0610* -0.1069* -0.1417* 0.0990* 1    
dAcAssigneet  14 0.0157 -0.0944* -0.2153* 0.0870* 0.2965* 1   
dNanoEx 15 0.0108 -0.1055* -0.1135* 0.1229* -0.0349 0.0041 1  
dPGPt 16 -0.004 -0.0322 -0.0995* 0.0451 0.0202 0.0925* 0.1068* 1 
